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ABSTRACT

Designed to assist police departments in improving the productivity of their patrol operations, this volume on specialized patrol and a companion volume on routine patrol operations are intended for use by various sizes of departments. The volume of specialized patrol focuses upon the appropriate use and effective operation of specialized patrol units. It emphasizes that specialized patrol should be considered when the best efforts of routine patrol officers to cope with particular crime problems are being frustrated by call for service response demands and by the inability of uniformed officers to employ the appropriate crime-related tactics. The volume includes a thorough discussion of and presents specific recommendations regarding the planning, implementation, deployment, tactics, and evaluation of specialized patrol operations. Appended are a chart showing specialized patrol operations (names of units, principal target crimes, and principal tactics) for departments in ten different U.S. cities, (2) model guidelines for control of expenditures from an informants' fund, and (3) an annotated bibliography on specialized patrol. (Volume I, available separately, focuses on the major issues of patrol productivity and recommends a number of steps patrol administrators can take to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of routine uniformed patrol operations.) (JT)

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PRESCRIPTIVE PACKAGE
Improving Patrol Productivity
Volume II
SPECIALIZED PATROL

by

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July 1977

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ABSTRACT

Improving patrol productivity depends upon the efficient utilization and management of patrol officers' time. A thorough workload analysis, a precise, up-to-date characterization of a jurisdiction's crime problems, and the close coordination of routine and specialized patrol operations are viewed as the essential underpinnings of an effective patrol operation.

Routine Patrol, Volume I of this report, focuses upon the general patrol division, recommending specific steps which departments of all sizes can take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. Included are detailed discussions of patrol workload analysis as the basis for developing efficient and effective deployment schemes; the management of call for service workload and the prioritization of calls for service; the use of crime analysis in support of routine patrol operations; and the conduct of pre-planned and directed prevention, deterrence, and apprehension activities. The volume concludes with the presentation of selected case studies of departments which have implemented many of the approaches outlined, and with a discussion of the major issues faced in planning, implementing, and evaluating changes in the patrol function.

Specialized Patrol, Volume II of this report, focuses upon the appropriate use and effective operation of specialized patrol units. It emphasizes that specialized patrol should be considered when the best efforts of routine patrol officers to cope with particular crime problems are being frustrated by call for service response demands and by the inability of uniformed officers to employ the appropriate crime related tactics. The volume includes a thorough discussion of and presents specific recommendations regarding the planning, implementation, deployment, tactics, and evaluation of specialized patrol operations.

Because of the essential interrelationship between routine and specialized patrol, because they represent different approaches to the attainment of similar goals, the two volumes should appropriately be used in conjunction with one another.

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PREFACE

This is the second volume in a two-volume publication on routine and specialized patrol operations. Its goal is to assist departments in improving the productivity of their patrol operations, the single most costly aspect of policing.

Routine and specialized patrol share the principal goals of criminal apprehension and crime deterrence. Routine patrol operations seek to realize these goals by implementing deterrence and apprehension tactics while providing mobile responses to citizen calls for service. Specialized patrol units, whether they are established on an *ad hoc* basis or on a permanent basis, are relieved of call for service responsibilities in order to concentrate on apprehension and deterrence. Routine patrol units are able to use *only those* short-term tactics which can be employed in periods of time in between calls for service responses, while specialized units are able to employ additional tactics which require longer and more continuous time commitments. Whether routine or specialized patrol represents the most appropriate response to a particular crime problem depends upon the nature of the problem and the tactics which are determined to be most effective in dealing with it. It is essential that patrol administrators understand that specialized patrol operations are conducted within the context of the general patrol division and that the two aspects of patrol must cooperate with one another and coordinate their activities:

- Routine and specialized patrol share the common goals of apprehension and deterrence;
- They have a common concern for generating a high degree of community satisfaction with police services; and
- The tactics employed by each type of patrol can either reinforce or interfere with the tactics of the other.

In addition, both routine and specialized patrol operations must seek to coordinate their activities with those of the detective division.

Volume I of this report, *Routine Patrol*, focuses upon the major issues of patrol productivity and recommends a number of concrete steps patrol administrators can

take to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of uniformed patrol operations. It includes discussions of how to analyze the patrol workload, develop efficient deployment schemes, and manage the service call workload so that officers will have time to implement pre-planned prevention, deterrence, and apprehension oriented activities. It describes how crime analysis can be used to focus routine patrol operations and suggests a number of anti-crime tactics that can be used by patrol officers when they are not responding to calls for service. Finally, the volume outlines the major issues patrol administrators will face in planning, implementing, and evaluating changes in the patrol function.

Volume II, *Specialized Patrol*, presents a discussion of the appropriate use and effective operation of specialized patrol. It points out that specialized patrol should be considered when the best efforts of routine patrol officers to cope with particular crime problems are being frustrated due to frequent interruptions by call for service demands and the inability of uniformed officers to employ certain types of tactics. The volume provides recommendations regarding the planning, implementation, deployment, tactics, and evaluation of specialized patrol operations.

Because of the close interrelationships between routine and specialized patrol, and because they represent different, yet complimentary, approaches to achieving similar goals, the two volumes of this report should appropriately be used in conjunction with one another. Patrol administrators should review the two volumes and reflect carefully upon the ways in which the recommendations and suggestions presented in them might help to improve their patrol operations.

The approaches presented in both volumes in this report, are applicable to departments of various sizes. Departments with more than 20-30 sworn officers should be able to implement most of the recommendations. Smaller departments will also find many useful insights which will help them in improving their patrol operations. The implementation of the approaches and programs discussed in these two volumes requires a firm commitment by the administrators of a department. However, in general, it demands little, if any, commitment of additional funds. In many cases, departments will find that the implementation of the deployment and workload management recommendations contained in Volume I will provide the time needed to undertake a vigorous proactive crime prevention, deterrence, and apprehension program. By operating more efficiently, many department have found it possible to mount an aggressive anti-crime program using both regular uniformed officers and specialized units without increasing the number of patrol personnel or the patrol budget.

This two-volume document presents a comprehensive set of recommendations for improving some of the most critical aspects of the patrol process. These recommendations are based on a state of the art review of patrol operations in many police departments throughout the country and a thorough assessment of recent research and commentary on patrol. Readers who wish to pursue the analytical and empirical underpinnings of many of these recommendations should refer to the following reports prepared under the auspices of the Phase I National Evaluation Program, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration:

- Traditional Preventive Patrol;
- Neighborhood Team Policing;
- Specialized Patrol;
- Crime Analysis in Support of Patrol.

These reports are available in microfiche or on loan in hard copy from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, P. O. Box 24306, Washington, D. C. 20024.

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We sincerely believe that the project benefited greatly from the contributions of all those individuals and departments we have mentioned. Needless to say, the project staff is solely responsible for the contents of these volumes.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A. Defining Specialized Patrol

The purpose of this volume is to present some practical, operationally oriented recommendations for the effective planning, implementation, management and conduct of specialized patrol.

Specialized patrol is defined as the activities of officers who are relieved of the responsibility for handling routine calls for service in order to concentrate on specific crime problems. Its primary purposes are the deterrence of suppressible crimes and the on-site apprehension of offenders. Specialized patrol operations commonly involve the use of decoys, saturation patrol of particular areas, aggressive patrol tactics, and surveillance of suspects and possible crime locations. These operations may be conducted by a specially organized unit or by regular patrol officers on an *ad hoc* basis as the need arises. Specifically excluded from consideration are: (1) the work of officers assigned to general patrol with the responsibility for handling routine calls for service (the subject of Volume I); (2) follow-up investigation of reported crimes, commonly the responsibility of detective divisions; and (3) crime prevention activities such as Operation Identification and Neighborhood Watch.

In general, specialized patrol operations are designed to handle problems and situations which are believed to require more concentrated and coordinated attention than can normally be provided by the general patrol force, and/or which call for tactics such as covert surveillance and decoys, which cannot be used by patrol officers in uniform. Frequently, specialized units are assigned a wide variety of diverse responsibilities including: hostage and sniper situations; V.I.P. protection; riot control; crowd control; and even mountain rescue. However, these special police problems are relatively infrequent occurrences in most jurisdictions. As a result, most specialized units concentrate their efforts on combatting more common types of criminal activity such as robbery, burglary, larceny and rape - the crimes which constitute the most persistently intractable law enforcement problems in most localities. It is the work of specialized units in this area that provides the central focus of this manual. Their responsibilities for handling special or unusual law enforcement situations and non-crime-related tasks will be considered only as they affect the conduct of day-to-day crime control activities

by specialized units.

Specialized patrol operations normally concentrate on what have been termed suppressible crimes. Suppressible crimes are generally considered to include: robbery, burglary, grand theft, petty theft, auto theft, assault and battery, and sex crimes.¹ While the lists of crimes which are believed to be suppressible may vary somewhat from department to department, they all share the underlying concept that suppressible crimes are those which can be significantly impacted by police operations. That is, they commonly occur in locations, under circumstances and/or in patterns which provide the police with a reasonable opportunity for deterring them and, if deterrence fails, for apprehending the offenders. Estimates vary as to the percent of crimes which can be considered to be potentially suppressible. One study suggested that about 40% of all known crimes occur in locations where they can be observed by non-participants and thus potentially suppressed by police activity,² while another placed the figure at approximately 60% for major crimes against persons.³ These are, however, very rudimentary, uncertain estimates. What is important to bear in mind is that the concept of suppressible crime provides only an orienting focus for considering possible target crimes for specialized patrol. Some crimes which are not normally considered to be suppressible may come to occupy the attention of specialized patrol units because of public demands for intensive police action and/or because they happen to be committed in a patterned way which lends itself to response by specialized units. On the other hand, some crimes which are generally felt to be suppressible may occur under conditions which render action by

¹ This list is similar to that used by the San Diego Police Department. See: John E. Boydstun, San Diego Field Interrogation: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1975), p. 27; and to that suggested in a widely used manual on crime analysis, see: George A. Buck, et al., Police Crime Analysis Unit Handbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1973), p. 33.

² J.F. Elliott and Thomas J. Sardino, Crime Control Team: An Experiment in Municipal Police Department Management and Operations (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1971), p. 11.

³ The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 95.

specialized units difficult if not impossible. As a general rule, specialized patrol should concentrate on the types of criminal activity upon which it has the greatest potential for positive impact. These target crimes need to be identified through careful and constant analysis of the levels, types, frequency and location of crime occurrences. They should not be selected merely on the basis of a predetermined list.

B. An Overview of This Volume

This volume has been designed to assist departments in determining if specialized patrol is an appropriate response to the crime problems in their jurisdictions. For departments which are interested in undertaking specialized patrol, this volume will assist them in assessing their needs and capabilities and in establishing and carrying out specialized operations. For departments which have specialized patrol units, this volume will assist them in critically reviewing their operations and improving their effectiveness. The volume does not, however, attempt to offer a blueprint for the successful conduct of specialized patrol. The range in size and orientation of departments throughout the country, the variation in the types of problems faced by different departments, and the rudimentary nature of existing knowledge about specialized patrol would make this impractical at best and probably impossible. In addition, the development, effective implementation, and long-term success of any specialized patrol operation requires that it be carefully tailored to reflect the needs, circumstances, organization and orientation of the individual department in which it is to be implemented. As a result, this volume seeks to assist patrol administrators by reviewing current knowledge about and experience with specialized patrol and presenting the information required to design an operation which will meet the specific needs of a given department and jurisdiction. By doing so, it is hoped that this volume will increase the meaningful exchange of information between departments; stimulate critical and creative thinking about specialized patrol; and provide useful suggestions, insights, and advice which will aid departments in employing specialized patrol to the greatest possible advantage.

The volume has been organized into the following chapters:

Chapter 2: *The General Pros and Cons of Specialization*, presents an overview of the basic issues surrounding the concept of specialization, thereby providing the context for the remaining eight chapters. Its purpose is to introduce the reader to the particular concerns which must be kept in mind in designing, imple-

menting and operating a specialized unit. The chapter first reviews what are believed to be the general advantages of specialization: clear placement of responsibility; heightened officer morale; improved officer training; increased officer and command commitment to assigned responsibilities; and increased public support for the department. It then reviews what are believed to be the general disadvantages of patrol specialization: problems of coordination and cooperation with other units in the department; negative impact upon the morale of routine patrol officers; problems in maintaining unity of command; reduction in general patrol coverage; empire building by specialized units; interference with officer career development; and a negative impact upon the public's image of the department. The chapter argues against the ardent advocacy of either a completely positive or negative attitude toward specialized patrol, since in and of itself, specialization is neither good nor bad. Rather, each department must consider both the pros and cons of specialization in the planning process and the evaluation of ongoing operations.

Chapter 3: *Planning for Specialized Patrol*, focuses on the decision to specialize and the planning, organizational and evaluation considerations involved in that decision, including: the relationship of strategic and tactical objectives to the fundamental goals of the unit; the placement of specialized activities within the department; the flexibility in specialized operations over time and across activities; the alternative types of specialization; and the size of the specialized units. Particular attention is paid to the development of a goal-oriented approach to understanding and conducting specialized patrol.

Chapter 4: *Personnel: Recruitment and Selection, Training, Supervision, and Reassignment*, emphasizes the fact that personnel typically constitutes the most important and expensive resource involved in specialized patrol operations. This chapter discusses personnel under the fairly standard categories of: recruitment and selection, training, supervision, performance evaluation, morale and turnover. It stresses that personnel requirements should be clearly related to the needs of particular types of specialized assignments.

Chapter 5: *Deployment*, concentrates on the decision-making techniques and processes which direct the deployment of officers assigned to specialized duty. Despite the fact that it is the topic of a recent crime analysis plays a central role in this chapter. It represents the most systematic, rational, and often under-utilized method of deploying specialized units.

Chapter 6: *Tactics*, focuses on the practical concerns involved in using both suspect- and location-oriented patrol. Each tactic is discussed in terms of its: objectives, effectiveness, limitations, specific operational characteristics, operational variations, safety, equipment requirements and particular legal concerns. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the compatibility of different tactics with one another, and the flexibility of specialized patrol in using different tactics.

Chapter 7: *Equipment*, discusses the use of equipment in different types of specialized patrol activities. This chapter concentrates on the more general concerns involved in equipment acquisition, maintenance, and utilization.

Chapter 8: *Evaluation of Specialized Patrol Operations*, stresses the importance of the continual evaluation of specialized patrol operations and of the ability of departments to conduct meaningful and useful evaluations without outside assistance. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that by using crime analysis for deployment purposes, departments may already be conducting more evaluation than is sometimes realized.

Chapter 9: *Special Concerns in the Conduct of Specialized Patrol*, places primary emphasis on the problems involved in coordinating and integrating specialized patrol operations with the activities of the regular patrol force and other departmental divisions and units, and on the techniques and procedures for overcoming these problems. The chapter also includes a brief discussion of the effects of specialized patrol on police/ community relations, and the use of specialized patrol in small departments.

C. Using This Manual

The information and ideas presented in this manual were drawn from a wide variety of sources. An extensive review was made of all the available literature related to specialized patrol and of project reports documenting the activities and results of programs supported primarily by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Police Foundation. Site visits were made to 26 departments of various sizes to review on-going programs which appeared to be of particular merit and interest, and telephone interviews were conducted with representatives of numerous other departments and of state planning agencies. During the course of each site visit, information was gathered not only about the specialized patrol unit(s) of interest, but also about the patrol division and department as a whole. This was done in order to develop a complete understanding of the role of the specialized unit(s) within the department, and its (their) linkages with other operational and support activities.

Additionally, in preparing both this volume and its companion, the project staff relied heavily on four recent National Evaluation Program reports on patrol.⁴ These reports provided valuable information about many facets of both routine and specialized patrol, along with comprehensive evaluations of the level and quality of knowledge about the effectiveness of many patrol practices.

Specialized patrol is a relatively new undertaking for most departments and, in common with most aspects of law enforcement, current knowledge about its effective operation is extremely incomplete. As the National Evaluation Program report on specialized patrol concluded:

...no conclusive statement can be made regarding the performance and effectiveness of specialized patrol. Short-term evaluations based on inadequate study designs have left basic assumptions untested and have yielded non-comparable results gleaned from a diversity of measures.⁵

⁴ William G. Gay, H. Talmadge Day, and Jane P. Woodward, National Evaluation Program, Phase I Summary Report: Neighborhood Team Policing (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice, 1977); G. Hobart Reinier, Mark R. Greenlee, Mark H. Gibbons, and Steven P. Marshall, National Evaluative Program, Phase I Summary Report: Crime Analysis in Support of Patrol (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice, forthcoming); Theodore Schell, Don H. Overly, Stephen Schack, Linda L. Stabile, National Evaluation Program, Phase I Summary Report: Traditional Preventive Patrol (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice, 1976); and, Kenneth W. Webb, Barbara J. Sowder, Arthur J. Andrews, Marvin R. Burt, Edward F. Davis, National Evaluation Program, Phase I Summary Report: Specialized Patrol Projects (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice, 1977).

⁵ Kenneth W. Webb, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

As a result of this situation, the information and ideas contained in this volume are not grounded on a firm foundation of careful research and evaluation. Rather, they are based on the data gathered in the field, the findings of the few limited studies which have been conducted to date, the observations and insights of police officials and officers who are experienced in the conduct of specialized patrol, the views of longtime students of police operations, and the judgmental assessments of the project staff. Accordingly, the conclusions presented here do not constitute a set of well-tested, firmly established directions for the effective use of specialized patrol, but rather a series of guidelines and suggestions which experience indicates have contributed substantially to the effectiveness of specialized patrol operations. More definite recommendations will have to await further research. Unfortunately, however, the pressures on most departments are such that they cannot afford to wait before undertaking efforts to improve the crime-related capabilities of patrol.

This manual seeks to cover all facets of specialized patrol, from the initial identification of the need for specialized operations through their planning, implementation, management, deployment, strategies and tactics, equipment and facilities, and evaluation. As indicated above, it is the second in the two-volume publication series. The first volume discusses routine preventive patrol: the activities of uniformed officers assigned to general patrol duty with the responsibility for handling routine calls for service. Specialized patrol is typically conducted within the context of general patrol operations. It normally draws personnel and resources from the patrol division, shares similar goals and objectives, attempts to coordinate its activities with the patrol force, and is generally viewed as playing a supplemental, supportive role to routine patrol. For these reasons, it is important to stress the value of using this volume in concert with the first. This will enable the reader to view specialized patrol as an integral part of a department's entire patrol operation. It will help to suggest ways in which specialized patrol can contribute to overall patrol productivity, and ways in which the two types of patrol complement and reinforce one another. And, since Volume I emphasizes the ability of a department to structure patrol activities in order to provide officers with uninterrupted periods of time for concentration on particular tasks, it will point to ways in which officers can be made available to specialized duty without the need for adding manpower to the patrol force.

CHAPTER 2

THE GENERAL PROS AND CONS OF SPECIALIZATION

Except in the area of investigations, police departments have traditionally been "generalist organizations." The majority of their resources are devoted to general patrol in which each beat officer is held primarily responsible for providing basic law enforcement services within an assigned geographical area. In most departments, it is both an article of faith and an accurate reflection of reality that routine patrol represents the "backbone" of police work and that resources devoted to this task should not, under ordinary circumstances, be diverted to other uses. As a result, recommendations for patrol specialization which carry with them the possibility that officers currently assigned to general patrol duties will be diverted to a special unit have typically been met with skepticism. Generally, patrol administrators have carefully guarded the resources devoted to general patrol, and specialization has been considered only when resources were expanding.

In considering the development of a specialized patrol operation or in rethinking an on-going operation, it may be helpful to bear in mind some basic, fairly well-accepted observations on the general effects of specialization. Most of these points concern the overall organizational consequences of specialization -- its general drawbacks, benefits, and ramifications. As such they constitute the basic issues which have led both to the traditional skepticism concerning specialization and to the more recent advocacy of its use. This overview of basic issues surrounding the concept of specialization sets the context for the rest of this volume, introducing the reader to particular concerns which must be kept in mind in designing, implementing and operating a specialized patrol unit.¹

¹ This section relies heavily on: Kenneth W. Webb, *et al.*, Phase I National Evaluation of Selected Patrol Strategies, Specialized Patrol Operations Under the National Evaluation Program: Product I - Literature Search (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, n.d.), pp. 29-41; G. Douglas Gourley, Effective Police Organization and Management, Vol. 4, Patrol Specialization vs. Generalization (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1966), pp. 333-350; O.W. Wilson, Police Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1950), pp. 26-35; and National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 206-218.

A. The General Advantages of Specialization

The following general advantages are commonly associated with patrol specialization by law enforcement personnel and other authorities on police work:

1. Clear Placement of Responsibility

Specialization places the responsibility for the performance of specific tasks and the achievement of specific objectives on a particular group of officers, their supervisors and commanders. This greatly facilitates the ability of departmental administrators to establish accountability for the performance of these tasks, and it increases their ability to control and assess activities directed at handling particular problems.

2. High Levels of Morale and *Esprit de Corps*

Specialized patrol units are usually comprised of fairly small, cohesive groups of officers who are relieved of the responsibility for handling routine patrol service duties in order to concentrate on crime control. They are able to focus all their efforts on doing what many officers believe to be "real police work." As a result, specialized patrol officers commonly develop a heightened sense of enthusiasm and pride in their work, which contributes to high levels of job satisfaction, morale, and performance. This is especially true when the specialized unit is considered to be an elite group which is difficult to join. The high level of morale is attested to by the low personnel turnover rates in many of these units.

3. Improved Training and Skill Development

Specialization in a narrow area of police work allows for more intensive training than is economically feasible to offer to the entire patrol force. Most specialized patrol units provide their officers with additional training, although the amount, content, and quality of this training varies substantially from unit to unit. Concentration on a few specialized tasks is also thought to allow officers to develop and refine their capabilities, skills, and knowledge. Finally, continual performance of similar tasks and repeated experience in handling similar situations (such as working stake-outs or decoy operations night after night) is thought to contribute both to the development of individual expertise and to the ability of the unit's members to coordinate their activities and work together as a cohesive team.

4. High Level of Staff Commitment to Assigned Responsibilities

Officers in specialized patrol units frequently develop a

strong sense of pride in their unit's ability to handle its assigned responsibilities. They tend to take a proprietary interest in all police activities related to their field of specialization, and actively seek to obtain the resources, authority, and autonomy they feel are needed to achieve their unit's goals and objectives. If not carried to an extreme, this can enhance the unit's performance and stimulate a healthy atmosphere of friendly competition with other units in the department.

5. Positive Public Interest

Specialized patrol operations frequently arouse a considerable amount of positive public interest and media attention. In part, this may stem from their often rather glamorous image as "crime fighters" doing what television has erroneously led the public to believe police work is all about; it can also, perhaps more realistically, flow from the perceived success of their efforts to control crime problems which are of particular concern to the community. Specialized patrol units in Atlanta and New York City, to mention just two jurisdictions, have received a substantial amount of positive public attention which has reflected favorably on the entire department. And in Denver, a specialized unit operating in a single community has been so well received that the residents, in a rather uncommon gesture of support for the police, threatened to demonstrate in front of City Hall should the unit be disbanded.

B. The General Disadvantages of Specialization

The generally perceived advantages of patrol specialization are, unfortunately, accompanied by a number of frequently mentioned potential disadvantages. These potential disadvantages, each of which is discussed below, should be carefully considered by departments. While each represents a real concern, it is emphasized that each can be and has been controlled, if not completely overcome, by departments throughout the country. This has been accomplished by paying careful attention to program planning, personnel management, deployment, use of appropriate tactics, and careful monitoring and evaluation -- the subjects of the following chapters.

1. Problems of Coordination and Cooperation Between Specialized Units and the General Patrol Force

Specialization of the performance of certain patrol tasks may lead general patrol officers to feel that they no longer have any responsibility for the problem areas which are the focus of specialized activities. For example, beat officers may come to believe that if a specialized unit is working on commercial burglaries in their beats, they need not be as diligent in conducting security checks and field interviews in commercial areas. This feeling can be heightened when specialized units sometimes request that beat officers avoid areas in which they are working, and by the not

uncommon tendency of specialized units to take all the credit for success achieved in handling their target problems. On the other hand, specialists are also frequently reluctant to undertake action in areas which are outside their field of expertise. In short, specialization can provide an excuse for both specialists and generalists to avoid unwanted tasks, each arguing that these tasks are the other's responsibility.

In general, by dividing up the responsibility for performing different facets of patrol, specialization can create problems in determining who is responsible for what. It can also involve serious difficulties in coordinating the efforts of specialists and generalists and result in a situation where they work completely independently or even at cross purposes with one another. As one observer put it, "Dividing up the work is easier than putting the parts back together."²

2. Negative Effects on Morale

While specialization may increase the morale of officers assigned to specialized units, it is commonly said to have the opposite effect on the morale of those who remain on general patrol. Despite the fact that general patrol is almost universally heralded as the "mainstay" of police work, general patrol officers occupy one of the lowest rungs in the pay and status hierarchies of most departments. The creation of a specialized, often elite, unit which concentrates principally on crime suppression can have negative implications for the morale and job satisfaction of the vast majority of the patrol force which remains assigned to general patrol duty. Officers in specialized units tend to concentrate on the most exciting aspects of police work, leaving mundane duties of the "cat in the tree" and the hospital run variety to the general patrol force. They are sometimes allowed to turn routine facets of their work, such as report writing and prisoner transport, over to beat officers. They are occasionally paid somewhat more and often have better promotional opportunities than general patrol officers. They frequently have special equipment and facilities and they often work out of uniform. Finally, they are generally selected on a highly competitive basis which can leave them feeling and, all too often acting, superior to their colleagues on general patrol. In short, specialization can be a serious threat to the already low status of general patrol officers. Instead of providing beat officers with needed support in their efforts to cope with beat conditions, as patrol theory argues they should, specialized patrol officers

² Paul M. Whisenand, Police Supervision: Theory and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 192.

frequently reverse the prescribed relationship, using beat officers as they see fit and frequently simply shunting them aside.

All these factors can combine to have a negative impact on the morale of the general patrol force, which can manifest itself in petty jealousy, low performance, and reluctant cooperation between specialized units and beat officers. This is one of the most difficult problems to overcome in operating a specialized unit and it represents a strong argument for undertaking specialized patrol with caution and care.

3. Problems in Maintaining Unity of Command

The generally accepted principle of unity of command asserts that one, and only one, individual should be in command of each police operation and that each officer should be directed by only one superior. Specialization can complicate the unity of command because, of necessity, it involves the delegation of authority and fragmentation of responsibility. The principle of unity of command is particularly difficult to maintain when a specialized unit organized on a departmental or division level conducts operations in concert with officers working under a district or precinct commander. It can also be jeopardized when several specialized units under separate commanders are involved in joint operations. When lines of authority cross, the result can be confusion at best and open friction and conflict at worst. While it is not an insoluble problem, it is widely believed that specialization can substantially complicate the task of command.

4. Reduction in General Patrol Coverage

Unless the level of manpower assigned to the patrol force is increasing (an uncommon situation in most departments today), specialization may detract from the total amount of resources devoted to patrol and result in less intensive general patrol coverage. For administrators committed to the paramount importance of general patrol, this can be a disturbing prospect. In large departments where specialized patrol consumes only a small fraction of the total patrol resources, the reduction in general patrol coverage is normally a relatively minor problem. However, in smaller departments, this can be a serious concern. Careful patrol workload analysis, as described in Volume I of this report, can determine the availability of personnel for specialized assignments.

5. Empire Building by Specialized Units

Specialized units may come to function as organized pressure groups within a department which constantly attempt to expand their size, budget, status, and areas of responsibility

beyond initial intentions. This can lead to internal competition for resources, and it can reduce the extent to which all members of a department are working together toward a common purpose. In addition, once established, specialized units can be very difficult to disband and specialization can also promote further specialization throughout a department as other divisions come to recognize the rewards that can accrue from establishing claim to a limited area of expertise and responsibility.

6. Interference with Officer Development

Officers assigned to specialized units normally develop high levels of expertise in narrow aspects of police work. While this leads to excellent performance of their immediate tasks, the lack of exposure to the full range of departmental operations can interfere with the long-term development of their general leadership and executive capabilities. This problem can be particularly severe if officers are frequently promoted through the ranks of their specialized units and if these units tend to attract the "best" officers on the patrol force. Systematic rotation of officers through various specialized and non-specialized assignments can counteract this problem, but it will cause a department to lose the advantage of the extended use of expertise which may have been developed at considerable cost.

7. Negative Public Attention

The public attention frequently attracted by specialized patrol units can help to enhance the image of the entire department. However, there have been a number of unfortunate cases in which specialized units have aroused considerable hostility from some segments of the community. It can be expected that some hostility and criticism will be generated by any proactive, aggressive police effort to control crime. However, on occasion large segments of the public, and sometimes even of the police themselves, have come to view specialized patrol as the department's shock troops who are not above resorting to rather offensive tactics in handling their assigned duties. This attitude has been the direct cause of the termination of more than a few specialized patrol projects.

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These general advantages and disadvantages of specialization establish a background for considering the planning and implementation of specialized patrol operations. They represent the kinds of issues that need to be addressed in the planning process and the types of concerns which should be kept in mind in reviewing the operation of specialized patrol units,

EXHIBIT 2-1

PATROL SPECIALIZATION

General Advantages

Clear placement of responsibility.

High levels of morale and *esprit de corps*.

Improved training and skill development.

High level of staff commitment to assigned responsibilities.

Positive public interest.

General Disadvantages

Problems of coordination and cooperation between specialized units and the general patrol force.

Negative effects on the morale of general patrol officers.

Problems in maintaining unity of command.

Reduction in general patrol coverage.

Empire building by specialized units.

Interference with officer development.

Negative public attention.

CHAPTER 3

PLANNING FOR SPECIALIZED PATROL

Careful and thorough planning is an essential element in the development and implementation of an effective specialized patrol operation. The quality of planning can make the difference between program success or failure. The planning process concentrates attention on the specific characteristics of local problems. It leads to consideration of the general benefits and drawbacks of specialized patrol as an approach to coping with the identified problem(s), examination of the full ramifications of the decision to undertake specialized operations within a given department, and consideration of the possibility of adapting specialized programs successfully used by other departments to local conditions and capabilities.¹ Finally, if conducted properly, the planning process can contribute greatly to generating support for specialized operations, both within the department and the community it serves.

Simply stated, planning is the process of deciding who will do what, where, when, how, and why. Planning is often portrayed as a straightforward, linear, even mechanistic process through which: problems are identified and analyzed; goals and objectives are established; possible approaches to problem-solving are reviewed; resources and constraints are assessed; the apparently optimal approach is selected and implemented; and procedures are established for monitoring its progress and evaluating its success. In fact, as most experienced administrators know, planning is usually anything but a direct, step-by-step textbook process. Instead, it is often a complex, unpredictable activity in which: the ideas and funding for programs may precede the clear specification of the programs' purpose and desirability; unavoidable time constraints may force the implementation of programs before they have been completely thought through; lack of adequate information may require decisions to be made on the basis of educated guesses and hunches rather than careful analysis; and the preferences and biases of powerful individuals both within and outside the department may force the adoption of certain options and preclude others regardless of the results of problem analysis. Planning can also be a highly political process, the results of which can affect the status and career prospects of members of the department and other public officials. Their concerns

¹ The transfer of exceptional programs from one department to another provides considerable potential for improving law enforcement without continually "re-inventing the wheel." However, the relevance of transferred programs to local needs and capabilities should be clearly established and they should be carefully tailored to fit local conditions.

with personal advantage can seriously interfere with a rational planning process. In short, planning in the real world frequently fails to correspond to the dictates of an ideal rational planning model.

While fully recognizing that it constitutes a prescriptive ideal rather than a completely accurate reflection of most actual planning efforts, it is still useful to set forth on an orderly, step-by-step basis the procedures involved in planning a specialized patrol operation. Although they may not be carried out as directly as they are presented here, these procedures still constitute essential parts of any planning effort, however informal and *ad hoc* it might be. As a general rule, the more conscious and reflective administrators are about the planning process; the more closely they seek to follow the ideal, rational model; and the more aware they are of the implications of deviating from the model; the greater the likelihood that a successful specialized patrol operation will be developed.

This chapter discusses the general process of planning a specialized patrol operation. It presents an overview of the process, leaving consideration of the content of specific decisions about such issues as deployment, training, and personnel selection to later chapters. The chapter is relevant to both departments which are considering the initiation of a new specialized patrol unit and to departments which are experienced in the conduct of specialized patrol. It is strongly believed that planning should be viewed not just as a one-time activity preceding the introduction of a new program, but rather as a continuous, on-going process which both monitors and evaluates the achievement of program goals and objectives, and continually reassesses the relevance of goals and objectives to the needs of the community.

The general planning process itself is viewed as consisting of six (6) discrete steps, each of which is discussed below. These steps are:

- A. Problem identification and analysis;
- B. Establishment of goals and objectives;
- C. Review of possible solutions;
- D. Determination of the size and organizational placement of specialized patrol operations;
- E. Development of evaluation procedures; and
- F. Preparation for implementation.

A. Problem Identification and Analysis

The first step in the planning process is the identification and analysis of a jurisdiction's crime-related problems. Most patrol administrators are painfully aware of the crime problems facing their departments; however, it is still useful to begin planning with a careful analysis of these problems.

As indicated above, specialized units generally concentrate on suppressible crimes, e.g., those crimes such as robbery and burglary which are felt to be at least partially controllable by police activities. Administrators should carefully review all available data on the nature and incidence of these crimes. A trend analysis of crime data, covering a period of several years if possible, should be conducted to establish the patterns of change in the incidence of different types of crime over time. This will serve to point out the jurisdiction's most pressing and persistent problems, and it will suggest the particular crimes which, on the basis of past changes, might be expected to require special attention in the future. This trend analysis should be conducted on a formal, written basis. It is also helpful to supplement it with graphic presentations which permit easy, visual comprehension of changing crime rates.

In conducting this statistical analysis, it is important to keep in mind that the reported crime rate usually understates substantially the actual levels of criminal activity. For example, victimization surveys completed in a number of cities have found that even for serious crimes, such as robbery, 40 to 50% of the actual incidents are not reported to the police.² Generally, it is economically unfeasible to conduct a victimization survey as part of the planning process; however, available evidence indicates that while the per cent of crime which goes unreported varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it is uniformly high in most of them. This factor should be taken into account in estimating the magnitude of the crime problem facing a department.

Public recognition of a particular crime problem and demands that the police take action to deal with it have frequently provided the impetus behind the creation of specialized patrol units. Public demands for special police action are important and legitimate concerns in the process of problem identification and analysis. However, even if these demands are sufficiently pressing to insure,

² See, for example: Crime in Eight American Cities: Advance Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1974), p. 38.

by themselves, that a particular problem will receive special attention, it is still important to conduct an independent analysis of that problem. Public perceptions of crime are frequently inaccurate and can be swayed by media accounts of a few particularly notorious criminal incidents. Reliance on them alone could lead a department to devote more resources to a problem area than are actually required, while diverting attention from equally, if not more important although less publicized problems.

In addition to examining the magnitude of crime problems, this stage of the planning process should also include an analysis of the patterns of criminal activity. Specialized operations are most appropriate for dealing with problems which have an underlying, identifiable pattern, making it possible to identify and forecast, with at least some degree of accuracy, the general times and localities of their most likely occurrence and/or the characteristics of probable perpetrators. Without at least some measure of predictability in criminal activity, it is extremely difficult to effectively plan and direct the activities of officers assigned to specialized patrol duty. This type of analysis can be accomplished by laying out the times and locations of particularly prevalent suppressible crimes. It is sufficient to do this for a small, selected sample of reporting periods, since to conduct this type of analysis for a period of several years would be immensely time-consuming and probably unnecessary to determine for the current period which crimes are sufficiently patterned to provide promising targets for specialized operations. The use of color-coded pin maps, overlay acetate sheets, or computerized crime maps can be helpful in conducting this analysis. In addition, information on the characteristics of criminal suspects can be developed from known offender files, from officers in the detective division, and from beat officers.

Aside from identifying and analyzing prevalent crime problems, it is also important to consider other types of problems which might appropriately be handled by specialized patrol operations. In many departments, specialized units, while concentrating primarily on crime control, are also trained to deal with special events and unusual occurrences such as riots, demonstrations, V.I.P. protection, sniper and hostage situations, etc., which require concentrated police action by specially trained officers for short periods of time. Examination of the past history of problems of this nature and estimation of their probable future occurrence should be included in the problem identification process.

This initial stage of the planning process will probably not be as laborious and time-consuming as it might at first appear. Departments with a crime analysis capability should be able to conduct the analysis readily, and many departments without this capability routinely collect most of the required types of data and

information. Problem identification and analysis is simply a matter of pulling together this material and examining it systematically to determine whether or not there are definable and patterned crime problems and special non-crime related problems which could be effectively addressed through the types of intensive police effort provided by specialized patrol.

Finally, it is important to note that ideally, although often not in practice, this phase of the planning process should be carried out in the absence of any predetermined commitment to undertake specialized patrol operations. Examination of problems is the first step in determining the potential need for specialized patrol. It should be conducted with an open mind, since it is entirely possible that other approaches might prove to be more effective and feasible solutions to the identified problems. In addition, the results of this analysis should be periodically reassessed in order to determine whether or not circumstances have changed sufficiently to merit a change in policy. A unit not needed now may be needed in the future; and a currently operating unit may no longer be needed in the future.

B. Establishing Goals and Objectives

The second phase in the planning process involves the development and specification of the goals and objectives which a department hopes to achieve in addressing the identified problems. Goals represent broad statements of purpose. They commonly take the form of rather general statements which set the overall standards by which the unit will be judged. In formulating goals, it must be kept in mind that their complete achievement will depend upon a number of factors, many of which may be beyond the control of a department. This is especially true for specialized patrol operations, since the level of suppressible crime is a function of many factors, and police activities are only one, and perhaps not even the most important, determinant of the level of crime.

Objectives are more specific statements of purpose which provide reference points in determining goal attainment. The achievement of given objectives represents a positive step toward the attainment of goals. In addition, precisely-stated objectives provide direction to program activities and permit the evaluation of results as compared to expectations. Objectives should be stated in such a way that their realization, at least in theory, is clearly under the control of the department.

Goals and objectives are generally arranged in a hierarchy moving from an overall statement of expected program results

to more specific, detailed activities which are expected to contribute to the achievement of the final results. There are three general types of objectives: one referring to general program outcomes; one referring to more specific program results; and one referring to specific operational resources which must be obtained and activities which must be carried out to accomplish the objectives and achieve the program's goals. These can be termed "strategic, tactical, and operational objectives."³ For example, in professional football, the overall goal of a team may be to have a winning season. More specific objectives would be winning particular games (a strategic objective) and making touchdowns (tactical objectives). Operational objectives would include acquiring certain players, conducting a certain number of practices, etc.⁴

Similarly, in police operations, goal statements set forth the general purpose of a specialized unit, as does the statement, "The purpose of the unit is to reduce the level of robbery and/or burglary." The three types of objectives establish the intended measurable results which are to be accomplished by the unit in seeking to attain its goals.

The first type, the strategic objective, sets forth the measurable impact which the unit is to have upon the target crimes, as does the statement: "The strategic objective of the unit is to disrupt the crime patterns targeted for the unit." The second type of objective, the tactical objective, sets forth the specific results of the unit's activities which are assumed to contribute to the attainment of the strategic objective, as does the statement: "The tactical objective of the unit is to increase the on-site apprehension rate for commercial robberies" (on the assumption that increased apprehensions lead to a disruption of crime patterns). The third type of objective, the operational objective, sets forth the resource and operational requirements for obtaining the tactical objectives, as does the statement, "The operational objective of the

³ There is little consistency in the language used by planners and students of planning in discussing different types of goals and objectives. The terms "goals" and "objectives" are often used interchangeably. Strategic objectives are sometimes called long-range objectives, tactical objectives are sometimes called short-term objectives, and operational objectives are sometimes called activities. Many other terms are also used to make distinctions between different types of goals and objectives. The reader should not allow the differences in terminology in various discussions of planning to become a source of confusion. The basic process of using goals and objectives in planning is fairly well established and does not vary much regardless of the words used to describe it.

⁴ Example drawn for Jack L. Kuykendall and Peter C. Unsinger, Community Police Administration (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975), p. 79.

unit is to establish a group of five appropriately trained and equipped officers to concentrate on commercial robberies." As such, these four levels of goals and objectives constitute a hierarchy. Each level of the hierarchy is derived from the preceding level on the basis of a definition of needs and the articulation of a set of assumptions linking problems to general goals, general goals to quantitative objectives, objectives to specific operational needs and activities. An example of such a hierarchy is presented below:

1. Identified crime problem: a 20% increase in commercial robbery over the previous year and a 33% increase over the year prior to that. Growing public concern about the problem.
2. General departmental goal: the control of suppressible crime.
3. Strategic objective: to disrupt and dissipate the identified patterns of commercial robberies targeted for the unit over the next year.
4. Tactical objectives:
 - a. To increase the on-site apprehension rate over the next year.
 - b. To increase the number of arrests which pass the prosecutor's first screening over the next year.
 - c. To reduce the number and seriousness of injuries to victims of commercial robberies over the next year.
 - d. To reduce the monetary losses resulting from commercial robberies over the next year.
 - e. To increase public awareness of commercial robbery prevention techniques over the next year.
5. Operational objectives:
 - a. To establish a five-officer specialized patrol unit which will concentrate primarily on commercial robbery within two months.
 - b. To place concealed cameras in high-risk establishments within four months.

- c. To begin using mobile alarms to stake out 15 establishments on a rotating basis during high risk times within four months.
- d. To instruct owners and employees of all high risk establishments in robbery prevention techniques and in procedures to follow during an actual robbery within six months.

The specification of goals and objectives, in the above manner, can and should be carried out to a rather fine level of detail, including equipment acquisition, training, deployment, and so on. Individual goals should also be set for each officer and supervisor involved in the operation.

There are a number of general factors which are important to consider in developing goals and objectives for specialized patrol operations:

- The goals and objectives should be consistent with general departmental policies, and they should be clearly and explicitly linked with the goals and objectives of the department as a whole and with those of relevant units. Establishing these ties at the outset can help to avoid future problems in coordination and cooperation. For instance, in the above example, it would be important to specify exactly how the specialized patrol unit views its role *vis-a-vis* that of the robbery squad in the detective division. Both use different types of tactics (stake-outs vs. investigation) to achieve the same strategic objective (e.g., apprehension of commercial robbery suspects). If precise responsibilities are not made clear at the outset, the result can be duplication of effort, poor coordination, and even active interference with each other's work.
- Objectives should be simple, specific, consistent with each other, and, if at all possible, they should be stated in measurable, quantitative terms. Quantification is frequently difficult in assessing police performance, but the clear sense of direction and accountability provided by numerical objectives makes it worthwhile to attempt to develop them whenever possible.
- In establishing the goals and objectives for a specialized unit, it is extremely important that they reflect a realistic assessment of what the unit can be expected to accomplish. In recent years it has been

common for law enforcement agencies to express strategic objectives (and sometimes program goals) in terms of an expected or desired level of reduction in the reported crime rate. Thus, many specialized units have adopted as their strategic objective a statement such as: "The reduction in the rate of reported target crimes by 20% over the preceding year." While this objective is precise and quantified, it can be the cause of considerable difficulty. Of necessity, general goal statements often refer to desired outcomes, such as reductions in crime, which are not entirely under a department's control. However, the attainment of objectives should, at least theoretically, be completely under the control of those responsible for achieving them. Since the level of crime is only partially a function of police activities, it is unrealistic to expect a specialized patrol operation to achieve a predetermined percentage reduction in target crimes over a specified period of time. In addition, since there is no definite way of establishing expected reductions in crime, they are set primarily on the basis of guesswork. And, for new specialized operations in particular, it is common to set rather ambitious objectives in an initial effort to sell the project. This can lead to unwarranted criticism of worthwhile, productive projects for their failure to meet impossibly high objectives.

As an alternative, it is recommended that strategic objectives refer to a specialized operation's success in having a positive impact upon the specific crime patterns it targets. As mentioned above, the presence of these patterns provides the principal rationale for undertaking specialized patrol.

Specialized units can be effective only if their target crimes can, with a reasonable degree of certainty, be determined to occur with sufficient frequency, in a well-defined geographic area, during identifiable periods of the day or night. When such patterns cannot be identified, the concerted effort of a specialized unit cannot be justified. It follows that the strategic objective of a specialized unit should be to disrupt and diffuse identified crime patterns (either through deterrence, apprehension, or displacement efforts) to the point where the continued deployment of the unit in response to these patterns would be inappropriate and unnecessary. As such, the strategic objectives should be stated in pattern-specific terms, emphasizing the disruption of identified crime patterns. While pattern

disruption may in fact mean a reduction in the rate of a targeted crime, monitoring rates alone is not sufficient to determine the efficacy of the continued deployment of the unit against a particular crime pattern. For example, should crime analysis determine that within a three-block area there is a daily (Monday-Friday) occurrence of three to four purse snatches between the hours of 3:00-6:00 p.m., a sufficiently strong pattern might be said to exist to warrant the attention of a specialized unit. If, as a result of the specialized patrol operation, the daily rate does not decline, but rather becomes diffused over a 12-15 hour period (rather than over the original three-hour period), or over a wider geographical area, the unit can be said to have disrupted the pattern to a point where its continued efforts to combat the problem would no longer be very productive. The original pattern will have been disrupted so that it no longer manifests a pattern amenable to specialized patrol operations. In this regard, the unit will have been successful even though the rate of crime may not have declined. When this occurs, the specialized patrol unit should be retargeted, leaving the diffused problem to be handled by either the regular patrol division, the detective division, or an appropriate crime prevention unit.

It is recognized that using pattern specific objectives may not be as easy, nor have the appearance of precision, as simply setting overall crime reduction objectives. However, the impact of specialized operations on crime patterns can be quantified, it can be readily monitored by crime analysis, and it represents a realistic objective which is clearly related to the daily operational realities of specialized patrol.

- Objectives should be time-bound, with definite target dates set for their accomplishment. This will help to insure that all aspects of specialized patrol operations are systematically reviewed on a periodic basis. It will also help to avoid the not uncommon problem of goal displacement in which a unit which was initially established for one purpose begins to handle other tasks on an *ad hoc* and often inefficient basis as the importance of its initial mission diminishes. As the stated goals of a unit decline in importance, its real goal frequently becomes one of mere survival. This appears to have happened to some of the specialized

patrol units which were formed to cope with the urban disorders of the 1960's and early 1970's. With the decline in the types of problems which characterized that period, some of these units now devote much of their efforts to more routine crime control activities. However, where this change in focus has taken place without a formal reassessment of goals and objectives, crime control is often still viewed as a secondary, residual activity, and the result is a generally low level of productivity. This is not to argue that crime control and other tactical work should not be handled by the same unit, but only that their relative importance, interrelationships, and performance expectations should be made explicit.

- Objectives can have a significant influence on officer morale and motivation since they provide the standards by which their performance, both individually and as a unit, will be evaluated. As such, they should be established at a level that is realistically attainable, yet challenging at the same time. It can be extremely damaging to morale to set overly ambitious objectives in an initial burst of enthusiasm, only to discover later that they could not possibly have been achieved no matter how well the officers performed. This danger can be at least partially avoided if objective setting is handled as a collective process in which all personnel involved in a program are allowed to participate.
- Finally, consideration should be given to the publicity accorded to a unit's goals and objectives. Certainly overall goals should be public knowledge, but the extent to which specific strategic and tactical objectives should be publicized seems questionable. The fact that crime can only be partially controlled by police operations is sometimes poorly understood by the public. As a result, a crime control program which fails to meet its stated objectives, even though through no fault of its own, can be subjected to unfair and damaging criticism. Additionally, some strategies and tactics aimed at criminal apprehension can lose much of their effectiveness if their use becomes common public knowledge.

C. Reviewing Possible Solutions: The Decision to Specialize

This is one of the most difficult and creative aspects of the planning process. It involves a review and assessment of all possible approaches to achieving the previously specified goals and objectives. Specialized patrol should initially be viewed as only one of many approaches to problem solving. It should be carefully and systematically compared with other potentially more effective and less expensive approaches such as increased crime prevention activity by beat officers, development of a more directed, crime-specific orientation toward the use of noncommitted patrol time, improved investigative techniques, and perhaps even changes in local ordinances which could have a positive impact on problem areas.

It is difficult to set forth firm decision-making rules for determining when specialization represents an appropriate response to identified problems. Conditions vary too greatly between departments to make this feasible. However, there are several analytical steps which can assist administrators in making this decision.

First, the problem should be reviewed with all police personnel who have been dealing with it. The various approaches that have been tried should be systematically analyzed to determine why they have apparently failed to produce satisfactory results. The creation of a specialized patrol unit on either a permanent or temporary basis would seem to be worthy of consideration if this analysis indicates that current crime control efforts are being frustrated by:

1. the inability of officers, due to interruptions caused by calls for service and general patrol requirements, to devote sufficient uninterrupted periods of patrol time to the problem;
2. the fact that tactics which might represent promising approaches to dealing with the problem, such as decoys, stake-outs, and covert patrol, are simply impossible for uniformed officers assigned to general patrol to use;
3. the fact that patrol policies, such as watch variations, interfere with the development and implementation of long-term, coordinated problem-solving efforts;
4. lack of adequate training and expertise;

5. a generally low level of interest in and commitment to handling the problem; or
6. the fact that responsibility for dealing with the problem has not been clearly placed.

As a general rule, specialized patrol should be considered when the efforts of uniformed patrol officers, no matter how well they are performing their duties, prove to be ineffective in coping with identified crime patterns. If the analysis of current attempts to cope with the problem concludes that the general advantages attributed to specialized patrol, such as fixed responsibility, specialized training, and expertise, concentrated and coordinated patrol activity, and flexibility in the use of various strategies and tactics might help to overcome current difficulties and facilitate problem solution, then the development of such a unit should be seriously studied.

Second, the analysis conducted during the problem identification phase should be reviewed to determine whether the problem is of sufficient magnitude, has a history of growth which indicates that it is likely to be persistent, and is sufficiently patterned and potentially predictable to constitute a productive target for concentrated, specialized patrol operations. For example, a continually high incidence of street robberies and purse snatches in an evening entertainment area of a city may be a promising target for decoy operations and/or intensive uniformed patrol, whereas a sudden and unusual outbreak of sex crimes might more appropriately be handled by detailing several detectives rather than creating a specialized unit.

Third, the department should review publications and project reports and evaluations concerning other specialized patrol operations which have been directed at similar problems. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's National Criminal Justice Reference Service in Washington, D.C., is a convenient source from which to obtain this information.⁵ Equally if not more important, the department should directly contact other jurisdictions which have used specialized patrol for similar purposes. While the characteristics of jurisdictions and departments vary widely, these contacts can provide important insights into the success others have had in using specialized patrol and the problems they have encountered. It will also help to develop a sense of the relative merits of different tactics in dealing with particular types of situations.⁶ If possible, it would be useful for departmental representatives

⁵ National Criminal Justice Reference Service, P.O. Box 24036, Southwest Station, Washington, D.C. 20024; (202) 755-9704.

⁶ See Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of the use of different tactics.

to make site visits to several departments.

Fourth, the department should conduct an assessment of its resource capabilities to undertake specialized patrol. If public concern about the problem is sufficiently great, it may be possible to increase the level of departmental funding to pay for additional personnel to staff the specialized unit. However, in most jurisdictions, increasing the police budget seems to be an increasingly difficult task. A frequently more feasible approach involves the preparation of a thorough patrol workload analysis to assess the possibility of transferring some officers from the routine patrol force to form a specialized unit. Several departments, such as Wilmington, Delaware, and Cleveland Heights, Ohio, have found that through careful workload analysis they were able to identify a substantial amount of slack manpower resources in the patrol force. In Wilmington, this analysis led directly to the creation of a rather substantial specialized patrol unit. Volume I of this two-volume series presents a detailed discussion of the steps involved in conducting a patrol workload analysis. In addition, the possibility of diverting manpower from non-patrol assignments to specialized patrol should be explored. Careful analysis might indicate that personnel positions currently allocated to investigations, crime prevention, community relations, or administration could be used more productively by devoting them to specialized patrol.

Consideration also has to be given to the availability of funds for purchasing needed equipment and covering the costs of additional training. However, as noted in Chapter 7, equipment is seldom a primary factor in the conduct of specialized patrol. With ingenuity and community cooperation, some needed equipment can be obtained at little or even no cost, and, with the exception of aircraft, undercover vehicles and hand-held radios, much of the expensive equipment which has been employed in or recommended for specialized operations, such as low-light viewing devices and body bugs, has frequently been found to be a useful convenience rather than an absolute necessity. Training can also be provided fairly inexpensively, since most of the knowledge and techniques required for the conduct of specialized patrol will generally be fairly familiar to experienced patrol personnel, and additional materials and guidance can be obtained from readily available published sources⁷ and from other departments which have had

⁷ For example, the following three volumes contain material which would be useful in specialized patrol training programs: Thomas W. White, *et al.*, Police Burglary Prevention Programs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1975); Richard H. Ward, *et al.*, Police Robbery Control Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National

a long involvement with specialized patrol.

The department should also explore the possibility of obtaining outside funding to provide for the "start-up" and initial operating costs of the unit. Many specialized patrol units have been established with the help of state or federal grants. Smaller departments might also consider developing joint programs with departments in neighboring jurisdictions, or contracting with larger departments as a means of gaining specialized patrol capabilities on a relatively inexpensive basis to handle temporary problems.

Finally, in addition to resource availability, the department must also assess the effects which constraints, such as the conditions of union contracts, might have on its ability to develop a specialized patrol unit.

On the basis of this type of analytical process, a department may conclude that specialized patrol represents a potentially fruitful approach to its crime-related problems. If so, the next step in the general planning process involves establishing the proper size and organizational placement of the proposed unit.

D. Determination of the Size and Organizational Placement of Specialized Patrol Operations

There is no "correct" size for a specialized patrol unit, nor is there any deterministic way of establishing how large such a unit should be. The appropriate size of a unit depends upon the nature of the problem it is expected to address, the types of tactics it will employ, the level of available resources, its relationship with the general patrol and detective divisions of the department, and its ability to integrate and coordinate its activities with these other units. As such, a unit's size may vary substantially over time and should be the subject of continual analysis and reanalysis.

Probably the most important determinant of unit size is resource availability. Most departments can only afford to devote a certain, and usually rather small, percentage of the total manpower of the department to specialized patrol duty on a permanent basis. As indicated above, the number of officers which can be freed from general patrol for specialized assignments can be best

Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1975); and Andrew Halper and Richard Ku, An Exemplary Project: New York City Police Department Street Crime Unit (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, n.d.).

determined through careful patrol workload analysis.⁸ However, even if this analysis concludes that only a few, if any, officers can be permanently spared from routine patrol, it is still possible to consider creating a small cadre of specially-trained officers who are available for specialized patrol duty on an as-needed basis. They could be deployed as a unit on an overtime basis, if sufficient financial resources are available to cover the associated costs. Or, if the target crime problem is so severe and pressing that the department is willing to sacrifice response time and general patrol coverage, the unit could be activated, leaving the remaining patrol units to cope with service demands, except for obvious emergencies, as best they can. This last approach may have particular appeal to small departments with limited resources which only occasionally confront crime problems requiring specialized attention. However, it should be recognized that dealing with many types of criminal activity can require long-term, even constant effort which can put a severe strain on a department which diverts resources from other vital activities.

The requirements of different specialized patrol tactics and their applicability to various problems are addressed in Chapter 6; however, it should be noted here that the tactics to be employed by the unit will have a significant impact on the appropriate size of a specialized unit. For example, an attempt to deter street robbery through saturation patrol of a 20-square block area would clearly require more manpower than the use of several three-officer roving decoy teams to affect apprehensions in the same area; and conducting simultaneous physical stake-outs of ten potential commercial robbery targets would be much more labor-intensive than the placement of mobile alarms in these locations with the alarms being monitored by a single 2-3 officer team. The point is an obvious but nonetheless important one: in planning for specialized patrol, unit size depends heavily upon its intended purpose and proposed tactics. There is more than one approach to most crime problems and departments should seek to tailor their tactics to match available resources.

⁸ In determining personnel availability, it is also of considerable importance to consider the reassignment of officers from divisions other than patrol. For example, since a successful specialized patrol unit may have a considerable deterrent, apprehension, and crime clearance effect, it may be possible to reduce the size of the detective division. In addition, recent studies of the investigative function indicate that a detective workload analysis might also uncover the existence of available personnel in the detective bureau. Finally, it is noted that if the crime problem to be addressed by the specialized unit has a high departmental priority, consideration might also be given to the reassignment of

The location of specialized patrol units within a department's organizational structure varies widely from department to department. In some departments, all specialized patrol operations are completely centralized in one unit under the field operations division; in others, there are several centralized units, each responsible for a particular crime problem, or each employing different approaches to cope with the same or similar problems. Some departments have decentralized all specialized patrol to the division level, and still others maintain such units at the precinct levels. And other departments have specialized units, staffed by both patrol and investigative officers, which are placed under the direction of the criminal investigation division. In short, the range of variation in organizational placement is extremely great.

There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to different organization schemes. Decentralization tends to increase the responsiveness of specialized units to the needs of local patrol commanders and supervisors and facilitates close cooperation between a specialized unit and the general patrol force; however, it can interfere with the concentrated deployment of specialized manpower in areas of a jurisdiction where crime analysis indicates it to be most urgently needed. Centralization facilitates priority deployment throughout a jurisdiction; however, it can contribute to coordination problems between specialized personnel and patrol officers working the beats to which a specialized unit is temporarily assigned. Finally, the establishment of multiple units, each focusing on only a single target crime and specializing in the use of only a limited set of tactics, seems to be the least desirable approach. This form of specialization will limit tactical flexibility, result in the need to coordinate the efforts of multiple units if a range of tactics must be employed at a single time, can lead to rivalry and tension between the units, and may inhibit the flexibility of a department or unit in adjusting its limited resources to changing needs and demands.

In the planning process, the particular characteristics of individual departments are of paramount importance in determining the number, placement, and operating characteristics of specialized units. For example, departments which have team policing may want to avoid the centralization of specialized patrol for fear that it would do serious damage to the integrity of the team concept. Other departments have opted to place their specialized unit under

officers from other divisions such as public information and community relations. For discussions of the potential availability of some detectives for other assignments, see: Bernard Greenberg, *et al.*, Felony Investigation Decision Model: An Analysis of Investigative Elements of Information (Menlo Park, Cal.: Stanford Research Institute, 1975); and Peter W. Greenwood, *et al.*, The Criminal Investigation Process, Volume I: Summary and Policy Implications (Santa Monica, Cal.: The Rand Corporation, 1975).

the commander of a particular division, less for structural reasons than because of his particular leadership capabilities and/or enthusiasm for the program.

Given the many differences between departments, it would be unwise to suggest an optimal organizational location for specialized patrol. It is worth noting, however, that several departments which have two or more specialized patrol units which either employ different tactics or focus on different target crimes have found that this division of labor leads to unnecessary rigidities and diminishes productivity. Their experience argues in favor of combining different functions and purposes within one unit, whether it be a single centralized one serving the entire department, or several units each operating at the division level.

E. Development of Evaluation Procedures

Evaluation is an essential part of any successful patrol operation. In the absence of careful evaluation, administrators have no valid and reliable means of determining the extent to which stated goals and objectives are being achieved and the relative effectiveness of various program components. Thus, evaluation constitutes a critically important management tool, rather than just a requirement of government grants or a scholarly exercise.

Chapter 8 presents a discussion of the procedures and techniques which can be used to monitor and evaluate specialized patrol operations. Here it is only important to stress the need to view the development and complete elaboration of an evaluation system as an integral part of the planning process. This system should be fully operational prior to the implementation of specialized patrol operations. This will facilitate the smooth collection of data, the timely preparation of analytical reports, and the development of background data against which to gauge the program's impact.

Ideally, the evaluation should be conducted internally by departmental personnel. This helps to insure responsiveness to administrative needs and concerns, early identification and communication of emerging operational problems, and the avoidance of occasional tension and strain which can develop between departmental personnel and outside evaluators. Yet, if a department is lacking in personnel trained in the process of research and evaluation, it should consider bringing in outside consultants. However, except in the case of elaborate experimental research projects, outside consultants should not conduct their evaluation on a completely independent basis. Rather, they should work closely with departmental personnel, instructing them in the process of evaluation. The techniques of simple, straightforward program evaluation can be mastered fairly easily by departmental personnel. Employing consultants as teachers as well as evaluators can contribute to the development of internal management capabilities and lead to significant savings in the conduct of future evaluations.

F. Preparation for Implementation

It is appropriate to conclude this discussion of planning by noting that the planning process involves much more than simply developing and elaborating an approach to dealing with identified crime problems. In addition to the content of the actual plan, the manner in which planning is conducted can greatly influence the smooth and effective implementation of the proposed specialized patrol operation. Of particular importance is the development of support for the program among all the departmental personnel who will be affected by its operation and whose commitment to it can be a critical factor in its successful implementation. While this is a significant factor in the development of all police programs, it is a particularly important concern in specialized patrol operations where lack of general departmental cooperation can often pose a serious problem.

Support can best be generated by approaching planning as a coalition-building process in which the ideas and concerns of all affected personnel, supporters and critics alike, are solicited, and seriously and conscientiously considered. In a small department, it may be possible to directly involve all interested personnel. In larger departments, it is more feasible to create a planning group or task force comprised of line and staff personnel of various ranks. The planning group should provide an open forum in which rank is not allowed to impede the free flow of ideas. Its members should be viewed as representatives of their colleagues at various levels and positions in the department. They can serve as conduits of information and ideas both from their colleagues to the planning group and from the group back to their fellow officers. It may even be possible to create a series of sub-planning groups, each composed of members of different segments of the department, such as patrol officers, patrol supervisors, investigators, and command personnel, and each with representatives on the central planning group. This procedure can contribute to the input of thoughts and suggestions from a variety of sources into the planning process, and it can help to create a real and widespread sense of involvement in the development of the emerging program.

In addition, the planning group should derive its mandate directly from the office of the Chief. This provides it with the authority to draw upon personnel throughout the department; to conduct basic problem analyses, and to assess the availability of departmental resources for the implementation and operation of a specialized unit. The early commitment of the chief executive of the department to the planning process will also facilitate the implementation of whatever recommendations result from the process.

Finally, in planning for the implementation of specialized patrol operations, it is also important to develop a definite, detailed schedule which sets forth the time required for accomplishing the tasks involved in establishing the unit and initiating its operations. This schedule should lay out the expected completion dates for all the activities involved in implementation such as: acquisition of equipment, facilities and training materials; development of the training curriculum; selection of officers and supervisors; development of crime analysis procedures to direct deployment; development of policy guidelines and operating procedures; preparation of evaluation plans; and commencement of actual operations. It can be helpful to prepare this schedule in a schematic format which visually displays the sequence of task performance and expected completion dates for each task. Simple charts, as illustrated below, can be used for this purpose. These charts can be prepared to any level of specificity, and it is useful to break down each step involved in implementing the operation into its component parts and to establish time frames for the completion of each of them.

The importance of paying careful attention to timing in the implementation of specialized operations cannot be over-emphasized. More than a few departments have undertaken promising programs only to find that delays in the arrival of equipment, difficulties in acquiring facilities, or failure to develop adequate deployment procedures have left the unit's officers either completely unable to perform their assigned tasks or able to do so only on an ineffectual and frustrating basis. This can do serious, perhaps irreparable, damage to a unit's morale and performance capabilities.

EXHIBIT 3-1

SAMPLE IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE *

Begin program implementation Completion date: _____	Order equipment Completion date: _____	Develop training program and policy guidelines Completion date: _____	Receive equipment Completion date: _____	Initiate field operations Completion date: _____
		Develop crime analysis capability Completion date: _____	Assign officers Completion date: _____	Initiate ongoing program evaluation Completion date: _____
	Acquire facilities Completion date: _____	Develop evaluation plan Completion date: _____	Conduct training Completion date: _____	
		Select officers Completion date: _____		

* This sample implementation chart is intended to indicate that the various steps involved in implementing a specialized patrol operation should be carefully sequenced. Some tasks will require more time than others, and some must be completed before others can be undertaken. However, the content and sequence of actual schedules will vary with the particular needs and capabilities of a department and the type of specialized operation it is undertaking.

CHAPTER 4
PERSONNEL:
RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION, TRAINING,
SUPERVISION, AND REASSIGNMENT

Personnel typically constitutes the most important, expensive, and valuable resource involved in specialized patrol. The effectiveness of specialized operations is heavily dependent upon the ability of a department to select qualified officers, train them adequately, carefully supervise their work, and evaluate their individual performance. In departments which have had notable success with specialized patrol, the caliber of specialized personnel commonly receives much of the credit; in departments which have been dissatisfied with their specialized operations, personnel problems are frequently cited as a major source of difficulty.

Several common characteristics of specialized patrol combine to make the quality of personnel and supervision particularly important: officers assigned to specialized duty often have a considerable degree of independence and personal latitude in conducting their daily activities; when working in civilian clothes, an officer's behavior is not constrained by a uniform; specialized patrol officers frequently work in situations where there is a constant and very real threat of danger and violence; and specialized patrol officers routinely employ tactics which can have serious negative implications for police/community relations unless the officers pay careful attention to legal constraints, departmental policies, and the possible impact of their actions upon the community as a whole. For a department to capitalize on the opportunities provided by specialized patrol, while avoiding possible pitfalls, close attention should be paid to the processes of officer recruitment, selection, training, supervision and individual officer evaluation.

A. Recruitment and Selection

The process of recruiting and selecting officers for specialized patrol involves the specification of minimum eligibility requirements for assignment to the unit, the generation of interest in participating in the unit, the development of selection criteria and procedures, and the implementation of the selection process.

1. Eligibility Requirements

In most departments, the minimum officer eligibility

requirements for specialized patrol assignments are fairly simple. The most common prerequisite is that officers have a certain established minimum amount of experience with the department. A few specialized units, such as the Dallas, Texas, Police Department's Tactical Section and the Atlanta, Georgia, Bureau of Police Services' High Crime Foot Patrol Unit have no experience requirements for eligibility. Dallas has transferred recruits directly from the Police Academy to the Tactical Section, and Atlanta has used probationary officers in its foot patrol project. However, most departments require that applicants have a specified amount of time on the force, and some also specify particular types of relevant experience. The actual requirements vary from department to department and, within a department, from unit to unit. For example, Denver, Colorado's, Special Services Unit requires applicants to have three years on the force, while the Department's Special Crime Attack Team requires only two. The Los Angeles, California, Police Department's Metropolitan Division requires four years of experience on the force, two of which must have been on patrol; Atlanta's Anti-Robbery Unit requires 16 months of street experience; and Tucson, Arizona's Tactical Operations requires two years on the force. While the numbers vary, the average experience requirement appears to be about two years.

Experience is generally considered to be an important prerequisite for specialized patrol. It is believed that experience contributes to the development of necessary police skills, to an understanding of overall departmental operations, and to an officer's maturity, good judgement and "street sense." In addition, experienced officers will have been on the force long enough to have established a track record. Information on their past performance and general reputations can be extremely helpful in assessing their suitability for specialized patrol.

The importance of an officer's previous experience depends considerably upon the types of activities in which a specialized unit is involved. Concentrated foot patrol would seem to demand less police experience than more complicated activities such as suspect surveillance and decoy operations. Departments should consider the nature of their specialized operations in setting the specific experience requirements.

Apart from experience, most departments have few formal eligibility requirements for specialized duty assignments. Frequently, however, there are informal criteria which provide interested officers with a means of gauging their chances of being assigned to a specialized unit. Officers are generally familiar with the backgrounds and qualifications of their colleagues on specialized patrol, and potential applicants can use this knowledge as a standard against which to compare their own prospects. Such informal criteria function as a screening and self-selection mechanism

which can greatly facilitate and simplify the formal selection process. For departments which are implementing a new specialized unit, self-selection can be encouraged by clearly explaining the selection criteria to all potential recruits. In fact, these criteria should be made explicit to officers in all departments, no matter how long the department has conducted specialized patrol. This will help to insure that the standards which are widely believed to govern the selection process represent a reasonable reflection of reality.

2. Generation of Interest in Specialized Patrol

Most specialized patrol operations rely entirely on volunteers and there is seldom a lack of qualified applicants. Despite the fact that specialized patrol frequently involves irregular hours, a substantial amount of night work, and increased risks of personal injury, specialized units generally have a large number of applicants for each available opening. For example, Tucson's Special Problems Detail received 45 applications for four positions, and Denver's ESCORT (Eliminate Street Crimes on Residential Thoroughfares) project, which is not generally considered to be the most elite of the department's three specialized patrol units, had approximately 200 applicants for twenty openings.

The reasons for the high level of interest in specialized patrol are several:

- Specialized units typically devote much of their time to crime-related activities. Specialized patrol is what many officers believe "real police work" should be all about. Officers often view assignment to specialized patrol duty as a means of relieving the frustrations involved in handling routine calls for service. They frequently believe that specialized patrol offers the opportunity to engage in the more exciting facets of police work which may have initially motivated them to join the force.
- Assignment to specialized patrol can represent a significant advancement in an officer's career. Members of specialized units are frequently promoted at a comparably high rate. For example, officers assigned to Miami's STOP Robbery/Burglary project receive a promotion to the rank of patrol investigator, which represents an important step toward making detective. And in New York City, specialized patrol provides officers with experience in high-crime, high-activity areas which is an important factor in the promotion process. In fact, the commanders of many specialized

units report that promotion is the major cause of personnel turnover in their units.

- Specialized patrol units often provide a highly attractive and desirable working environment. Some units operate in a more relaxed, informal, and less militaristic fashion than the general patrol force. Others, especially those responsible for handling emergency situations, are frequently highly regimented and disciplined. This can foster a sense of *esprit de corps* similar to that found in elite military units like the Rangers and the Green Berets.
- Specialized units which work in civilian clothes provide their officers with the frequently desired opportunity to work out of uniform -- to "get out of the bag." Some decoy and blending operations also allow, indeed encourage, participating officers to wear long hair, beards, and unconventional clothing.
- Specialized patrol officers are often extremely enthusiastic about their work and take great pride in it. They sometimes regard themselves as the elite of the patrol force, and this appraisal may be begrudgingly reciprocated by beat officers, if only in their jealous attitudes toward the specialized unit.
- Finally, specialized patrol can involve a variety of assignments, some of which may require a considerable amount of creativity and inventiveness. Decoy operations that involve the use of fairly elaborate disguises and extended surveillance of a moving suspect can require a great deal of ingenuity. For officers who enjoy a challenge, certain types of specialized patrol can be intrinsically enjoyable.

In light of these attractions, the need to offer special incentives to recruit officers to specialized patrol seems doubtful. In some departments, assignment to specialized duty provides officers with an opportunity for additional pay and other perquisites. However, experience in most departments indicates that the intrinsic rewards of specialized patrol seem to be more than sufficient to attract an adequate number of well-qualified officers, and that special inducements may be unnecessary and even potentially damaging. Enhancing the attractiveness of specialized patrol by offering increased pay and/or special perquisites to officers on the unit might serve to add to the unit's elite image and to beat officers' negative feelings toward it. This can contribute to problems of coordination and cooperation between the unit, the general

patrol force, and other units in the department. In general, it is wise to downplay the elite characteristics of specialized units. This may serve to foster improved cooperation and, under most circumstances, it should not complicate the recruitment process.

While there are many perceived advantages to specialized patrol, it is important to point out the negative aspects of specialized patrol to perspective recruits. Officers should be made aware of drawbacks such as irregular working hours, frequent evening and night work, increased danger, and the boredom and frustration involved in such activities as extended stake-outs. The personal and family difficulties which these drawbacks can cause should also be emphasized. In short, officers should be presented with an accurate, honest portrayal of what it is like to work on specialized patrol. This will help to limit the applicants to those who are willing to take the necessary risks and make the necessary personal sacrifices, and it will help to avoid the personnel problems which can result from false and unrealistic expectations.

3. The Selection Process

These are three essential considerations in the development of a selection process for specialized patrol: the establishment of selection criteria and the development of procedures for selecting individual officers; the determination of the frequency with which officers will be selected for assignment to the unit; and the treatment of officers whose applications to the unit are rejected. Each of these aspects of the selection process will be considered in turn.

a. Selection Criteria and Procedures: The selection of officers for assignment to specialized patrol represents an attempt to predict which of the eligible applicants will best meet a unit's particular needs and requirements. The selection process should be guided by a carefully considered, clearly stated set of criteria which seeks to relate the characteristics, capabilities, and past performance of applicants to the likelihood that they will be able to function effectively on specialized patrol.

The selection criteria should be explicitly job-related. Different types of specialized patrol may require different individual qualities and characteristics. For example, uniformed saturation patrol with a heavy emphasis on field interrogations might best be handled by aggressive officers, while long-term stake-outs would seem to call for a great deal of patience. Departments which have had experience with specialized patrol can develop selection criteria by analyzing the characteristics of officers who have effectively performed similar tasks in the past. Those which are selecting officers for a relatively new undertaking might profitably review the criteria used by other departments

in similar circumstances and/or simply rely on the informed judgement of experienced patrol administrators. In the absence of research findings relating particular officer characteristics to the effective performance of particular specialized patrol tasks, there is no definitive way of developing selection criteria.

The personal attributes which are valued in prospective specialized patrol officers vary somewhat from department to department and unit to unit; however, a fairly representative sample would include: adaptability, aggressiveness, ability to work with others, curiosity, desire, good judgement, initiative, maturity, patience, physical fitness, and "street sense." The common image of many specialized patrol units as a department's trouble-shooters would suggest that aggressiveness might be the most important attribute of selected officers. In fact, however, while many unit commanders state that they do want active, aggressive, self-motivated officers, they also stress that it is essential that aggressiveness be well-tempered by maturity and good judgement. Aggressiveness in the absence of these other qualities can be and has been the source of serious problems.

In addition to personal qualities, it is also necessary to consider certain immutable individual characteristics such as ethnicity and sex. These can be especially important to units which use tactics such as decoys and covert surveillance, which require officers to blend inconspicuously into particular locales and situations. While there may be an understandable reluctance to allow these factors to influence the selection process, it must be recognized that it is extremely difficult for white officers to work inconspicuously in black or Chicano neighborhoods and visa versa; and that a strapping young 6'3", 220-pound male officer would be a much less promising strong armed robbery decoy than a smaller male or female colleague. A number of units have not been able to conduct effective specialized operations in particular areas because they lacked personnel with the appropriate characteristics. At least one department -- St. Petersburg, Florida -- explicitly recognized this problem when it recently established a specialized unit comprised entirely of black officers to concentrate on black-on-black crime in black neighborhoods. The unit's purpose and methods of operation were carefully explained to community leaders, and the overall response has been extremely positive.

Finally, specialized units in some departments, such as the Los Angeles Sheriffs' Special Enforcement Bureau, the Los Angeles Police Department's Metropolitan Division, and the Denver Police Department's Special Services Unit, stipulate fairly rigid physical fitness requirements. In considering whether or not stringent physical fitness requirements should be set, careful consideration should be given to the activities to be engaged in by the unit. Those units which call upon their officers to perform

physically demanding tasks such as specialized rescue and some SWAT activities along with the more routine specialized patrol activities should consider the establishment of fitness criteria which must be met by incoming officers and maintained by all members of the unit. Specialized units which engage in activities which typically place considerable psychological and emotional stress upon their officers might also consider establishing fitness standards. Officers in good condition are generally better able to bear such stress, and they will tend to have more confidence in their ability to handle potentially dangerous situations without resorting to deadly force.

Translating desired officer attributes into actual criteria to guide the selection process is an extremely difficult task. Many personal characteristics could be examined through psychological testing. However, it has yet to be determined how scores on psychological tests can be interpreted to predict performance on different types of specialized patrol, and few departments use this rather complicated procedure. Most departments rely upon information which is readily available in their personnel files, supplemented by interviews with the applicants, and their supervisors and peers.

The following are steps commonly taken in gathering and assessing information about the ability of individual applicants to perform effectively on specialized patrol:

- The first step in the selection process is usually an examination of the applicants' personnel and internal affairs files to determine whether they have had any disciplinary problems, substantiated citizen complaints, medical or absentee problems, or sub-standard performance ratings. Generally, one substantiated complaint or poor marks in any of the other categories would be sufficient to remove a candidate's name from further consideration.
- The second step involves a review of activity records covering arrests, citations, field interrogations, etc. Emphasis here should be placed primarily on the quality rather than the quantity of activity. A large number of poor quality arrests would be an excellent reason for rejecting an applicant, while a smaller number of high quality, on-site apprehensions would tend to show initiative and good judgement. If possible, it would be useful to judge the quality of arrests by examining the number which passed first screening by the prosecutor. If this information is unavailable, the evaluation of arrest quality by the officers' immediate supervisors would be an appropriate substitute.

- Interviews with the applicant's supervisors and peers can provide information about the applicant's general reputation, ability to cooperate and work well with others, and ability to handle particularly difficult or stressful situations. In essence, these interviews should contribute to the assessment of the applicant as a "street cop." It would also be useful to follow the example of the Pueblo, Colorado, Police Department's Special Operations Section by interviewing district attorneys to determine how well the officer testifies in court. In apprehension-oriented specialized operations, an officer's skill at testifying can be an extremely important consideration.
- Personal interviews with those who have successfully passed through the previous stages in the selection process frequently constitute the final and, many would argue, the most important factor in selection. The interviews are generally conducted by the unit's command and supervisory personnel; however, in some cases, patrol officers also participate on the interview panel. Interviews are generally intended to provide a means of directly assessing applicants' knowledge of relevant legal considerations, police procedures and practices; their judgement, maturity, and motivation for participation in the unit; and their handling of stressful situations.

The interviews can be conducted with various degrees of formality. In some departments, they may be little more than relaxed, informal discussions, while in others they are highly-structured with carefully predetermined questions and numerical or alphabetical rating systems. Atlanta's Anti-Robbery Unit has developed an interesting two-part interview procedure. The first part includes questions pertaining to the legal parameters governing robbery apprehension efforts; the second presents a series of questions following the presentation of hypothetical situations analogous to those which the applicant might confront in actual anti-robbery operations. These questions are designed to assess aggressiveness, decisiveness, judgement, application of legal knowledge, and self-restraint. For example, as an indicator of legal knowledge and aggressiveness, each applicant is asked, "If a perpetrator completed the commission of a robbery and was escaping the scene with his back toward you and no life was in danger, would you or would you not shoot him? If yes, why? If no, why not?" Judgement and self-restraint are explored by such questions as, "If you were observing a cashier through a two-way mirror and observed a subject walk to the cashier and lay a gun on the counter, then start a conversation with the cashier, how

would you handle the situation from that point on?" Each applicant's responses to these questions are rated on a scale of 1 through 10, and the number of direct, factual questions he answers correctly is added to this score to produce an overall interview rating. In Atlanta, the oral interview scores count for 50% of the final selection rating, with previous training and experience accounting for 10%, supervisors' performance ratings 10%, absenteeism 10%, and personnel jacket data 20%.

The degree of formality and structure in the selection process varies considerably and appears to be at least partially a function of department size. Specialized units in large departments generally find that a structured process facilitates the evaluation of large numbers of applicants, most of whom are strangers to the evaluators. In smaller departments, there are usually fewer applicants, and they are often well-known to those making the selections. This makes it possible to conduct the selection process in a more informal, *ad hoc* manner. It is important to note, however, that while it may be easier and less time-consuming to staff a unit on an informal basis, there are definite advantages to formalizing the process. Formalization forces a department to carefully review and assess the personnel requirements of its specialized patrol operations, and it serves to minimize the degree to which departmental politics and personal favoritism can influence the process. Furthermore, the development of explicit selection guidelines, criteria, and procedures allows a department to review periodically the selection process to determine its effectiveness in staffing specialized patrol units with properly qualified officers whose actual performance corresponds with previous expectations. A formal selection process thereby serves as a "self-correcting" device facilitating the continual reassessment of the relevance of selection criteria.

b. Frequency of Officer Selection: Given the stipulation of selection criteria and procedures, a department must then determine how frequently to conduct the selection process. Some units will consider applications only when there is a vacancy. Others maintain a pool of officers who have successfully met all the unit's requirements and may even have received the required training, but remain on general patrol until there is an opening. The Los Angeles County Sheriffs' Department's Special Enforcement Bureau has a two-year waiting list of selected officers, and Atlanta's Anti-Robbery Unit has approximately 50 officers in a similar position. This provides both units with a ready source of additional, qualified manpower which can be called upon as the need arises. The establishment of such a pool insures that vacancies can be filled immediately, and it serves to reduce tension and strain between the unit and the general patrol force since a number of officers who have been selected and trained for specialized duty and may be periodically involved in specialized operations still remain

on general patrol.

In selecting officers when several vacancies occur at the same time, care should be taken to minimize the disruptive effects which the selections can have on general patrol operations. The selection of several officers from the same precinct at the same time could interfere with the provision of adequate patrol coverage and services in that precinct. An effort could be made to select officers from different precincts. However, a more effective and equitable practice would be to select the most qualified applicants and make adjustments in the assignments of general patrol officers to minimize the impact of the transfers.

c. The Treatment of Rejected Applicants: A final consideration in the selection process concerns the treatment of officers who apply for assignment to a specialized patrol unit and meet the minimum eligibility requirements but are not selected. Given the perceived desirability of specialized duty, it is likely that officers whose applications are rejected may feel extremely disappointed and perhaps even bitter. They may perceive themselves to have been judged inadequate, even though they may believe themselves to be excellent patrol officers. These feelings can add to the tension which often exists between beat officers and their colleagues on specialized patrol, thereby complicating the process of patrol coordination and cooperation.

There is probably no completely adequate solution to this problem. However, several steps can be taken to diminish its impact:

- The selection criteria should be made as clear and explicit as possible, and the selection process should be conducted openly and fairly. This will help to counteract allegations that choices are influenced by favoritism and departmental politics.
- If at all possible, selections should be made only on a competitive basis in which there is more than one applicant for each opening. This will relieve the problem of rejected applicants feeling that they were not selected simply because they were unable to measure up to the unit's requirements. Competition indicates to the rejected applicants that the selected officers merely had qualifications more closely matching the unit's needs.
- The creation of a waiting list of selected officers serves to separate in time the selection decision from the actual assignment of officers to the unit. This can mitigate the sense of loss for two reasons. First, it can make actual assignment to the unit less certain, since waiting lists can be quite long and personnel turnover in specialized units is typically rather low.

Due to promotions or loss of interest, many officers on the list may never actually serve on the unit. Second, the delay in assignment means that all applicants, both successful and unsuccessful, will remain on general patrol, performing the same functions for a considerable time. As a result, the actual transfer of an officer to the unit will appear routine when (and if) it does occur.

- It should be made abundantly clear that specialized patrol units attempt to select officers with those particular capabilities and characteristics which fit the unit's specific needs and purposes. Units do not necessarily select the "best" officers in a general sense of the term. Thus, some first-rate patrol officers may fail to make the unit simply because they do not match its very specific needs.
- The reasons for non-selection should be explained in a diplomatic fashion. Positive suggestions might be made concerning ways in which officers can improve their qualifications, either for specialized duty or for other tasks for which they might be better suited. If it is felt that an applicant might have a realistic chance for selection at a future time, the officers might be encouraged to reapply. However, such a recommendation should not be given lightly.
- Consideration should be given to the possibility that the assessment of officers by the specialized unit (or for that matter, the fact that they applied for the unit) should not become a part of the officers' general personnel file if they are not selected. As a consequence, officers will not perceive themselves to have been penalized for having applied to the unit, and rejection by the unit will not in and of itself have an adverse effect upon their careers.

While these measures will probably not entirely diffuse feelings of disappointment and resentment, they should help to temper these feelings and reduce their negative impact.

B. Training

There are five essential aspects of training which should be considered with regard to specialized patrol units. These include: (a) determination of the need for training; (b) determination of the

content of training programs; (c) determination of appropriate approaches to training; (d) development of training resources and capabilities; and (e) determination of the need for an approach to on-going training. Each aspect will be considered in turn.

1. Determining the Need for Training

Officer training is commonly considered to be a key factor in the effectiveness of specialized patrol. The opportunity which specialization provides for advanced training in specific patrol techniques is regularly cited as one of its principal advantages and the development of specialized skills through intensive training and practice is often viewed as the hallmark of an effective specialized patrol operation. On the other hand, it can also be argued that carefully selected officers with excellent performance records and considerable street experience are capable of handling most types of specialized patrol with little or no additional training.

Examples of both these attitudes toward training, and many which fall in between them, can be found in departments throughout the country. The amount and types of training given to officers on specialized patrol varies widely. For example:

- The Wilmington, Delaware, Bureau of Police routinely rotates officers between general and specialized patrol, providing little formal training to officers assigned to specialized duty. The Bureau relies on on-the-job training by supervisors and experienced officers to develop the skills of officers newly assigned to its specialized patrol force.
- Officers in New York City's Precinct Anti-Crime Units receive little formal training prior to undertaking their assigned duties. Most precincts rely upon daily briefings and roll-call training coupled with actual street experience to develop officers' specialized patrol skills.
- Tucson's Tactical Operations Unit assigns new officers immediately to work with a squad. However, after a month or so of experience, each new officer's performance is reviewed and the officer is given a series of test problems in order to assess the development of his/her abilities.
- Miami's STOP Robbery/Burglary Unit attempts to provide new members of the unit with 40 hours of training as soon as possible after they join the unit. Heavy emphasis is placed on the process of robbery and burglary investigation.

- Denver's Special Crime Attack Team provided officers with 40 hours of initial training supplemented by a substantial amount of in-service training when it first began operation. It now relies solely on in-service training from experienced officers to prepare newly-assigned officers.
- Finally, all deputies assigned to the Los Angeles County Sheriffs' Department's Special Enforcement Bureau receive six weeks of intensive training covering all facets of the Bureau's work.

In short, the variation in the amount of training provided to officers in different specialized units is substantial. In the absence of careful research findings linking the quality of officer performance on specialized patrol to various amounts and types of training, it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions concerning the training requirements for specialized patrol. The "optimal amount" of training and appropriate training standards for various types of specialized patrol have never been established. Each department must assess the training needs of newly created and on-going specialized operations in light of the unit's overall responsibilities, the particular problems it is charged with handling, the types of strategies and tactics it employs, the sophistication of the equipment it uses, and the expertise and previous experience of its officers.

It is easy and, to some extent, accurate to assert that officers in all specialized units should have the benefit of extensive, detailed training. The importance of training to all facets of police work has become almost an axiom in law enforcement circles. However, as patrol administrators know, training is an expensive and time-consuming process. It is thus important to assess carefully the actual training needs of particular specialized units. While this must be done individually by each department for each of its specialized patrol units, experience suggests that extensive training is most important for units which are responsible for handling difficult and potentially dangerous situations which demand the ability of the unit's members to work together closely and to coordinate their activities almost instantaneously under stressful and often rapidly changing circumstances. Problems of this nature which come immediately to mind are sniper attacks, barricade and hostage situations, riots, and other emergency situations which call for the use of special weapons and tactics.

It is generally agreed that officers in units using special weapons and tactics require extensive initial training and constant practice to develop and maintain their skills with such weapons, and to gain experience in working together as a team. In fact, it has been suggested that departments which are unable or unwilling to provide

their special weapons units with the appropriate training might be better off without such units. A heavily armed, aggressively-oriented, but poorly prepared squad of officers can turn a delicate situation into a complete disaster.

Other types of specialized patrol such as decoy operations, extended suspect surveillance, and stake-outs, also require careful coordination and a feeling of trust among officers. It is essential that officers feel that they can rely on each other in difficult, hazardous situations. There is no substitute for training and practicing together as a unit to develop the necessary skills and confidence of officers in one another. However, the training requirements for units which employ these types of tactics appear to be somewhat less than those for special weapons squads. The deployment and activities of specialized units other than special weapons squads are generally more predictable. In addition, since they usually work on a fairly regular, non-emergency basis, officers' skills and capabilities are quickly developed and maintained through constant, on-the-job practice.

Specialized units which employ sophisticated equipment such as low-light viewing devices, Tac II alarm systems, directional tracking devices, and cameras, should provide careful training in the proper use and care of such equipment. Without adequate training, the equipment may not be used to best advantage, and maintenance costs may be extremely high. It is generally best not to purchase expensive equipment unless provisions are made for training officers in its appropriate use. In many cases, training may be available from the equipment manufacturer.

Finally, officers in units which concentrate on relatively uncomplicated tasks such as uniformed saturation patrol generally require rather little specialized training. Uniformed saturation patrol involves techniques, such as observation, vehicle and pedestrian stops, and field interrogation, which are similar to those which officers studied at the academy as new recruits and practice daily on general patrol. The only difference is that these patrol skills and techniques are employed in a more concentrated form by specialized units. Experienced patrol officers should be well-equipped to handle such tasks effectively with little additional instruction; however, it may be useful to provide them with some motivational training which stresses the impact of visibility on deterrence. Only if the unit is also responsible for special events such as VIP protection, riots, and crowd control is extensive training called for.

2. Determining the Content of Training

The content of training programs should vary with the purpose and responsibilities of a unit, its methods of operation, the background and experience of the personnel, and the resources available for training. Accordingly, it is not feasible to present a model training curriculum which is applicable to all types of specialized patrol. However, the following is a list of general topics which should be considered for inclusion in a training program. Officers assigned to specialized

duty should be thoroughly capable in each area relevant to their unit's operations.

- Legal considerations: All officers should have a thorough knowledge of the criminal law and procedures related to the unit's target crimes and its methods of operation. They should understand the legal definitions of target crimes, the legal constraints governing the use of various tactics, and the prescribed procedures for arresting and booking a suspect and handling evidence. In addition, officers should be thoroughly instructed in the legal concerns and departmental procedures regarding the issues of entrapment, search and seizure, use of deadly force, and invasion of privacy -- issues particularly salient to the conduct of specialized operations. In brief, all officers should know and understand the laws they are sworn to enforce, and the procedures by which they must abide.
- Departmental policies and procedures: In addition to legal considerations, officers should also be completely familiar with departmental policies and procedures which apply to their work. These might include guidelines covering: the use of deadly force, conduct of field interrogations, handling informants, report writing, arrest procedures, etc. Specialized patrol units are normally required to adhere to the same policies and procedures which apply to all other aspects of departmental operations, and there may be special policies governing their operation.
- Background and purpose of the operation: All personnel should be aware of the reasons for undertaking specialized patrol and the unit's goals and objectives. They should understand why the unit was established and what it is expected to accomplish.
- Strategies and tactics: All members of the unit should be thoroughly versed in the safe and effective use of the unit's strategies and tactics. For example, if the unit engages in decoy operations, all the elements involved in these operations should be covered in detail, including: target selection; the roles of decoy and back-up officers; techniques of unobtrusive surveillance; disguises; confrontation and arrest procedures; officer identification; coordination with the general patrol force and investigators; etc. In short, officers should have a complete understanding of all the strategies and tactics they will be using. The more complicated and difficult these strategies and tactics, the greater the need for training.

- Evidence and reports: Although all officers will probably have had previous training and experience in report writing and evidentiary procedures, it is still useful to stress their importance and the care which they require. The quality of reports and evidence can have a significant impact on the preparation and final disposition of court cases. In apprehension-oriented units, it might also be helpful to provide officers with instruction in the techniques of effective court testimony. Often their testimony may be the primary or even the only evidence against a suspect, and they should know how to present it to maximum advantage.
- Relationship with other departmental operations: Officers should understand the relationship of their specialized patrol activities to the operations of the general patrol force, the detective division, and other specialized units. They should also be familiar with the process of crime analysis and the ways in which it guides specialized operations.
- Equipment: Training should be provided in the proper use of all special equipment. Even officers who are not directly involved in the use of a particular piece of equipment should appreciate its purpose and role in the unit's operations. Proficiency in the use of weapons should also be carefully maintained.
- Community relations: Public support is an essential part of most successful specialized patrol operations. In the past, specialized units which have neglected the public impact of their activities have encountered serious difficulties. Some have even been terminated because of negative public reactions. Consequently, it is important that officers be aware of potential public response to their activities. They should be instructed to perform their duties in a diplomatic, professional manner and to be sensitive to the reactions of various segments of the community to their work.
- Physical training: For specialized units which may be called upon to execute physically demanding tasks, consideration should be given to establishing a rigorous physical training program for all individuals entering the unit. Provisions should also be made to help all members of the unit to maintain a high degree of physical fitness.

In developing a training program or reassessing an on-going program, the relevance of the above topic areas should be reviewed and consideration should be given to any other topics which might appropriately be included. As stated above, the need for training in par-

ticular areas will depend upon a unit's responsibilities, strategies, and tactics; and upon the skills and capabilities of its officers.

3. Determining the Approach to Training

The techniques which can be used in training range from the traditional lectures, briefings and on-the-job experience to role-playing and elaborate simulation. As a general rule, training should be as realistic as possible. It should be conducted in a manner and environment which is similar to that which will be encountered in actual field operations.

a. On-the-job training: Many specialized units rely almost entirely on on-the-job training. Frequently, it is possible to put officers through a fairly extensive, formal training program when a unit is first established, especially if it is funded by an outside grant. However, it is often difficult to maintain the initial training program due to a lack of resources and to the problems involved in arranging for a full-scale training program for individual officers who join the unit as vacancies occur. As a result, newly-assigned officers receive their initiation into the unit's activities from supervisors and from actual street experience working with their new colleagues. The drawbacks of this procedure are at least partially offset by the fact that the training is provided by experienced personnel. In some units, such as New York City's Street Crime Unit, new officers are given their initial training by their immediate supervisors and by experienced members of the unit who are designated as training officers. The use of specially prepared training officers is an excellent means of introducing new personnel into a unit's operations.

b. Videotape presentations: If the facilities and equipment are available, videotaped or tape recorded presentations can be extremely valuable techniques for providing certain types of training. Their use enables new officers to benefit from formal training without the expense and bother of repeating lectures and demonstrations each time an officer transfers to the unit. Taped presentations also permit the exercise of quality control, which is particularly important in training on subjects such as legal and procedural concerns. Commercially available training films can also be used to present training materials on various aspects of specialized patrol.

c. Role playing: Some specialized units, such as Los Angeles County Sheriffs' Department's Special Enforcement Bureau, make extensive use of simulation and role-playing as training techniques. Through its Advanced Patrol and Special Enforcement Training Program, all deputies assigned to S.E.B. are given six weeks of intense training which, along with classroom instruction and on-the-job experience, includes a number of simulated

field problems which are based on actual police incidents. The correct response or solution to most of the problems is generally not immediately obvious. Role playing is used to teach deputies proper procedures, coordination of their work with others, and, above all, the importance of sound judgment, keen perception, and thoroughness.

d. Developing Training Resources and Capabilities

While some departments, particularly larger ones, are able to call upon a training academy to develop and conduct in-service training programs for officers assigned to specialized units, other departments have extremely limited training capabilities. However, even in the absence of established training facilities, the development of an appropriate training program need not be an expensive or insurmountable task. It is, for example, quite possible to make considerable use of the expertise available in other units and divisions of the department, and to gain assistance from outside sources. Miami's STOP Robbery/Burglary Unit and Tucson's Special Problems Detail prepare officers by having them spend some time working with criminal investigations. Many of the techniques employed in specialized patrol, such as the covert surveillance of suspects and stake-outs of probable crime locations, have long been used by investigators, and they provide an excellent source of ready expertise for training. Using investigators in this capacity can also help to establish linkages between specialized patrol and the criminal investigations division which can facilitate the mutual sharing of information and overall cooperation.

Other units have received help from FBI agents and members of other departments in developing and operating their training programs. The Phoenix Police Department used local FBI agents in initially training officers for its District Crime Prevention Units, and members of the Los Angeles Police Department's Metropolitan Division have visited other departments to assist in specialized patrol training programs.

It can also be extremely beneficial in the development of a training program for command and supervisory personnel to contact other departments with experience in conducting similar types of operations. They can provide a source of training ideas and advice, in addition to materials which could be adapted for local use.

e. Determining the Need for and Approach to On-Going Training

In addition to providing training to officers who are newly assigned to a specialized unit, consideration should also be given to the development of an on-going training process. It has already been pointed out that for some types of specialized

operations, provisions should be made to maintain the physical fitness, and weapons proficiency of officers. It is desirable for a unit to view every aspect of its daily operations from a training perspective. Each operation engaged in by the unit can be looked upon in retrospect as a learning experience which can serve to improve individual and unit capabilities. It is extremely useful to conduct systematic reviews of unit operations, drawing all officers into the analysis of its strengths and weaknesses. This type of analysis should be done on a periodic basis. Training to correct any identified problems can be conducted at roll-call, during squad conferences, or on special training days.

C. Supervision

Most specialized patrol units are commanded by a captain or lieutenant with a span of control of usually less than ten officers to each sergeant. The general purpose and process of supervision in specialized units does not differ greatly from that in the general patrol force. In both cases, it is the function of supervision to: develop operational plans; assign tasks and insure that they are carried out promptly, effectively, and in accordance with established departmental policies and procedures; maintain officer morale, motivation and integrity; provide in-service training; maintain liaison with other units and divisions in the department; and evaluate officer performance.

In some respects the supervision of specialized patrol units is a comparatively easy task. Specialized units are typically staffed with carefully selected, experienced volunteer officers who are enthusiastic about their work and take pride in it. Morale and *esprit de corps* is usually high in specialized units, and there is frequently a great deal of peer pressure on officers to perform to the best of their ability. These common characteristics of specialized patrol units greatly facilitate the supervisory process. Officers who enjoy their work and are anxious to perform well are relatively easy to manage.

On the other hand, the strategies and tactics employed by specialized units and the circumstances under which they are used can be the source of considerable supervisory difficulties. For example:

- Tactics such as decoy operations, covert suspect surveillance and the use of informants of necessity require that officers be given a certain amount of personal leeway in their activities. In addition, working out of uniform removes an important constraint on their behavior. This can provide an

opportunity for misconduct, corruption and neglect of duty. While individual officer discretion can cause supervisory problems in all facets of police work, it is a particularly important concern in the supervision of officers on specialized patrol.

- Specialized patrol units can be a source of serious conflict within the department. Both the general patrol force and the detectives may feel that specialized operations infringe on their areas of responsibility, frequently grabbing the limelight while shirking routine, uninteresting tasks.
- If not handled extremely carefully, tactics commonly used on specialized patrol can do considerable damage to police/community relations. Decoy operations have led to charges of entrapment and the unnecessary use of deadly force. Surveillance activities have resulted in allegations of invasion of privacy. And, the intensive use of field interrogations has been construed as police harassment. The public reaction to specialized operations is particularly important since specialized units frequently work in high-crime, low-income areas where good police/community relations are often difficult to maintain.

Two basic approaches have been taken to handling potential supervisory problems such as mentioned above. The first, participatory supervision, attempts to foster individual officers' personal sense of duty and commitment to high levels of performance; the second, paramilitary supervision, places greater emphasis on external controls of officer behavior.

Participatory supervision attempts to foster and capitalize upon the above mentioned attributes of specialized patrol units which simplify the process of supervision. It provides all officers with an opportunity to have a significant input into various facets of the unit's operation. Relaxed squad or unit conferences normally replace traditional, formal stand-up roll-calls. Officers are encouraged to engage in an open, honest exchange of ideas and opinions, to work collectively on the correction of weaknesses in a unit's operations, to exchange job-related information, and to discuss the use of promising strategies and tactics. The conferences also provide a convenient means for the conduct of on-going training through the critical review and analysis of recently-completed and current operations. Specialized units, such as New York City's Street Crime Unit and Atlanta's Anti-Robbery Unit, which have adopted this approach to supervision have found that it provides officers with a sense

of personal involvement in a unit's activities and a feeling of responsibility for its overall effectiveness. The result is a high level of morale and dedication to duty, and a desire for excellence in both individual and unit performance.

Participatory supervision is most frequently used in specialized units which concentrate on low visibility patrol activities. For these types of operations, it represents an attractive alternative to traditional, external supervision which could interfere with the effective use of certain covert strategies and tactics.

It is important to note that participatory supervision should not be equated with lax or ineffective control. Providing officers with an opportunity to influence a unit's operations need not and should not be allowed to interfere with their ability and willingness to respond unquestionably to their supervisor's commands in circumstances which require immediate action. All officers should realize that a unit's effectiveness depends upon their ability to handle difficult and potentially dangerous situations with military precision. Participation and discussion should take place in squad conferences, not in the field.

Perhaps the major drawback of participatory supervision is the demands it places upon supervisory personnel. Participation can complicate the decision-making process. It requires supervisors to adopt a new and sometimes uncomfortable orientation toward their work. And, it can be construed as a serious threat to their authority. The effective use of participatory supervision requires highly skilled supervisors who are sufficiently confident in their knowledge, abilities and authority to accept and seriously consider advice and even criticism from their subordinates.

The traditional paramilitary approach to supervision is common in specialized units which concentrate on highly visible patrol operations and those which are responsible for handling situations which require the use of special weapons and tactics. This approach stresses the strict, external control of officers' activities through close, on-site supervision. Emphasis is placed upon the ability of officers to respond to commands in an efficient, disciplined manner. Their input into the decision-making process is desired less than their responsiveness to its results. Morale in units supervised in this manner is frequently quite high, as officers take pride in the military-like discipline of their unit.

While paramilitary supervision is being used effectively in a number of specialized units, it appears to have several important drawbacks. Foremost among these are that: (1) it fails to take full advantage of the free flow of ideas and information

which participation encourages; and (2) it does not stress the development of officer initiative and creativity which can be extremely important in the conduct of certain types of specialized operations. Its principal advantages would seem to be that it is generally effective in maintaining a highly disciplined unit, most supervisors and officers are fairly comfortable with this style of supervision, and it is relatively uncomplicated.

On the balance, it would seem to be worthwhile for departments to carefully consider adopting a participatory style of supervision for their specialized patrol operations. If the caliber of line and supervisory personnel is high and if a clear and unambiguous distinction is made between those times and circumstances in which participation is appropriate and those in which complete and unquestioned obedience is required, then participatory supervision would seem to provide a more flexible approach to coping with the supervisory problems encountered in various types of specialized operations.

In addition to the style and process of supervision, particular attention should also be paid to the evaluation of individual officers' performance. Performance evaluation is an important supervisory tool, since it provides officers with a clear indication of what the unit and the department expects from them. Frequently, officers' perceptions of the standards by which they are evaluated can be a significant determinant of their behavior.

Most specialized patrol units use the same standard evaluation forms and procedures as the general patrol force. However, some, such as New York City's Street Crime Unit, have developed their own internal evaluation process to supplement the process used by the department as a whole. Other units might do well to follow the Street Crime Unit's example in this regard, since the performance criteria relevant to specialized patrol can differ greatly from those applied to general patrol officers whose primary responsibility is handling calls for service.

The criteria for officer performance should be developed on the basis of an analysis of the requirements of their jobs and the expected results of their activities. They should be closely linked to the criteria which guide the selection of officers. This will permit performance evaluations to serve as a means of monitoring the adequacy of the selection process.

Common evaluation criteria include quantitative factors such as:

- number and quality of arrests;
- number and quality of field interrogations;
- number and disposition of citizen complaints;
- absenteeism;
- firearms proficiency rating;

and qualitative judgements concerning:

- initiative;
- adaptability;
- motivation;
- job-related knowledge; and
- ability to work with others.

An effort should be made to use quantitative criteria whenever possible. They provide greater objectivity and focus attention on individual and unit productivity. However, numerical performance ratings should be weighted to reflect the importance of the activity they measure. For example, in evaluating an officer's arrest productivity, emphasis should be placed on the number of *quality* arrests he/she made instead of total number of arrests. The quality of arrests can best be determined by the results of first screening by the prosecutor. If this information is not readily available, and in many departments it is not, supervisors should rely on their experience and informed judgement in attempting to assess arrest quality.

Consideration should also be given to the relevance of officers' arrests to the unit's goals and objectives. A decoy squad deployed to combat street robbery which blows its cover to make a misdemeanor arrest is clearly not contributing to the unit's effectiveness.

Finally, in examining officers' arrest productivity, attention must be paid to assigning credit for arrests and assessing the difficulty involved in making them. An officer who develops information which leads to an important apprehension by his colleagues should be given a large share of the credit, as should a decoy for arrests made by back-up officers; and an officer who, after considerable effort, successfully handles a pressing problem by making an arrest should receive at least as much credit as one who makes several easier and less important apprehensions.

An attempt should be made to qualify other quantitative performance measures in a similar fashion.

Performance evaluations should be conducted on a regular basis, and the results should be discussed privately with individual officers. *Efforts should be made to correct identified weaknesses in officer performance and, if these efforts fail, an attempt should be made to transfer the officer to another assignment for which he/she might be better suited.*

In most specialized units, promotions rather than poor performance account for most of the personnel turnover. However, supervisors in a number of units have observed a tendency for some officers to "burn out" after several years of competent service. Such officers simply lose their ability and desire to cope with the irregular working hours, interference of work with their personal lives, and the tension and stress of the job. When this occurs, it is in the best interest of both the individual officer and the unit for such officers to be reassigned to another position. Supervisors should try to catch this problem in its early stages so that the officer can be transferred without damage to either his/her career or the unit's operations.

D. Officer Reassignment: The Re-Integration of Specialized Patrol Officers into the Department

Specialized patrol units are a relatively new phenomenon in most departments and, as a result, few departments have confronted the question of the "optimal" tenure for officers in specialized units. As mentioned above, there has been conjecture about the problem of officers being "burned out" by the emotional and psychological stress inherent in many specialized assignments; however, few departments have seriously considered addressing the problem by establishing a maximum tour of duty on specialized units. Most patrol administrators seem to feel that the problem will take care of itself -- that officers will either voluntarily leave the unit when the stress becomes too much for them, or that they will be transferred when their performance begins to suffer.

There are two problems inherent in such a laissez-faire attitude. First, when an officer feels that his performance on specialized patrol has declined to the point that he requests a transfer, it is possible that his ability to perform many other police tasks may also have been seriously impaired. Second, when an officer's performance declines to the point where his supervisor is forced to request that he be transferred from the unit, the transfer can have a negative impact upon the officer's morale and will constitute a black mark on his record, which can under-

mine his entire career. In both cases, an officer's capacity to perform his job effectively will have been needlessly diminished.

In order to reduce the probability that officers will "burn themselves out" after a prolonged tenure on a specialized unit, departments may want to consider establishing a maximum tour of duty of a period from two to four years. While, to our knowledge, no departments have done this, it is our belief that the policy could have the following advantages:

- The elite image of the unit may be reduced due to the fact that officers assigned to the unit will be reintegrated into either the patrol division or will join another division of the department when their tenure is over. Forced attrition will also provide more officers with an opportunity to serve on a specialized unit during their careers.
- The level and quality of experience of officers in the general patrol division and perhaps in other divisions will increase as officers rejoin the patrol division or take other assignments upon completing their tour of duty on specialized patrol. This will be particularly valuable in those departments which are either considering or have already implemented directed patrol activities.
- The ability to coordinate the activities of specialized units with the general patrol and detective divisions and to receive their cooperation may be enhanced due to the assignment of former members of the unit to these divisions.

As indicated, few departments have considered the stipulation of a maximum tour of duty. It is our belief that, for the reasons outlined above, it is a policy worthy of consideration by all departments. However, in assessing the merits of this policy, departments should also be aware of several potential drawbacks. The policy would require that the selection process be carried out more frequently, and small departments might eventually encounter difficulties in finding enough qualified officers to replace those who have been reassigned from specialized patrol to other positions. Finally, the costs of training would be increased somewhat, although the departments would reap some overall benefits from having more officers trained and experienced in specialized patrol.

CHAPTER 5

DEPLOYMENT

A. The Importance of Crime Analysis

The deployment of a specialized patrol unit -- the determination of where and at what times it should operate within a jurisdiction -- should be guided by systematic crime analysis. Historically, the police have devoted most of their resources to reacting to crime incidents after their occurrence. Specialized patrol units generally attempt to identify crime patterns, and to anticipate the location and time of suppressible crimes in order either to deter them or to apprehend the perpetrators while the crime is in progress. As a consequence, the more information that can be developed about these crimes and the more clearly they can be understood, the more effective will be efforts of specialized units to cope with them. As an influential student of law enforcement recently stated, "It would seem essential for an agency that focuses on a specific crime category, such as robbery or auto theft, to take the problem apart prior to exploring new ways in which it can be attacked."¹

Crime analysis is the process of systematically examining recent crime incidents and criminal behavior in an effort to identify crime patterns and characteristics so as to permit the effective deployment of personnel and resources and the adoption of appropriate strategies and tactics. The purpose of crime analysis for specialized patrol is to provide early identification of emerging crime problems, to indicate the probability that target crimes will occur at particular times and locations, and to identify possible suspects. The quality of crime analysis can make the difference between successful and unsuccessful specialized patrol operations. The conclusion of a recent evaluation of eight specialized patrol projects in Virginia underscored this point: "A continuing operations planning crime analysis capability contributed significantly to the productivity and effectiveness of the respective H.I.T. High Incidence Target program police units."²

¹ Herman Goldstein, Policing a Free Society (unpublished manuscript, n.d.), p. 183.

² Arthur Young and Company, HIT Program Evaluation Handbook, Volume II - Evaluative Findings (Richmond, Virginia: Commonwealth of Virginia, Division of Justice and Crime Prevention, 1975), p. V-52.

Virtually all specialized patrol units make use of some form of crime analysis; however, approaches to analysis and the quality of the results vary widely. Crime analysis may involve:

- the informal analysis of patrol officers;
- the informal judgement of command and supervisory personnel;
- simple, straightforward tabulations of crime occurrences;
- carefully developed, elaborate manual analysis procedures; and/or
- highly sophisticated, computerized analysis routines.

In addition to the departmental analysis, community perceptions of particular crime problems are also commonly taken into account.

The amount of effort and care devoted to crime analysis usually depends upon the nature of the crime problems facing a department, the capabilities of its personnel, and the availability of necessary resources. Not all departments can afford to develop sophisticated, computerized crime analysis systems such as the Dallas Police Department's Real-Time Tactical Deployment Project and the Los Angeles Police Department's Pattern Recognition and Information Correlation (PATRIC) System; and the identification and understanding of some crime patterns, such as the frequent robbery of transients on skid row, do not require great analytical skills. However, as a general rule, a department should strive to support its specialized patrol operations with as much crime- and suspect-specific analysis as it is capable of providing. Even where the characteristics of a jurisdiction's crime problems are thought to be fairly simple and straightforward, systematic crime analysis can provide confirmation of informal judgements. It insures that a department is keeping abreast of developing problems, and it provides the capability of analyzing more difficult, intractable problems which might emerge in the future.

This chapter does not present a detailed, step-by-step discussion of crime analysis procedures and techniques. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this manual, and it would be unnecessarily redundant with a readily-available and pertinent

report, Police Crime Analysis Unit Handbook.³ This Handbook contains excellent practical instructions and advice about the conduct of crime analysis, providing detailed consideration of: (1) manual crime analysis for small departments; (2) semi-automated systems for medium-sized departments; and (3) fully-automated systems for large departments. It thus provides guidance to departments with various needs and capabilities. Given the availability and content of this Handbook, this chapter seeks only to highlight aspects of crime analysis which are of particular relevance to specialized patrol. It presents a discussion of the sources and collection of data for crime analysis, methods of crime analysis for specialized patrol, and the influence of other considerations on deployment decisions. Departments with little experience in crime analysis should use this chapter in conjunction with the Police Crime Analysis Unit Handbook.

B. Data Sources and Collection

The results of crime analysis can be only as good as the data on which the analysis is based. Most of the data used in crime analysis are drawn from reports generated routinely by operational divisions of a department. Available reports typically include: incident or offense reports; investigative or crime follow-up reports; arrest reports; and field interrogation reports. These documents will provide information concerning: the incidence of reported crimes; their locations and times of occurrence; suspect and vehicle identifications; the methods of criminal operation; the characteristics of victims; the characteristics of property losses; the names and addresses of witnesses; the characteristics and movements of prime suspects and their associates; and the characteristics of known offenders.

The format of routine reports and their level of detail varies substantially from department to department. For the purpose of crime analysis it is important that routine reports contain as much detail as officers and investigators can reasonably be expected to gather. For example, in analyzing a series of burglaries involving the theft of office machines from commercial establishments, it is certainly important to know when and where recent offenses occurred, how entry was gained and what was stolen. In addition to this routinely gathered information, however, it can also be helpful to know whether only specific types of office

³ George A. Buck, *et al.*, Police Crime Analysis Unit Handbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1973). Available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Stock number: 2700-00232; price: \$1.75.

machines were stolen while others were left untouched; whether the point of entry was open or concealed; whether the burglarized establishment had interior lighting; and the characteristics of the area surrounding the establishment. In short, if they have the ability and willingness to use it, making more detailed information available to crime analysis personnel is an excellent and relatively simple way of improving the analysis function. It is recognized that patrol officers and investigators have heavy workloads and can only be expected to produce so much information about crime occurrences. However, it would be extremely helpful for a department's crime analysts to review reporting forms and make suggestions concerning changes or additions which would facilitate the analysis of specific crime problems in order that specialized units can be effectively guided to counteract the problems. The possibility of periodically issuing special requests for particular types of information, such as field interrogation reports on particular suspects, should also be considered.

In collecting information, procedures should be established to insure that the data are valid and reliable. Inaccurate information is often worse than no information at all. In addition, it is extremely important that requisite information be received on a timely and regular basis. Since crime patterns can change rapidly, crime analysts should receive all required reports quickly -- at least within 24 hours of the occurrence of an event. They should also receive reports on attempted crime occurrences, since knowledge of unsuccessful attempts can be extremely important in the analysis of crime patterns. All collected data should be carefully indexed and cross-referenced so that particular aspects of separate incidents can be compared. Unless the data are organized to facilitate easy access to various types of information such as suspect characteristics, victim characteristics, time of incident occurrence, etc., systematic pattern identification and analysis will be virtually impossible.

In addition to data from routine departmental reports, specialized units often make use of other sources of information in analyzing crime patterns and making deployment decisions. These include: case dispositions of arrested suspects; prisoner debriefings; lists of offenders recently released from custody; information from other jurisdictions; and soft intelligence developed by regular patrol officers and investigators, including information from informants. Information from these other sources allows crime analysis personnel to maintain up-to-date known offender files; to identify and analyze inter-jurisdictional crime patterns; and to acquire an understanding of suspect activities which cannot be gained solely from the statistical analysis of formal reports.

A number of specialized units -- such as Miami's STOP Robbery/Burglary Unit, Tucson's Special Problems Detail, and the High Incidence Target programs in Newport News and Virginia Beach, Virginia -- make extensive use of information provided by informants. This information is particularly helpful in identifying suspects for surveillance and possible stake-out targets. Many departments have found that tips from informants can greatly facilitate the apprehension of suspects. For example, in Newport News, the H.I.T. Unit made 38 separate payments totaling \$2,650 from its informants' fund in one year, which resulted in 63 arrests and 79 case clearances; and the Virginia Beach H.I.T. Unit spent \$810, which led to 48 arrests and 129 case clearances.⁴

If the use of informants is to be emphasized, it is important that specific procedures be developed for working informants and making payments from an informants' fund. This will help to avoid allegations that known offenders are being allowed to buy their freedom by providing information, or that money from an informants' fund is being improperly used. It will also reduce the likelihood that several officers are paying the same informant for the same information. For example, the STOP Robbery/Burglary Unit in Miami has adopted detailed procedures for drawing and accounting for money from its informants' fund. These include the following: officers are required to explain in writing their reasons for requesting funds, to receive formal supervisory approval of the request, and to obtain a receipt from the informant which is dated and signed by a witness. While these procedures might be thought to detract from an officer's ability to use informants, the Miami Unit has found that in reality such procedures do not unduly constrain operations. The standard operating procedures governing payments from Miami's informants' fund are presented in Appendix B.

Finally, it is extremely important that specialized operations do not overlook the general patrol and investigative divisions as information resources. General patrol officers and investigators can provide a wealth of useful crime-related information to guide the deployment of specialized units. Unfortunately, however, in many departments there is a long-standing tradition which inhibits the sharing of information. Specialized units have often found that detectives are willing to provide information only on cases which are more or less played out, and that the negative feelings of patrol officers toward specialized units reduce their willingness to share information about their beats. This problem of cooperation and exchange of information between units can be at least partially overcome if specialized units and crime

⁴ Arthur Young and Company, *op. cit.*, p. V-22.

analysis personnel make a special effort to establish a close working relationship with the patrol force and detective division. In Wilmington, Delaware's Bureau of Police, the commander of the Special Operations Division (S.O.D.), which is responsible for crime analysis, meets daily with the commanders of the patrol and detective divisions to exchange information and discuss crime patterns and appropriate strategies and tactics. The division also has established a task force made up of officers from different segments of the Bureau. One of its functions is to provide S.O.D. with periodic input from officers concerning their perceptions of current and emerging crime patterns in the city.

C. The Analysis Process

In order to determine the optimal deployment pattern for a specialized unit, the crime analysts should identify crime patterns which are serious enough to warrant the attention of specialized units; and each identified pattern should be carefully analyzed in an effort to develop information and insights which can assist in the selection of appropriate approaches to controlling or disrupting it. Crime patterns are generally identified through an examination of the geographical locations, dates and times of reported incidents, and through a corollary analysis of suspect descriptions and methods of criminal operation (M.O.'s). A pattern can be said to emerge whenever there is a concentration of a particular type of crime or whenever the analysis of suspect information suggests that a given individual or group of individuals is responsible for a series of crimes throughout a jurisdiction.

The following pages present a discussion of the three principal aspects of crime analysis:

- Spatial and temporal crime pattern identification;
- In-depth crime pattern analysis; and
- Suspect analysis.

1. Spatial and Temporal Crime Pattern Identification

The most common approach to identifying crime patterns relies upon geographic analysis of crime occurrences. Geographic pattern identification simply involves examining and mapping the location of crime incidents over a period of time. This is generally accomplished by counting, for a predetermined time frame, the number of crimes by type of crime in specific geographical areas (such as precincts, beats or census tracts). This is followed by

an examination of the dates and times of each crime occurrence. The determined level of crime in the area is then compared with a pre-established standard. The standard for comparison may be either crime levels in other areas of the jurisdiction or the level of crime in the target area during previous analysis periods. If the comparison indicates that the target area has a relatively high incidence of a particular type of crime as compared to other areas in the jurisdiction, or if the level of crime in the area has risen significantly above its recent historical norm, then it should be considered as a possible location for specialized patrol operations.

Examples of this type of analysis include:

- The New York City Police Department's Street Crime Unit, which deploys primarily on the basis of monthly rankings of the city's precincts in terms of the incidence levels of suppressible crime, especially robbery. The Street Crime Unit generally attempts to deploy squad teams in the ten precincts with the highest levels of reported target crimes for the previous month.
- The Atlanta Police Department's Anti-Robbery Unit, which continually monitors the level of its target crimes (pedestrian robbery, commercial robbery, residential robbery, inside robberies, and robbery of taxis, delivery vans, etc.) in the city's census tracts and redeploys weekly on the basis of changes in the level of reported target crimes. Unlike New York's S.C.U., there is no strict decision-making rule for finally selecting the tracts in which the unit is to be deployed.
- The Los Angeles Police Department's Metropolitan Division which rates each of the city's 17 police areas in terms of the incidence of four principal target crimes: robbery, burglary, auto theft and auto larceny, and uses these ratings to provide general guidance to weekly deployment decisions. Metro squads are not always assigned to the highest crime areas. Of particular importance in Metro's crime analysis are changes in the level of target crimes from their historical norm in a given area. Thus, one area might have a higher robbery rate than another, but if the robbery rate in the second area represents a significant upward departure from its norm, then this is considered indicative of a possible emerging pattern which might be productively worked by a Metro squad.

There are several approaches to conducting an initial geographical analysis of crime rates and patterns, including statistical analysis, graphic displays of reported crimes by area of occurrence, and mapping of crime incidents. Graphs can be used to present a comparative display of crime rates and trends in different areas of a jurisdiction. Statistical analysis can indicate the percentage of a particular type of crime which occurred in a specific geographic area and can provide a precise indicator of the extent to which the current crime rate represents a deviation from the area's historical norm. Finally, mapping involves the visual display of the locations of different types of crime occurrences throughout a jurisdiction for a particular time period.

While all three techniques -- graphs, statistical analysis, and crime mapping -- are widely used, crime maps play a particularly prominent role in the analysis conducted by or for most specialized patrol operations. Crime maps range from the simple traditional pin maps, to acetate overlay maps which facilitate the visual examination of changes in crime location patterns over time, to highly sophisticated computerized systems which automatically identify geographic concentrations of crime incidents and develop computerized maps. Regardless of the approach to generating crime maps, maps can and should present information beyond the location of particular types of crimes. Various symbols can be used to provide information concerning the dates and times of crime occurrences, victim and offender characteristics, types of property stolen, case numbers, etc. For example, the color of the pins or plastic dots on a map of recent commercial robberies could indicate the type of establishment which was robbed.⁵ In general, it is useful to provide as much detail as possible on crime maps. Separate maps can be used for different crime categories to permit detailed presentation while avoiding undue clutter.

2. In-Depth Crime Pattern Analysis

The second phase in the geographical analysis of crime patterns involves a more detailed, in-depth examination of the nature and characteristics of the specific criminal activity in high crime areas. This phase in the analysis is designed to determine whether the identified geographical concentrations of crime depicted on the crime maps or suggested by the statistical analysis represent patterns which could be effectively addressed by specialized operations. If so, the analysis should provide direction to the selection of particular strategies and tactics which might best be employed in dealing with the identified crime problems.

⁵ Example drawn from George A. Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

Analysis in this phase should focus on examining:

- the precise locations of target offenses within the selected geographical areas;
- suspect descriptions;
- victim characteristics;
- M.O.'s common to a number of offenses;
- property losses; etc.

This analysis constitutes an attempt to develop a detailed picture of particular crime patterns in order to select specific deployment locations, identify possible suspects, and develop appropriate strategies and tactics.

In New York, following the initial identification of target areas, the Street Crime Unit reviews relevant precinct crime analysis reports to gain information about the precise locations and times of target crimes, victim and suspect descriptions, and methods of operation. Spot maps are developed for each selected precinct and information packets about the area and its crime problems are prepared and disseminated to S.C.U. personnel. On the basis of this analysis, S.C.U. squad teams are deployed to particular zones within the selected precincts.

In Atlanta, Anti-Robbery decoy teams are assigned to work a two- to four-block area around a particular intersection. These areas are selected by a pin map analysis of the exact locations of street robberies in the previously-identified high crime census tract. Victim and offender characteristics are also examined to develop the appropriate dress, demeanor and disguises for decoys and to identify probable suspects.

In Los Angeles, after identifying areas which have experienced a particularly notable increase in the incidence of target crimes, the Metro Division's crime analyst reviews all available information about the areas' crime patterns to develop an understanding of their particular characteristics. Area patrol supervisors and investigators are also contacted to gain their perceptions of the patterns and their suggestions as to how these patterns might be effectively disrupted.

There is a variety of techniques which can be used in conducting in-depth analyses of identified geographical crime patterns. Most of these techniques involve efforts to develop

correlations between the patterns of particular crime occurrences and factors which might help to explain the patterns. The conduct of this type of analysis requires carefully cross-indexed files which allow analysts to link the data elements drawn from different sources with one another. For example, field interrogation reports, incident reports, and known offender information should be filed so that victim or witness descriptions of suspects and vehicles contained in the incident reports can be matched with similar information drawn from field interrogation reports and known offender files. It is essential, therefore, that files be cross-referenced according to specific types of crime; dates, times, and locations of crime occurrences; suspect and vehicle descriptions; M.O.'s; characteristics of property stolen; etc. A carefully cross-indexed filing system will permit access to relevant reports on the basis of only limited bits of information about a particular crime. For example, it should be possible to search field interrogation report files for information which might match an incomplete license number recorded on an incident report and to compare suspect characteristics from victim and witness descriptions with descriptions in a known offender file.

In carrying out the detailed analysis of identified crime patterns, an effort should be made to correlate and compare available data on all aspects of particular incidents. In addition, attention should be paid to factors which are not available in police information systems. For example, a rash of daytime residential burglaries in the vicinity of a school which has a high level of truancy would suggest that the offenders might be juveniles. The hypothesis that the offenders are juveniles could be examined further by analyzing the M.O.'s associated with the burglaries and the types of property that have been stolen. M.O.'s which indicate that the burglaries have been committed by relatively inexperienced burglars would lend credibility to the hypothesis; and theft of property, such as liquor, which is not readily available to juveniles, would provide further confirmation. As a result of this analysis, specialized patrol operations focusing on truants might be appropriately undertaken to combat the burglary problem. In sum, in analyzing crime patterns, the analyst should consider anything which might help to indicate when, where, how, and by whom future target crimes might be committed, and the available data should be used to test logical hypotheses which, if borne out, could have significant implications for the choice of strategies and tactics.

Crime mapping procedures can also be used to assist in this detailed analysis of crime patterns. As indicated above, crime maps can present information ranging far beyond the identification of the locations of particular types of incidents. An

example of the innovative use of mapping as a tool for in-depth crime analysis is the Miami Police Department's Juvenile Neighborhood Search Analysis Program. This program is based on the department's observation that many juvenile offenders, probably due to lack of transportation and experience, often commit crimes in their own neighborhoods and are likely to leave latent fingerprints. Based on such assumptions, the department's Criminal Identification Unit adopted a method of fingerprint searching in which the identification numbers of young offenders who have previously been fingerprinted are entered on maps to indicate the location of the individual's home. Over 1,300 juveniles have been recorded on these maps. When a crime occurs and latent prints are obtained, crime analysts try to match the prints against those of the known juvenile offenders living in the area. For one two-month period, the program produced suspect identifications which led to arrests in 26 separate felony cases.

3. Suspect Analysis

The analysis of geographic crime patterns attempts, in a secondary analysis, to use suspect-specific information to enhance the understanding of identified crime patterns. Another distinct, yet closely related approach to crime analysis concentrates entirely on analyzing suspect-specific data, examining geographical patterns only as they are related to the activities of a particular suspect or group of suspects.

Specialized patrol units which engage primarily in suspect surveillance, such as Tucson's Special Problems Detail, commonly use this approach. S.P.D. focuses on criminals rather than particular crimes. It deploys primarily on the basis of intelligence and suspect information provided by informants, detectives, prisoner debriefings, and field interrogation reports. The unit maintains a filing system for documenting and cross-referencing data on suspects.

The Kansas City Police Department had a somewhat similar unit several years ago. Analysis for the deployment of officers in the department's Perpetrator Oriented Patrol project involved keeping track of the whereabouts and activities of known or suspected offenders and their associates. The department's Crime Information Center developed and maintained files on robbery and burglary suspects. Information packets were assembled for each suspect, including his name, address, physical description, mug shot, associates, vehicles, M.O., past record, and current status in the criminal justice system. Using this information, officers carried out surveillance of the target subjects.

Of necessity, the analysis of suspect-specific information to develop targets for surveillance or frequent field interrogation tends to be somewhat less systematic, although no less difficult, than the analysis of geographic crime patterns. Much of the data used in this type of analysis is drawn from soft intelligence and cannot be analyzed quantitatively. The basic purpose of suspect-specific analysis is to collect enough information about possible suspects to indicate whether or not surveillance of their activities would be potentially productive; and to learn enough about their daily behavior patterns to make surveillance possible.

* * * * *

The basic analysis of geographical and temporal crime patterns is not a particularly difficult task. It does not generally demand a tremendous amount of effort or special expertise. More sophisticated types of analysis involving the comparative examination of many elements in separate crime incidents can require a great deal of skill and perseverance, and an intuitive understanding of the problems being analyzed. In conducting any type of crime analysis, it should be recognized that crime analysis is not a very advanced science. Even when it is conducted with a great deal of expertise, departments should not be disappointed if crime analysis does not lead to dramatic increases in apprehensions and reductions in crime. Crime analysis is the most rational basis on which to deploy specialized patrol units, but it cannot be realistically expected to provide instant or easy answers to a jurisdiction's crime problems.

The following are some general observations on the process of crime analysis which may be of assistance to departments interested either in developing an analytical capability to support specialized patrol operations or in upgrading an existing crime analysis capability.

First, in conducting crime analysis, departments should not use artificial geographic units as the basic unit for pattern analysis. The use of beats, census tracts, precincts, or other predetermined geographical areas as units for data collection and analysis is problematic because crime is generally not uniformly distributed within a given area. A detailed study of robbery in Oakland, California, found that the use of beats as the basic unit of analysis greatly obscured the actual geographical patterns of robberies.⁶ In the 3 1/2 year period covered by the study,

⁶ Floyd Feeney and Adrienne Weir, The Prevention and Control of Robbery: A Summary (Davis, California: The Center on Administration of Criminal Justice, University of California at Davis, 1974), pp. 57-64.

Oakland had one of the highest per capita robbery rates in the country; however, two-thirds of the half-block size areas in the city has no robberies or purse-snatches at all. Robberies were found to be linearly distributed along the city's major streets. These streets are also the boundaries of census tracts and police beats. Thus, use of these areas in analysis would distort the actual pattern of robbery. A census tract or beat bounded by major streets could be shown as having an extremely high level of robbery when, in fact, most of the area is relatively free of the crime. The use of specific geographical areas as units of data collection and analysis can also obscure the identification of patterns which overlap different areas.

This problem can be overcome by the use of maps which show the exact location of crime occurrences without regard to an artificially established boundary. The maps will visually display incident clusters, independent of their beat or census tract locations. It is also helpful to use a system of x, y coordinates which divide a jurisdiction into a grid to plot crime occurrences. As the size of the grid decreases, the patterns of reported crimes become clearer.

Second, most crime analysis represents an attempt to predict at least the general locations, dates and times of probable crime occurrences and the characteristics of likely perpetrators. Some departments, especially those with sophisticated, computerized crime analysis systems, have attempted to develop models to predict the actual level and locations of particular types of crime. To date, most of these efforts have not lived up to initial expectations. As a recent evaluation of the Real-Time Tactical Deployment Project in Dallas, Texas, concluded: "Findings of the Crime Prediction Feasibility Study indicate that there are no major breakthroughs in the crime prediction modeling field at this time, and that resources would be better utilized through continued enhancements to the existing RTD system capability."⁷

In spite of this pessimistic assessment of the efficacy of crime prediction techniques, at least one crime analysis unit, the Miami Police Department's Criminal Information Center, occasionally makes predictions concerning specific crime incidents.

⁷ Dallas Police Department and System Development Corporation, Real-Time Tactical Deployment Project: Evaluation and Final Report (Dallas, Texas: Dallas Police Department, 1975), pp. 2-7.

The following is an example of a prediction made in one of C.I.C.'s weekly robbery reports. All names, addresses, and descriptions have been changed to conceal the identity of the suspects.

A new turn of events has given rise to a need for special attention to an area never before troubled by repetitive criminal activity. In zone 22 in the area of Garden Grove Elementary School there has been an unprecedented amount of strong armed robberies. Within this last week three have occurred with a total of five for the month and one armed robbery. All strong armed robbery attacks have been during school days and have taken place between 0900 and 1300 hours. The most frequent day is Thursday between 1200 and 1300 hours. All of these incidents have been near 3942 N.W. 8 Street and around the school building by groups of negro male juveniles. The M.O. used is to attack white female juveniles from the school or old white females carrying a purse. I am forecasting that a similar type incident will occur on Thursday, January 23, 1975, at 1220 hours within the same area. Negro male juvenile John Doe, age 14, 5'4", 118 lbs., of 1117 N.W. 7 Street, #3333 is known to be working this area. Some of his friends are:

N/M Frank Smith aka "Smitty"
N/M Ralph Jones
N/M James Jones
N/M Bob Brown

There is no further information on above subjects except that they may attend Grover Cleveland or Garden Grove Schools. It is the opinion of this writer that Doe's home may be the base of operations.

This prediction proved to be quite accurate. It led to the apprehension of four of the five suspects. Over a period of several months, C.I.C. made ten such predictions, seven of which were successful. The predictions are made by the skilled and systematic use of standard, manual crime analysis techniques supported by an extensive, carefully cross-referenced set of data files and sufficient clerical support to maintain and access the files. The accuracy of the predictions also depends greatly upon the informed judgement and hunches of an experienced patrol officer. It should be emphasized that the prediction of actual crime occurrences is extremely difficult and can only be realistically attempted on those fairly infrequent occasions when analysis of data, soft intelligence, and hunches suggest that the occurrence of a particular incident

or set of incidents is highly probable. The example presented here is not intended to be an expectation of what crime analysis should be able to accomplish on a regular basis. Rather, it is meant to indicate the level of detail and precision which crime analysis should strive for. Efforts to make predictions can force crime analysis to attempt to achieve a high degree of specificity in their pattern and suspect-specific analyses. Little is lost if the predictions are inaccurate and much can be gained from attempting to make them.

Third, crime analysis should be a continuous process. The impact of specialized patrol operations on their target crime patterns should be monitored constantly. The possibility of crime displacement as the result of specialized operations should be followed closely as should the emergence of new crime patterns. It is extremely wasteful to leave specialized patrol officers assigned to work on a particular problem after they have cleared up the problem or disrupted its pattern significantly. This will tend to reduce their productivity substantially and, where it has occurred, it has led to a sharp drop in morale. For these reasons, it is extremely unwise to deploy specialized units for predetermined periods of time. Deployment decisions should be under constant scrutiny. Some crime patterns may be disrupted rather quickly by specialized operations, while others may require extended effort. In addition, the relative seriousness of some problems may diminish in the face of new and more urgent concerns in other parts of the jurisdiction.

The impact of specialized patrol operations can be monitored by looking at changes in the level and patterns of target crime problems and at indicators of productivity such as the frequency of "hits" at stake-out locations, and changes in the number of officer-days per arrest. Monitoring the impact of specialized units also provides an excellent indicator of the effectiveness of crime analysis in directing deployment decisions and providing information which assists in the selection of strategies and tactics.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that while crime analysis generally relies on reported crime incidents, victimization surveys indicate that for most crime categories reported crime rates greatly understate the actual level of crime. It is difficult to handle this problem in the analysis process, since the relationship between reported and unreported crime is not clearly understood. There is no way of predicting the amount of actual crime from reported crime rates. Nevertheless, analysts should be aware that their data usually provide only a partial indication of the scope and nature of crime patterns. Most crime patterns

are much more extensive and severe than data from offense reports indicate.

D. Deployment on the Basis of Other Considerations

In theory, the deployment of specialized units should be based upon crime analysis; in fact, deployment decisions are frequently governed by other considerations. Specialized patrol units in many jurisdictions are looked upon as available pools of officers who can be called upon to provide VIP protection or to police special events. The problem of responding to these needs is minimal if the unit recognizes that these assignments are clearly within its area of responsibility and if such activities can be scheduled in advance to minimize the degree to which on-going operations are disrupted. There are, however, three categories of events which can and do create significant problems for specialized patrol units:

- (1) Dispatchers may occasionally interrupt specialized operations by assigning a specialized patrol mobile unit to handle a call for service in order to avoid dispatch delays and the queueing of calls for service.
- (2) It is not uncommon for area or precinct commanders to request that a specialized unit address particular problems within their area or precinct.
- (3) It is not uncommon for police administrators to call on a specialized patrol unit to deal with a highly publicized or politicized crime problem.

The first problem, that of dispatcher assignment, can be readily handled: strict guidelines must be laid down forbidding the routine assignment of specialized patrol mobile units to calls for service unless the specialized unit has requested that certain types of calls be assigned directly to its officers. Otherwise, the specialized patrol officers assigned to mobile units should not be allowed to accept dispatcher assignments. The other two problems are not so easily resolved.

While patrol administrators must be sensitive to the needs and demands of the community, and while a specialized patrol unit's responsiveness to the requests of precinct commanders can enhance the level of cooperation and support it receives from the general patrol force, it is extremely important that the capabilities of the unit, its on-going activities, and the appropriateness of requested assignments be carefully considered prior to interrupting on-going operations in response to such requests. There are several reasons for the exercise of such caution:

- The strategies and tactics of a unit deployed against a particular crime pattern may require continuity through time if they are to be effective in disrupting the targeted crime pattern. As a consequence, premature or temporary reassignment of the unit to address another problem may significantly undermine the effectiveness of an on-going operation in which considerable resources have already been invested.
- A highly politicized or well-publicized crime problem may, in fact, not constitute an appropriate target for specialized patrol, and assignment of a specialized unit to address the problem may constitute a significant misuse of the unit's resources. As has been emphasized, specialized patrol units are most appropriately used to address well-established or emerging crime patterns; not disparate events.
- If the crime analysis function is being carried out properly, then a specialized unit will be routinely targeting on the most significant patterned crime problems in a jurisdiction. While there may be considerable overlap between the problems identified for attention by crime analysis and those for which special attention is requested, such may not always be the case. Before special requests are honored, care should be taken to determine whether or not the requested assignment is in fact more important than the problems routinely targeted by the unit.

Specialized patrol units are typically deployed to work on the most significant patterned crime problems in a jurisdiction. While individual area or precinct commanders may feel their particular needs to be paramount, specialized units must assign relative priorities to a variety of needs and deploy with the best interest of the entire jurisdiction in mind. There are of course extenuating circumstances. Community pressure and the media coverage devoted to a particular problem can be so intense that the credibility of the police could be undermined if they failed to pay special attention to the problem, even if they believe it to be of relatively low priority. In such cases, a specialized unit may be left with virtually no choice in responding to a request. However, as a general rule, while all requests should be given careful consideration, deployment decisions should be made primarily on the basis

of crime analysis. When special requests have to be denied, the reasons should be thoroughly explained to the individuals or groups making the requests.

CHAPTER 6

SPECIALIZED PATROL TACTICS

Specialized patrol operations employ a variety of tactics in attempting to control identified crime problems. The most common include:

- uniformed tactical patrol;
- decoy operations;
- physical and electronic stake-outs; and
- suspect and area surveillance.

This chapter discusses these tactics in terms of their target crimes, operation requirements and characteristics, and established or perceived levels of effectiveness. Although conceptually stake-outs are really a form of surveillance, the two tactics are treated separately here. Stake-outs are normally focused on specific locations, while surveillance involves monitoring the activities of particular suspects or observing suspicious behavior in high-crime areas. The two tactics have somewhat different operational requirements and a distinction between them is frequently made by police practitioners.

The appropriateness of a given tactic depends upon the characteristics of a particular crime problem and upon assumptions concerning the most effective means of dealing with that crime. Some specialized units, as a matter of policy, employ only one or two specialized patrol tactics. In large departments with several specialized units, each using a particular tactic or set of tactics to address persistent crime problems, this may be an adequate arrangement. However, for smaller departments which may face more transitory crime problems, this practice greatly limits the flexibility of a specialized patrol unit and the types of problems it can address effectively. Some tactics are more appropriate for handling certain types of crime than others. Selection of specialized patrol tactics should be made on the basis of a careful and continuous analysis of crime problems. The selection of tactics should not be made on an *a priori* basis. For example, there is no point in having a squad of officers dedicated strictly to the surveillance of multiple offenders if the squad is having difficulty

identifying individuals to follow. Their efforts might be better devoted to other tasks.

In addition, as shown in Exhibit 6-1, most crimes can be addressed by more than one tactic. In attempting to cope with a particular crime problem, a specialized unit should take a flexible approach to the selection of tactics. Several tactics might be tried in an effort to find the optimal one, and it is quite possible that the most effective approach to a given crime problem will include the combination of several tactics. For example, highly visible saturation patrol might be used against street robbery in a particular area with decoy teams deployed in adjacent areas to make apprehensions for the crimes displaced as a result of the saturation patrol.

A recent evaluation of eight specialized patrol projects concluded that a major problem in the operation of the projects was that most of them "developed a single specific overall strategy but did not develop alternative strategies in order to determine by detailed comparison the optimal strategy. Thus, the choice or options available to each jurisdiction were extremely limited."¹

A. Uniformed Tactical Patrol

Uniformed tactical patrol is the most traditional and one of the most widely used forms of specialized patrol. It is a fairly simple, straightforward approach to specialized patrol which involves the same procedures and techniques used by general patrol officers when they are not handling calls for services. These include: constant visible movement throughout an area to generate a sense of police presence; careful observation of street activity; vehicle and pedestrian stops; citizen contacts, etc. The principal differences between these two types of patrol is that uniformed tactical patrol employs these tactics in an intense, concentrated fashion. Officers are relieved of the responsibility for responding to routine calls for services so that they can devote their full time and attention to patrol, thus intensifying its impact. In addition, uniformed tactical patrol operations typically deploy a number of officers in particular target areas, thereby greatly

¹ Arthur Young and Company, HIT Program Evaluation Handbook, Volume II: Evaluation Findings (Richmond, Virginia: Commonwealth of Virginia, Division of Justice and Crime Prevention, 1975), p. VI-11.

EXHIBIT 6-1

SPECIALIZED PATROL TACTICS AND TARGET CRIMES

Target Crime	Tactical Alternatives
Street robbery	Uniformed tactical patrol; Decoy operations; Suspect surveillance; Area surveillance.
Commercial robbery	Physical stake-outs; Electronic stake-outs; Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance.
Residential robbery	Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance.
Purse snatches	Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance; Decoys.
Residential burglary	Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance.
Commercial burglary	Uniformed tactical patrol; Physical stake-outs; Electronic stake-outs; Suspect surveillance; Area surveillance.
Vehicle theft	Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance; Decoy operations.
Theft from vehicles	Uniformed tactical patrol; Decoy operations; Area surveillance.
Rape	Decoy operations; Uniformed tactical patrol; Suspect surveillance; Area surveillance.

increasing the level of patrol in these areas.

Uniformed tactical patrol can be used to control virtually any type of suppressible crime, i.e., crimes which can be viewed from locations where the police have a legitimate right to be and can therefore be potentially affected by police operations. These suppressible crimes include: street robbery; purse snatches; commercial robbery; vehicle theft; residential burglary; commercial burglary, etc. Uniformed tactical patrol can also have an impact on other types of crime as officers develop information on the whereabouts, activities, vehicles and associates of suspects through observation, field interrogations, and citizen contacts.

The primary purpose of uniformed tactical patrol is deterrence. The use of this tactic is based on the assumption that highly visible, active patrol will deter potential offenders. By increasing the perceived probability of apprehension, conspicuous patrol is thought to reduce the likelihood that crimes will occur and, should deterrence fail, heightened patrol coverage is believed to increase the probability of the immediate apprehension of the suspects.

Uniformed tactical patrol is frequently used to saturate an area which is experiencing a particularly serious crime problem. Although it has been widely used for years, saturation patrol has never been clearly and adequately defined. Exactly what level and intensity of patrol constitutes saturation has never been determined, nor have the effects of different levels of patrol been clearly established. It is thus extremely difficult to prescribe the level of uniformed tactical patrol which should be used to disrupt a crime pattern in a particular area. This should be determined through an analysis of the size and characteristics of the area of concentration of each potential target crime pattern, coupled with an assessment of manpower availability.

Some patterns can be effectively handled by very small increases in the level of patrol. For example, in Portland, Oregon, Operation CRIMP (Crime Reduction Involving Many People) had a significant impact on street robberies and assaults in the city's skid row area by initiating two two-officer uniformed foot beats in the area. This was sufficient to saturate the primary locations of the target crimes during the high crime hours, and it led to a substantial reduction in these crimes with little apparent spillover into adjacent areas. Other departments have used saturation patrol on a much larger scale. For example, in the mid-1950's, the New York City Police Department attempted to saturate an entire precinct by assigning well over 200 additional officers to the

precinct's patrol force. Foot beats covering extremely small areas were arranged in straight lines so that an officer could keep the entire street area of his beat in view at all times. The four-month experiment led to a dramatic reduction in crime in the precinct. Compared with the same period in the previous year, street muggings fell by 89.9%, burglaries where entry was made from the front of the building dropped by 78%, and so on. The only crime category which was not affected was the relatively private crime of murder. Since crime displacement was not examined in the experiment, its true impact remains unknown. However, Operation 25 does strongly suggest that massive additions of police manpower can have a substantial effect on crime. The problem is that most departments do not have the wherewithal to conduct even a limited version of Operation 25.

In short, the amount of resources required for saturation patrol can vary tremendously, and there is no definite way of determining how much additional patrol is needed. This can best be decided on a problem-by-problem basis, using experience and evaluations of past efforts as a guide. As a general rule, the augmentation of patrol should be sufficient to affect rather quickly the perceptions of would-be offenders concerning the level of police activity in a particular area. As one analyst concluded, "It appears to be essential for such a strategy to be effective that sufficient resources be applied in a limited area to ensure a true 'saturation' effect."²

Uniformed tactical patrol operations can make use of various modes of transportation. Patrol cars are most often used; however, foot patrol can be effective in congested downtown business districts, and motor bikes have been used to good advantage in high density residential areas. Visibility, mobility and access to citizens should guide the choice of appropriate modes of transportation.

Some specialized units deploy uniformed officers in unmarked police cars. This is done in an effort to strike a balance between overt and covert patrol, hopefully gaining many of the advantages of both. Unmarked cars may also be readily available since in many departments investigators work primarily during the day, which leaves their vehicles free for specialized patrol on the evening and early morning watches. While the potential savings involved in using detectives' vehicles should not be ignored, this approach has serious drawbacks. First, unmarked police cars

² *Ibid.*, p. V-24.

are somewhat less visible than marked patrol cars, yet they are still easily recognizable as police vehicles to large segments of the public, especially when the officers in them are in uniform. Second, use of these cars in uniformed tactical patrol could lead to the sacrifice of some of the deterrent effects of high visibility without realizing the apprehension benefits of truly covert patrol.

There are several patrol techniques which have been tried to increase the visibility of uniformed patrol and enhance the sense of police omnipresence. Tandem patrol uses two marked patrol cars which follow each other at intervals of one-half to several blocks. Two units can also patrol in a parallel fashion, with one on one street and the other on a parallel street one block over or in an alley. Another approach combines foot and vehicle patrol in an effort to increase visibility. Officers park their marked cars in conspicuous locations in high crime areas; then are transported to other high crime areas where they patrol on foot. The frequent repetition of this procedure is seen as a way of multiplying patrol visibility.

Unless a target area is more or less completely saturated, as in Operation 25, patrol officers should move in a random, unpredictable pattern. This will make it difficult for potential offenders to plan their crimes on the basis of observation of patrol activities. One department found that its uniformed tactical patrol operation was actually helping burglars to commit break-ins. Interviews with confessed burglars indicated that they were aware that visible patrol units passed through the neighborhoods at fairly regular intervals and they planned their crimes accordingly.

In addition to increasing the level and visibility of patrol in high crime areas, uniformed tactical patrol operations often employ aggressive patrol tactics involving frequent vehicle and pedestrian stops. Officers stop, question, and perhaps search a citizen when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the citizen may have committed, may be committing, or may be about to commit a crime. Since the concept of "reasonable suspicion" is somewhat vague, officers have a considerable amount of leeway and discretion in conducting field interrogations. Field interrogations that do not result in either immediate arrest of the citizen or in alleviation of the officer's suspicions are usually documented in field interrogation reports.³ Field interrogations serve to

³ This discussion of field interrogations relies heavily on John E. Boydston, San Diego Field Interrogation Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1975).

generate information about the activities of probable suspects and, more importantly for deterrence, they make the suspects aware that the police know of their presence in a given area, regard them as suspicious, and are watching them closely. This is expected to reduce the likelihood that they will commit crimes, at least in the area in which the tactical force is working.

The extensive use of field interrogations is often highly controversial. Especially in high crime, low income areas where police-community relations are often strained, tactical units which emphasize field interrogations have been accused of being a department's "storm troopers" who constantly harrass citizens and abuse their rights. And, in fact, there is sometimes a certain amount of truth to the allegations of harrassment, especially when the activities of a particular type or group of suspects are being closely monitored. Not surprisingly, individuals who are stopped and questioned frequently are likely to complain, particularly if they have reason to be concerned about close police scrutiny. However, a recent study of field interrogations in San Diego found that, at least when conducted at moderate levels, "FI activities do not have a major effect on police community relations in San Diego."⁴ "The majority of citizens in all three study areas accept Field Interrogations as legitimate and properly conducted police activity..."⁵ and "the majority of all citizens who were the subjects of FI contacts felt that the contact was justified and properly conducted."⁶ The study also found that the suspension of field interrogations in a particular area was associated with a significant increase in the level of suppressible crime in that area, and that the resumption of field interrogations in the area was associated with a significant decline in the amount of suppressible crime.⁷

In short, the results of the San Diego study provide confirmation for the widely-held belief that field interrogations can have an important deterrent effect on suppressible crime without doing irreparable damage to police/community relations.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

The potentially negative impact of field interrogations on certain segments of the community can be held to a minimum if the interrogations are conducted in a professional manner. Citizens should be informed of the reasons why they are being stopped. They should be detained for as little time as possible, and they should not be subjected to verbal or physical abuse. There is also no need to stop "everything that moves." Attention should be focused on specific individuals which analysis indicates are likely suspects in target crimes.

A number of tactical operations have had success in concentrating on particular types of suspects, especially juveniles. Denver's Special Crime Attack Team found that intense, highly visible patrol was an effective way of coping with residential burglaries committed primarily by juveniles. Since they lack the means of transportation to travel very far from home, juveniles frequently commit burglaries in their own neighborhoods. Saturation of a particular neighborhood can have a substantial positive effect on its residential burglary problem, and the lack of mobility of juvenile offenders keeps the geographical displacement of crime to a minimum. Units in other departments have paid special attention to truants in an effort to reduce daytime residential burglaries. Departments in Glendale and San Bernadino, California, achieved substantial reductions in day-time residential burglaries by apprehending truants and returning them to school⁸, and an evaluation of Virginia's eight High Incidence Target projects concluded that "*truant hassle* represents the only operational strategy used in the HIT projects that has had a direct effect on crime reduction."⁹

While experience and a limited amount of research indicate that uniformed tactical patrol can have a positive impact on the level of suppressible crime in areas in which it is used, the overall effectiveness of this tactic is a controversial and much-debated issue. The principal concern is that rather than reducing crime, uniformed tactical patrol may simply lead to its displacement from one area to another or from one time period to another.

⁸ For descriptions of these programs, see: Thomas W. White, *et al.*, Police Burglary Prevention Programs (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, 1975), pp. 31-32; and Katryna J. Regan and Thomas W. White, Ten Case Studies of Police Department Burglary Prevention Programs (Washington, D.C. The Urban Institute, 1976), pp. 73-77.

⁹ Arthur Young and Company, *op. cit.*, p. V-22.

The extent to which uniformed tactical patrol actually results in crime displacement is unclear. Research on displacement has produced mixed results. For example, a recent study of three uniformed tactical patrol projects concluded that "there is no uniform pattern in either displacement of crime into surrounding areas or spillover of project benefits to the target area periphery."¹⁰ Other studies have found considerable amounts of crime displacement, some moderate amounts, while others have noted that displacement was virtually nil.¹¹ In short, there is little definite knowledge concerning : the level of crime displacement that can be caused by uniformed tactical operations; the degree to which crime displacement varies with the type of crime, criminal characteristics, and geographical area characteristics; and the areas or times to which various types of crime are displaced. However, existing evidence does suggest that crime displacement is generally not sufficiently severe to rule out the use of uniformed tactical patrol as an approach to dealing with suppressible crimes in high crime areas. And, it can even be argued that displacement can have a positive impact on crime: it disrupts existing crime patterns, and can force criminals to work in areas and under circumstances where the commission of crime is more difficult and less rewarding and the chances of apprehension are greater.

¹⁰ J.S. Dahmann, National Impact Program Evaluation: Examination of Police Patrol Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1975), p. 71.

¹¹ See, for example: Frank Budnick, An Examination of the Effects of an Increase in Intensive Police Patrol (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1971); Jan M. Chaiken, *et al.*, The Impact of Police Activity on Crime: Robberies on the New York City Subway System (New York: The New York City Rand Institute, 1974); Judith S. Dahmann, National Impact Program Evaluation: A Review of Six Research Studies on the Relationship Between Police Patrol Activity and Crime (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1974); and S. James Press, Some Effects of an Increase in Police Manpower in 20th Precinct of New York City (New York: The New York City Rand Institute, 1971).

In conducting uniformed tactical patrol, a department should carefully monitor crime trends for indications of possible displacement effects. This is an important aspect of evaluating the impact of tactical operations, and it will provide information to guide future deployment and tactical decisions. Chapter 8 of this volume presents some techniques which can be used to examine crime displacement.

B. Decoy Operations¹²

Decoy operations can be used effectively against crimes for which police officers can convincingly pose as likely "victims." Decoys are frequently used to combat street robberies, purse-snatches, rapes, prostitution, and thefts from vehicles. The primary purpose of decoy operations is to make apprehensions for targeted crimes; however, by publicizing the use of decoys, they can also have a deterrent effect, since would-be offenders can never be certain whether or not prospective victims are police officers.

The basic elements of this tactic are fairly straightforward. The fundamental idea is to attract an offender to a prepared "victim." To conduct a decoy operation, a specialized patrol unit simply disguises an officer to resemble a likely victim of a target crime and places him or her in a location where the crime is particularly prevalent. The decoy is watched closely by several back-up officers and, when a "hit" occurs, the officers move in to apprehend the suspect. However, while the basic concept is simple, considerable care should be taken in initiating and conducting decoy operations. Unless they are carefully planned and properly carried out, decoy operations can have serious implications for citizen and officer safety, police/community relations and the productivity of specialized patrol. The following observations should help a department to use decoys in a safe, legal, and effective manner.

¹² In addition to this discussion, departments which are interested in using decoy operations should also refer to Andrew Halper and Richard Ku, An Exemplary Project: New York City Street Crime Unit (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, n.d.). This volume presents an excellent description and analysis of the effective use of decoys. Copies can be obtained from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Stock number 027-000-00338-9, Price: \$2.40.

The type of decoy to be used should be determined by an analysis of the characteristics of victims of target crimes. The size, race, dress, demeanor, and apparent age and sex of a decoy should closely resemble that of previous victims. Age can be simulated by the use of make-up. For crimes committed primarily against women, it is most effective and easiest to use female officers as decoys. However, if they are unavailable, men can be made up to pose as females. Some specialized patrol units provide officers with special training in the use of make-up and disguises. The pictures in Exhibit 6-2 are examples of some of the disguises which have been developed by officers in Atlanta's Anti-Robbery Unit.

In selecting a decoy, it is important to consider an officer's inherent ability as an actor. If a decoy is to pose as a derelict, he must not only look the part, but must also convincingly act like a derelict, possible for extended periods of time. Considerable skill at role-playing is required to do this effectively.

In general, a decoy should try to act like a potential victim and present an attractive crime target without being too obvious about it. Overacting can arouse the suspicions of potential offenders. Also, the display of large amounts of cash or expensive jewelry or camera equipment, or the use of decoys who appear to be "falling down drunk", although not illegal, can provide arrested suspects with the opportunity to use the defense of entrapment.¹³

Back-up officers should also be either disguised or concealed so that they are able to stay close to the decoy without being recognized as police officers. They should develop techniques for constantly watching the decoy without giving the appearance of doing so. Considerable care should be devoted to disguises and role playing. Many criminals are quite adept at identifying police officers, and once a decoy or back-up officer is "made," the operation is effectively over and the effort put into it is wasted.

¹³ Entrapment can be successfully used as a defense if the defendant can prove to the court's satisfaction that he was lured by the police into committing an offense that he had not previously intended to commit. The intent of the defendant is the critical factor and, since intent is a rather ambiguous concept which can be determined in various ways, it is best to avoid any practice which might be interpreted as an effort to induce a suspect to commit a crime.

EXHIBIT 6-2
EXAMPLES OF DECOY DISGUISES*



* Courtesy of the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services

The particular areas in which decoy operations might be effectively used should be identified on the basis of crime analysis. In selecting the exact location to set up a decoy operation, a decoy team should look for places which appear advantageous from a potential offender's point of view, while at the same time provide back-up officers with the opportunity to observe the decoy in an unobtrusive manner and with the ability to assume immediate control of the situation when a "hit" occurs. It is also useful to attempt to determine if there are likely suspects in the area before setting up. If the decoy will be moving through an area, back-up officers should know his or her planned route of travel and a system of signals should be worked out for communicating any changes in the planned route without using a radio. In all cases, local patrol commanders should be informed before decoy operations are undertaken in their area of responsibility.

The number of back-up officers used in decoy operations varies from department to department. Some generally use two, while others may have as many as four or five. The amount of back-up support provided to a decoy should be determined by the danger potentially involved in a particular operation, the number of suspects who might be involved in a "hit," and the characteristics of a particular location which might affect the ability of the decoy team to make an arrest following a "hit." The overriding concern is that there be sufficient back-up support to protect the decoy and insure that arrests are made safely with a minimum use of force.

Communications between back-up officers and the decoy are often strictly visual, with reliance placed on prearranged signals to indicate when a "hit" has taken place or when there is a change in plans. It is possible to use a small pocket transmitter and a portable receiver to maintain unobtrusive verbal communication with the decoy. This equipment can transmit over a distance of several blocks with adequate reception. It is particularly useful if the decoy will be out of sight of the back-up officers during any part of the operation.

Back-up officers should attempt to stay as close as possible to the decoy without interfering with the operation. It is often useful to place at least one back-up officer in an unmarked car which is not identifiable as a police vehicle. This will facilitate pursuit should a suspect manage to evade officers deployed on foot. It is also important to develop procedures for reacting to a "hit" on a back-up officer rather than the decoy. While unusual, this has occurred in decoy operations.

Operational guidelines for handling arrests should be

clearly established before decoy operations are undertaken. Officers should be instructed to wait until a crime has been committed before moving in to make an arrest. A suspect cannot be convicted for a crime they thought he was about to commit. Officers should also avoid making arrests for minor offenses which might occur in their presence. This will only serve to blow their cover and defeat the purpose of the operation. Uniformed police officers can be called in to handle minor incidents.

A major problem in making arrests in decoy operations or in taking any form of overt police action is the identification of members of the decoy team as police officers. It can be extremely difficult to convince suspects, citizens, and even other officers that an officer who appears to be a derelict, prostitute, or an elderly lady is actually a police officer. On occasion, identification problems have led to one officer attempting to apprehend another. Some departments have sought to avoid this problem by using uniformed officers hidden in cars or vans as a back-up team. This facilitates the arrest process, but it can jeopardize the covert nature of the operation and greatly reduce operational flexibility. A more promising approach is the use of headbands, armbands, baseball caps, or jackets which identify team members as police officers. These should be put on before any overt police action is taken. Color codes which are changed periodically can be used to avoid the use of identifying garments by individuals seeking to impersonate police officers.

Decoy operations have yet to be examined by systematic research. However, many departments which use decoys have found the tactic to be extremely effective in making high quality arrests for target crimes. For example, decoy operations conducted by Atlanta's Anti-Robbery Unit resulted in 85 arrests during the first six months of 1976, with a conviction rate of between 99 and 100%; and in 1974, decoy teams in New York City's Street Crime Unit made 2,120 arrests for their target crimes of robbery and grand larceny from persons with a conviction rate of approximately 90%. The major doubt about the effectiveness of decoy operations concerns their productivity in terms of arrests per officer days. It has been argued that, while decoy operations do lead to high quality arrests, the time and effort that is devoted on the average to each arrest is more than most departments can afford and that manpower might be used more productively in other ways. For example, it has been reported that the Street Crime Unit spends an average

of 8.2 mandays per felony arrest.¹⁴ Whether or not this is considered to be an adequate level of productivity would have to be determined by comparison with the productivity of other types of operations which are directed at similar crime problems. To insure that decoy operations are used to best advantage, a department should monitor and evaluate their productivity on an on-going basis, deploy decoy teams on the basis of careful crime analysis, and use them only when there are problems to which decoys appear to be a particularly appropriate response.

C. Stake-Outs

There are two basic types of stake-outs: physical and electronic. The first involves the placement of officers in positions where they can observe a specific location which crime analysis has identified as a likely crime target. The second uses electronic equipment, such as alarms and cameras, to provide the police with prompt notification of crime occurrences at particular locations and/or with information which will assist them in identifying and apprehending suspects. Both types of stake-outs can be directed at virtually any type of suppressible crime; however, they are most often used to cope with commercial robbery and burglary.

Stake-outs are used primarily to make apprehensions. Their purpose is to have officers at the scene of the crime when it is occurring or soon enough after its occurrence to make immediate on-site arrests and/or to provide pictures of the suspects which will facilitate their later apprehension. However, stake-outs can also have a significant deterrent effect if the public is informed that they are being widely used. This can be done through media exposure or by posting stake-out notices in both targeted and non-targeted establishments. Exhibit 6-3 is an example of the stake-out notices used by the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services.

¹⁴ Kenneth W. Webb, *et al.*, Phase I National Evaluation of Selected Patrol Strategies, Product 4: Assessment of Knowledge on Specialized Patrol (Bethesda, Maryland: Institute for Human Resources Research, n.d.), p. 86.

ROBBER/BURGLAR NOTICE

THIS IS A STAKEOUT LOCATION

When challenged by Police

Do not move or turn!

Drop your weapon immediately!

Raise your hands immediately!

**ATLANTA BUREAU OF POLICE SERVICES
ANTI-ROBBERY/ANTI-BURGLARY
TAC UNITS**

1. Physical Stake-Outs

Physical stake-outs involve the covert placement of officers inside or in the immediate vicinity of an establishment which crime analysis has identified as a probable robbery or burglary site. At least two officers are generally used on a stake-out to insure their safety and the safety of citizens. The officers can be placed in any position which allows them to determine immediately when a crime is taking place. Atlanta's Anti-Robbery Unit uses one-way mirrors through which the officers can covertly observe activity in a stake-out location and small, concealed microphones which allow them to monitor conversations at the cash register. Other units position officers outside the stake-out target. When a "hit" occurs, they are notified by prearranged signals. The principal advantage of an outside stake-out is that it allows arrests to be made on the street. This is generally safer than confronting armed suspects in a crowded store and it reduces the likelihood that hostages will be taken. Its primary disadvantage is that it can interfere with the officers' ability to closely monitor activity in the stake-out location, and it may complicate efforts to keep the operation covert. However, these disadvantages can be substantially overcome if microphones are used to permit officers to overhear conversations in the stake-out location.

Officers on stake-outs should be instructed to remain in place until a target crime or other serious offense occurs. They should not attempt to make arrests for minor offenses such as shoplifting. This will only serve to needlessly blow their cover.

The officers should be provided with some means of immediately identifying themselves as police officers. Police baseball caps, headbands, shirts, or jackets may be used for this purpose. In stake-outs which may result in violent confrontations, officers are often equipped with shotguns and second-chance vests.

Prior to initiating a stake-out, employees should be briefed on the proper procedures to follow should a "hit" take place. Generally, they should be instructed not to take any action which might tip off a potential offender, to cooperate with the offender(s) during the course of a robbery, and to get out of the way when a confrontation occurs. They should be told in no uncertain terms not to try to "help" officers by attempting to assist in an arrest.

Physical stake-outs can be extremely time-consuming and

costly. One recent study, which included an examination of the use of stake-outs by several specialized units, concluded that, "Stake-outs traditionally exhibit a low rate of return in police operations."¹⁵ For example, one specialized patrol unit spent an average of 156.2 officer hours for each stake-out arrest and for another the average number of officer hours per stake-out arrest was 180.¹⁶

The figures underscore the importance of using physical stake-outs only when analysis provides strong indications that a particular establishment is an extremely likely location of a target crime. Where there appear to be several promising stake-out locations, empty marked cars can be parked near some, while the others are staked-out. Denver's Special Crime Attack Team has successfully used this practice to "guide" suspects to stake-out locations.

It is also important that physical stake-outs be truly covert if they are to result in apprehensions. Some specialized patrol units have attempted to conduct stake-outs by having officers observe establishments from unmarked cars which are easily identifiable police vehicles. One unit tried this approach to control a commercial robbery problem. During the two-week period in which the stake-outs were used there were no reported commercial robberies. On the first day after the stake-outs were discontinued, three commercial robberies occurred at target locations.¹⁷

Specialized units which establish stake-outs on the basis of a thorough analysis of solid information and plan them carefully in advance have met with considerable success. For example, officers in the High Incidence Target Program in Virginia Beach, Virginia, conducted 22 stake-outs over a seven-month period which resulted in 19 arrests. The average number of officer hours per arrest was only 22.3.¹⁸

¹⁵ Arthur Young and Company, *op. cit.*, p. V-23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. V-27.

¹⁷ Lawrence G. Gunn, Commercial Robbery in a Medium-Sized City: Columbus, Georgia (McLean, Virginia: The Mitre Corporation, 1973), p. 39.

¹⁸ Arthur Young and Company, *op. cit.*, p. V-23.

2. Electronic Stake-Outs

Electronic stake-outs are used to provide the police with an early warning of crime occurrences so that they can respond quickly enough to make on-scene arrests, and, less frequently, to capture photographic evidence of actual crimes which will aid in the apprehension of the suspect(s). Electronic stake-outs are basically labor-saving devices designed to provide the benefits of physical stake-outs while avoiding the considerable cost that their widespread use entails. There are basically two types of electronic stake-outs: portable police-owned alarm systems and hidden cameras. They can be used separately or as an integrated system.

a. Alarm systems: The characteristics of portable alarm systems vary depending upon the manufacturer and the system requirements requested by a department. They generally consist of a mobile base receiver with the capacity to receive signals from a number of small transmitters (generally about 20) which are placed in probable burglary and commercial robbery locations. The transmitters can be activated by a wide variety of small, easily hidden sensors such as bill clips in cash registers, magnetic door switches, pressure mats, foot pedals, waffer switches which set off the alarm when a object is moved, accoustic sensors, etc.

The alarms may be monitored either by a dedicated response force of two to four officers who patrol in the vicinity of alarmed establishments during high crime hours, or by officers at departmental headquarters or a district station house. In the first instance, the dedicated response force responds to all alarms; in the second, response is made by general patrol units.

Some departments have successfully used regular patrol units to respond to alarms; however, the majority rely on a dedicated force of specialized officers. The primary purpose of a mobile alarm system is to increase apprehensions by reducing response times to crimes in progress. Since most crimes take very little time to commit (it has been estimated that the execution of a typical commercial robbery takes between 30 and 60 seconds¹⁹), response times must be very low to result in on-site apprehensions.

¹⁹ Warner A. Eliot, *et al.*, National Evaluation Program Phase I Report, Early-Warning Robbery Reduction Devices: An Assessment of Performance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1976), p. 36.

It is generally believed that the use of a specialized team of officers with the sole responsibility for monitoring and responding to alarms will result in faster response times and more apprehensions. A recent national evaluation of early-warning robbery reduction projects reports that the average response time to alarms was slightly under two minutes for regular patrol units and less than one minute for dedicated response units.²⁰

The use of a specialized response team also facilitates the careful planning of responses. In New York City's Robbery Alert Project, before undertaking operations in a given area, the response team develops a profile of each alarmed establishment. The profiles contain information on floor plans, location of doors and windows, opening and closing times, the amount of cash generally on hand, the direction of traffic flows in the immediate vicinity, and photographs of the employees. The profiles assist officers in formulating plans for handling confrontations at each location.

The placement of alarm systems in target locations is constrained by the effective range of a system's transmitters and by the need to concentrate a set of alarms in a fairly limited geographical area to insure rapid response times by a dedicated response force. Alarm systems are most effectively used when a number of establishments in relatively close proximity to one another are identified as likely crime targets. Isolated targets should generally be staked-out physically.

The effective use of an alarm system requires the full cooperation of the owners and employees of targeted establishments. Owners are usually more than happy to have alarms placed in their businesses, especially since they have probably experienced a recent robbery or burglary problem. However, gaining cooperation from employees, who must activate the alarm or at least not interfere with its automatic operation, can pose problems. Some employees may be prone to trigger an alarm for relatively minor matters such as shoplifting, when they become suspicious that something may be about to happen, or simply by mistake. In some cases, employees have activated an alarm in order to cover for thefts that they themselves had committed. In other instances, they may be reluctant to trigger an alarm during the commission of a robbery for fear that the perpetrator(s) might notice.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

False alarms rates can be kept to a minimum by training employees in the proper use of the alarm system and by using sensors which are difficult to trigger accidentally. Available evidence indicates that while false alarms are a problem, police-owned and controlled alarm systems have a much lower false alarm rate (50% or below) than commercial burglar alarms (about 90% on the average).²¹ If an establishment has an especially high false alarm rate, consideration should be given to removing its alarm.

Employee cooperation is also needed to maintain the covert status of an alarm system. Several departments which experienced a surprisingly low number of attempted crimes at alarmed locations strongly suspected that leaks from employees were the principal reason. There is rather little that can be done about this problem beyond stressing to employees the importance of not discussing the alarm with others. It is also helpful to develop covert procedures for installing alarms. Officers can pose as electricians or cash register repairmen, and they should make the installation at times when they are least likely to be observed. Installation can take from a few minutes to over half an hour, depending on the number and type of sensors being used.

The overall effectiveness of portable alarm systems has yet to be determined. Some departments have used them for period of over a year without making any apprehensions, while others have had considerable success. A recent nationwide assessment of alarm systems directed at commercial robbery stated that "none of the projects investigated was able to provide evaluation reports or data summaries that offered definitive evidence of project effectiveness... On the other hand, most officials interviewed during the field survey indicated that they were satisfied with their own EWRR (Early Warning Robbery Reduction) projects, and planned to continue."²²

In sum, while their effectiveness and general applicability have not been firmly established, officials in a number of departments believe that alarm systems have made a worthwhile contribution to their specialized patrol operations.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

b. Cameras: Hidden cameras or video equipment can be used in conjunction with an alarm system or independently. In both cases, the equipment is intended to provide photographic evidence of a crime which can assist in the apprehension of the suspect(s) and help to insure their conviction. Cameras have been effectively used to combat commercial robberies in several departments. When used properly, they are a relatively inexpensive means of staking-out likely commercial robbery targets such as convenience stores, liquor stores, and motels.²³

Hidden cameras are used by a number of departments including those in: Phoenix, Arizona; Wilmington, Delaware; and Tucson, Arizona. In Tucson, 60 camera units have been placed in convenience and liquor stores. The 35 m.m. cameras are hidden in simulated speaker boxes, which are placed on a shelf behind the cash register. They are extremely difficult to detect unless the observer is familiar with them. The cameras have wide-angle 60 degree lenses which are focused on the active part of the check-out counter directly in front of and adjacent to the cash register. When marked "bait bills" are removed from a "bill trap" in the register, the camera is activated. It takes ten to twelve exposures at the rate of one every two seconds. While not silent, it is virtually impossible to hear the camera in the normal working environment of a store.

When a robbery occurs, officers respond immediately to the scene, remove the exposed film and return it to the photo lab for processing. Developing the film and making copies requires no more expertise and equipment than that possessed by an amateur home photographer. Copies of the photographs are distributed to both general and specialized patrol officers, to detectives in the department, and to departments in neighboring jurisdictions. The entire process can be completed in well under 24 hours. As shown in Exhibit 6-4, the quality of the photographs can be remarkably good.

In Tucson, the use of hidden camera appears to have been extremely effective. For example, in the first three months of 1975, there were seven liquor store and thirteen convenience store robberies in the city. Of the twenty stores robbed, eleven were equipped with cameras. Usable pictures were obtained in all eleven robberies. Eight suspects were identified and arrested within hours of the crime, one was apprehended somewhat later, and two

²³ Gas stations are also common commercial robbery targets, but their physical layout makes the use of cameras difficult.



EXHIBIT 6-4
PICTURE TAKEN BY CONCEALED 35 m.m. CAMERA*

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117* Courtesy of the Tucson Police Department.

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remained at large as of April, 1975. From the nine arrested suspects, the department cleared one homicide, one kidnapping, and eighteen robberies. In addition, the photographic evidence, in combination with the marked "bait bills" which are often found in the suspect's possession, contribute to an extremely high conviction rate. Most suspects simply confess when confronted with the evidence.

The principal problems involved in using hidden cameras concern their maintenance and covertness. Cameras must be in good working order to be effective. They cannot simply be placed in a store and then forgotten until a crime takes place. Tucson's cameras are equipped with a small test light located in the cash register. The light indicates whether or not the camera is functioning properly. The department has also placed a single officer in charge of the cameras. He devotes a considerable portion of his time to installing the cameras, monitoring their status, and instructing employees in their use. He will remove the camera from an establishment if it is being abused. It is also vitally important that the use of hidden cameras be kept secret. Cameras have virtually no deterrent value since perpetrators can easily subvert their effectiveness by wearing masks..

Hidden cameras are not terribly expensive. Those used in Tucson cost about \$350 apiece, including the speaker disguise and triggering mechanism. A single camera is generally sufficient to stake-out a small convenience or liquor store with only one register. The stores pay for the film. It is also possible that store owners could be persuaded to pay for the entire unit; however, the police should still install and maintain the units and exercise control over their use. This is necessary in order to insure that the units are kept in proper working order, and to guarantee that a proper chain of evidence is established when a camera is set and after it has been triggered. A chain of evidence can easily be established by recording the date, time and picture of the officer servicing a camera on the first frame of a roll of film each time the camera is set and by recording the same information on the last frame after a camera has been legitimately triggered. A log should also be maintained which documents the placement of the cameras and their service records.

D. Covert Surveillance

Covert surveillance can be used against virtually every type of suppressible crime. There are two basic types of covert

surveillance. The first concentrates on criminal suspects and the second on high-crime areas. The objectives of both tactics are to make arrests for crimes in progress and to develop information which will aid in making apprehensions following a crime occurrence.

1. Suspect Surveillance

Suspect surveillance should be undertaken only when there are firm grounds for believing that the suspects are active criminals who commit offenses with sufficient frequency that closely monitoring their activity for a relatively short period of time is likely to be rewarding. Suspect surveillance is a particularly appropriate tactic when the identity of probable offenders is known but the targets and locations of their crimes do not form a coherent pattern.

Suspect surveillance is not an easy tactic to use. An interim evaluation of the tactic by the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department noted that: "The strategy is much more difficult to work than was thought when designing the project, and it takes a special kind of police officer to use this strategy effectively. It was also learned that the active burglary and robbery suspects were extremely 'tail conscious' and surveilling these people for any length of time without being exposed is very difficult."²⁴ Several steps can be taken by specialized patrol units to minimize the difficulties involved in suspect surveillance.

Before initiating a surveillance operation, as much information as possible should be collected about each suspect. It is helpful to develop a profile of each suspect including his: home and work address, known criminal history, M.O.'s, vehicles, known associates, life style and habits, places frequented, and picture. Information should be systematically added to the profile during the course of a surveillance. The more that is known about a suspect, the easier it will be to identify specific times when he should be closely watched, to develop appropriate techniques for following him, and to find him again should the surveillance team lose track of him. Tucson's Special Problems Detail has found that after several days of heavy surveillance, a suspect's pattern of daily activity can be fairly well established. This permits the unit to cut back on the hours devoted to a particular surveillance,

²⁴ Major Fred Guenther, *et al.*, Special Operations Division Task Force: July Monthly Report and Project Activity Summary (Kansas City, Missouri: Kansas City Police Department, 1973), p. 21.

thereby conserving scarce resources and reducing the likelihood that the surveillance team will be "made".

Adequate resources should be devoted to a surveillance effort. For example, careful surveillance of a moving suspect is generally believed to require three covert police units. Two units are positioned behind the suspect's vehicle and one ahead of it. At periodic intervals, or when the suspect turns onto another street, the unit which is immediately following the suspect passes his vehicle and the unit in front of the suspect turns off and moves in behind the third unit, which takes up position in view of the suspect's vehicle. In following this procedure, the surveillance units should maintain constant radio contact with each other. Some specialized units use radios with secure channels so that communications cannot be monitored by the suspect(s).

Even with this level of manpower, suspect surveillance is still extremely difficult. It can be quite hard to maintain the rotation of surveillance units on some types of street configurations and expressways. It is difficult to follow a suspect unobtrusively in quiet, little-traveled areas. And, despite all precautions, a wary suspect may still take note of the fact that the same vehicles seem to be traveling with him for extended periods of time. The arousal of even the slightest suspicion that he is being followed can be enough to destroy the effectiveness of a surveillance operation.

Some specialized patrol units have used electronic tracking devices, or "bloodhounds" as they are commonly called, which are secretly attached to a suspect's vehicle. These devices transmit a signal to a receiver in a surveillance vehicle which indicates the distance between the suspect's vehicle and the surveillance unit and the direction in which the suspect is traveling. Several specialized units, including Miami's STOP Robbery/Burglary Unit, have used these devices to great advantage. However, they are by no means foolproof. The devices have a tendency to short out in wet weather and a suspect can be lost if he turns onto an expressway and moves out of range before the surveillance team has a chance to catch up with him. The devices can also take a considerable amount of time to install, since the officers must wait for an opportunity to gain covert access to a suspect's vehicle. A court order is generally required before they can be used.

Aircraft can be immensely helpful in suspect surveillance. Either helicopters or small fixed wing aircraft can be used in conjunction with a loose ground tail. Departments, such as the

Phoenix Police Department, which have tried both types of aircraft have found that the fixed wing airplanes have several important advantages. They are quieter than helicopters, much cheaper to purchase, easier to maintain, and they can stay airborne for much longer periods of time (six to seven hours as compared with two to three hours for helicopters). When equipped with a stall kit, they can fly at speeds as low as 25 m.p.h. Fixed wing airplanes cannot fly as low as helicopters, but with gyroscopically-stabilized binoculars, officers report that they have little difficulty keeping a suspect's vehicle under surveillance. The flying heights and relatively low noise levels of fixed wing planes and the fact that their use is rarely associated with municipal police operations reduce the likelihood that suspects will become aware that they are being followed.

When a suspect is lost by a surveillance team, a call can be put out to the general patrol force to assist in determining his location. Uniformed officers can also be used to stop surveillance subjects when information is needed about their associates or the contents of their vehicles.

The difficulty and expense involved in suspect surveillance means that it should be attempted only when there are excellent reasons for believing that it will be productive. A specialized patrol unit in one department which concentrates exclusively on suspect surveillance found that one of the most difficult aspects of using this tactic is finding appropriate targets. Where this occurs, it would be better to turn to other tactics rather than trying to force one tactic to fit a particular problem.

2. General Area Surveillance

Covert patrol and surveillance of high crime areas can be used to make apprehensions for crime problems for which: there are no suspects who warrant personal surveillance; the suspects are too numerous to permit personal surveillance; decoys would be inappropriate; and there are too many potential targets to conduct either physical or electronic stake-outs. Examples of these types of problems would be a rash of residential burglaries or auto thefts in a particular area.

This tactic simply involves the covert patrol of a particular area and the observation of suspicious or unusual activities and occurrences which might indicate the likelihood of a crime occurrence. Suspicious individuals are not stopped, but are watched

until they either commit an offense or the officers' suspicions are removed. Area surveillance, or "blend and observe" as the tactic is frequently called, is basically a combination of suspect surveillance and physical stake-outs in which the suspects and stake-out locations are neither pre-selected nor necessarily watched on a continuous basis.

A list of the various techniques which can be employed in area surveillance would be virtually endless. The following are some which have been effectively used by specialized patrol units:

- Mingling with citizens at the scene of a crime in order to pick up information on possible suspects;
- Rooftop surveillance of a shopping center parking lot to locate larcenies from vehicles;
- Surveillance of a housing project by posing as maintenance workers;
- Following likely crime victims such as elderly citizens leaving a bank or conventioners making the rounds of downtown bars;
- Surveillance of residential areas by placing officers on garbage trucks or on top of telephone poles posing as repairmen; and
- Surveillance of rooftops for unusual activity by officers in aircraft or on high buildings. Binoculars are used to facilitate surveillance, and rooftops are marked so that street units can be dispatched to check out suspicious circumstances.

As in all types of plain or old clothes patrol, care should be taken to insure that area surveillance is truly covert. Rental vehicles, which can be changed frequently, provide an excellent, though expensive, means of covert transportation. Out-of-state license plates can help disguise vehicles, and surveillance vans can be equipped with changeable magnetic signs which identify the vehicle as a plumber's van one day, a television repairman's truck another day, and so on. Vehicles should not be parked in the police parking lot, nor should they be refueled from police gas pumps.

Officers on covert patrol should be dressed to fit in with the environment in which they are working, and they should have apparently legitimate, non-police-related reasons for being where they are. Several specialized units have found that surveillance teams composed of one male and one female officer can work in many situations without arousing suspicion. An apparently married or romantically involved couple lingering in a park, meandering slowly down the street, or sitting together in a parked car would generally appear less suspicious than two male officers doing the same things. Finally, it should be noted that in some small, tightly-knit neighborhoods where residents know each other well, covert surveillance may be difficult if not impossible, since the presence of any stranger arouses immediate curiosity and suspicion.

In common with most other approaches to specialized patrol, the effectiveness of suspect and area surveillance have not been firmly established by research. A recent study of perpetrator-oriented patrol (the surveillance of a selected group of suspects) and location-oriented patrol (the surveillance of high crime areas) concluded that in terms of arrest productivity both strategies were, not surprisingly, superior to regular patrol, and that location-oriented patrol appeared to be somewhat more effective than perpetrator-oriented patrol.²⁵ However, the researchers note that caution should be used in drawing general inferences from their study and that various problems encountered in the course of the study "resulted in data yielding conclusions that were less definitive than anticipated about the impact, and thus the value, of apprehension-oriented patrol strategies."²⁶

Field experience with the use of these two tactics suggests that suspect surveillance can be effective and rewarding if it is conducted with extreme care, and that it may be the most practical approach to take in attempting to apprehend multiple offenders who do not necessarily specialize in a particular type of crime. Area surveillance appears to be helpful in dealing with rather diffuse crime problems in which it is difficult to identify particular crime targets or suspects.

* * * * *

These tactics represent the basic approaches which

²⁵ Tony Pate, *et al.*, Three Approaches to Criminal Apprehension in Kansas City: An Evaluation Report (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1976), p. 69

²⁶ *Ibid.*, "Executive Summary," p. 1.

specialized patrol operations normally take in attempting to control suppressible crime. Some of the tactics, such as uniformed tactical patrol, are directed primarily at crime deterrence, while others, such as decoy operations and suspect surveillance, are employed to achieve apprehensions for target crimes. The tactics are most commonly used independently of one another; however, there are some indications that the combined use of several tactics in an integrated operation might be an effective way of coping with particular types of crime problems. Especially promising is the coordinated use of highly visible and covert patrol. A visible patrol force could be deployed to a particular area to deter crime there and direct it toward other areas in which officers using covert, apprehension-oriented tactics are working. To date, efforts to direct criminal activity to areas or targets where officers are set up to make apprehensions have only been tried on a sporadic basis. However, this would appear to be a promising approach to crime control which warrants greater attention in the future. It can be viewed as the creative use of crime displacement.

Many of the tactics discussed in this chapter could not be effectively undertaken by general patrol officers who simultaneously have the responsibility of handling routine calls for service. It is obvious that the effectiveness of decoy operations, physical stake-outs, and suspect surveillance would be utterly destroyed if the officers had to interrupt these activities to handle calls for service. It is also generally unwise to have non-uniformed, "old clothes" officers respond to calls for service. However, general patrol officers can make use of the pictures taken by hidden cameras, monitor portable stake-out alarms, and conduct uniformed tactical patrol.

Uniformed saturation patrol can be conducted by the general patrol force by assigning a number of patrol units to patrol a particular geographical area, leaving the area only to respond to calls for service, and returning to it when the calls are completed. General patrol officers can also be pulled from patrol duty to form temporary, *ad hoc* strike forces which could employ any of the tactics discussed above. A strike force could work for a period of a few hours up to several days or beyond, depending on the duration of the crime problem and the ability of the general patrol force to work short-handed for a period of time. General patrol officers can also handle specialized duties on an overtime basis if a department can afford the additional cost. Techniques for gaining time for general patrol officers to concentrate on non-call for service activities are discussed in detail in Volume I of this report.

The importance of crime analysis in identifying crime problems and suggesting appropriate tactics deserves repetition. Specialized patrol units should be deployed to address clearly identified crime patterns, and they should choose their tactics on the basis of an analysis of these patterns and a comprehensive knowledge of the area of occurrence. The nature and characteristics of a particular crime pattern should be the driving force behind the selection of tactics. None of the tactics of specialized patrol can be effectively used unless crime patterns have been identified and analyzed.

It is unwise, especially for small and medium-sized departments, to create specialized units which concentrate exclusively on the use of only one or two tactics. This can lead to efforts to attempt to force a pre-selected tactic to fit a particular crime problem, rather than allowing the characteristics of the problem to guide the choice of the most appropriate tactical approach to dealing with it,

It can be argued that a specialized patrol unit with complete tactical flexibility will forego the benefits derived from the expertise developed through the continued performance of particular tasks. While there is some truth to this argument, none of the tactics presented in this chapter are sufficiently complicated that they cannot be readily mastered by experienced patrol officers. And whatever is lost in terms of finely-honed expertise is more than made up for by the ability of a specialized unit to adapt quickly to the changing nature of the crime problems facing a jurisdiction.

Finally, it should be noted that there are many possible variations on the tactics discussed in this chapter. In addition to crime analysis and evaluations of the success of the tactics used in the past, specialized units should solicit input from officers in selecting appropriate tactics. Their experience, imagination, and "street sense" represent invaluable resources which should be exploited to the utmost in developing productive ways of coping with crime problems.

CHAPTER 7

EQUIPMENT

As the previous chapter indicates, specialized patrol operations can employ various types of equipment - some of it simple and inexpensive and some of it sophisticated and extremely costly. It is important to stress that, with several exceptions, most of this equipment is useful rather than absolutely essential for specialized patrol. Thus, stake-outs can be conducted without portable electronic alarm systems, hidden cameras, or one-way mirrors; suspect surveillance can be accomplished without aircraft or electronic tracking devices; night-time area surveillance can be done without low-light viewing devices; and so on. While special equipment may greatly facilitate the effective use of these and other tactics, it is not required. Departments which do not possess special equipment or the wherewithal to purchase it should not be discouraged from undertaking specialized patrol operations.

The only equipment that is critically important for specialized patrol is standard police equipment, especially radios and vehicles. If possible, all officers assigned to specialized duty should be equipped with hand-held radios. The nature of many specialized patrol tactics requires officers to work away from their vehicles, often for extended periods of time. To insure their safety and to coordinate and control their activities, they should be provided with a means of maintaining constant communication with their supervisors and fellow officers. Hand-held radios, which cost about \$1,000 per unit, are becoming increasingly common in both specialized and general patrol. They represent perhaps the single most important piece of equipment for specialized patrol. For specialized units without them, it is recommended that top priority be given to acquiring hand-held radios.

Vehicles are also an extremely important piece of equipment for specialized patrol. As observed in the previous chapter, vehicles must be suited to a specialized unit's tactics. Uniformed tactical patrol operations should use clearly marked, highly visible police vehicles; covert operations should employ vehicles which cannot be easily associated with the police.

The need for unmarked vehicles for covert patrol operations does not mean that a department using covert tactics must purchase new cars at a cost of several thousand dollars each. Often, used cars can be more effective in covert operations than new ones. Some specialized units have used rental vehicles. This has the advantage of permitting the vehicles to be changed

at will; however, it is quite expensive, costing between \$200 and \$300 a month for each car. Other units have acquired vehicles which have been impounded by the department and have remained unclaimed for a substantial period of time. Finally, some specialized units have allowed officers to use their own personal vehicles on patrol. This is an easy way of gaining access to a wide variety of unobtrusive vehicles, but it involves serious liability problems and most units avoid the practice of using private vehicles for this reason.

There are a number of ways of changing the appearance of vehicles so that they do not come with time to be identified as police vehicles. For example, they can be repainted at various intervals, magnetic signs can be attached to them, and license plates can be changed. Several specialized units have used out-of-state license plates, believing that it reduces the likelihood that a vehicle will be associated with the local police.

Unconventional vehicles such as garbage trucks, taxi cabs, delivery vans, etc., can frequently be borrowed for short periods of time. Commercial establishments are often only too happy to provide vehicles which will help the police cope with crime problems directly affecting the companies, and arrangements can usually be made with municipal services and utilities to allow the police to use their vehicles on a temporary basis.

With the exception of radios and vehicles, most of the expensive equipment which is commonly used in specialized patrol should be viewed as aides rather than absolute necessities. Given the expense of much of this equipment, it is vitally important that the need for the equipment be carefully assessed and clearly established before it is purchased. This may seem to be a rather obvious point; however, all too often, specialized patrol units have invested scarce resources in expensive pieces of equipment only to find that there was little occasion to use the equipment in actual field operations.

For example, a number of specialized patrol units have found that their low-light viewing devices were needed rather seldom, and that specially equipped surveillance vans were not used nearly as often as had initially been anticipated. An evaluation of specialized patrol projects in several jurisdictions found that most of the projects "placed an overemphasis in the planning stages on equipment to be used in the HIT [High Incidence Target] projects. By this overemphasis is meant that a great deal of planning in the planning stage was spent on deciding which sophisticated equipment to buy rather than whether or not it was needed."¹ The evaluation report goes on to observe that much

¹ Arthur Young and Company, HIT Program Evaluation Handbook, Volume II: Evaluation Findings (Richmond: Commonwealth of Virginia Division of Justice and Crime Prevention, 1975), p. VI-14.

of "this equipment had little effect on the results of HIT unit activity."²

To avoid this problem, the need for special equipment should be examined in terms of its expected contribution to the effectiveness of particular tactics. The examination should be especially careful if the equipment is extremely expensive, highly sophisticated, and/or new to a unit's operations. Specialized patrol units in other departments which have used similar types of equipment should be contacted to gain the benefit of their experience. This can save a considerable amount of time and money in assessing the need for and suitability of particular types of equipment.

New equipment should also be thoroughly field tested before it is purchased, and careful comparisons should be made between similar types of equipment offered by different manufacturers. Failure to do this has led some specialized units to purchase equipment systems of inferior design when much better systems were readily available.

In selecting equipment, there is sometimes a certain seductiveness to highly sophisticated equipment systems. Sophistication is often equated with quality and utility. In fact, however, sophistication in equipment is not necessarily a virtue. As a general rule, if simple equipment can do the job adequately, it is preferable to more sophisticated equipment with a similar purpose. Simple equipment is usually less expensive and easier to maintain and operate. For example, some specialized units have tried elaborate sensor devices for triggering their portable alarm systems; then returned to simpler devices which are easier to install and lead to fewer false alarms.

In purchasing equipment, it is wise to allow for considerable lag time between the decision to buy the equipment and its actual delivery. Processing orders through the department and appropriate government agencies can occasionally take an unexpectedly long period of time, and there are frequently substantial delays between the placement of a purchase order with a manufacturer and receipt of the ordered equipment. For instance, a specialized unit in one department ordered 20 vans which were to be an integral part of its operation. Ten months after the unit formally began operation, the vans were just beginning to arrive. In another department, a specialized unit which was established on a 12-month grant, placed an order for hand-held radios. Eleven months into the grant, the radios had still not been received. The project director understandably felt that equipment acquisition was the single greatest problem that he encountered in implementing the project.

² *Ibid*, p. V-16.

Lengthy delays in the delivery of important pieces of equipment can have particularly serious implications for newly-established specialized units. It can impede the effective operation of a unit and do serious damage to officer morale. It may also jeopardize a unit's future before it has had an adequate opportunity to prove itself. Frequently, it is during the first few months of a unit's operation that more or less lasting impressions are formed about its overall effectiveness. The fact that a unit was hampered by the lack of needed equipment can easily be overlooked in the development of these initial subjective evaluations.

Some of the equipment and supply needs of specialized patrol units can be met at little or no expense to the department. As indicated above, vehicles can be provided for temporary use by commercial establishments and government agencies. Various types of clothing and props for covert operations and simple means of transportation such as bicycles can often be provided by the officers themselves. Clothing and props can also be obtained from the department's property clerk or borrowed from cooperative merchants. A local theater group may be persuaded to provide training in the use of make-up for disguises and role-playing.

In short, a substantial amount of equipment, supplies, and assistance may be available free of charge. Requesting the material assistance of local merchants and community groups and involving them in a positive way in specialized patrol operations can have a beneficial impact on police/community relations. However, care should be taken that requests for help are not misconstrued as demands. Given the authoritative role that the police play in the community, even the most innocent and carefully worded request can be misinterpreted. One way of avoiding this potential problem is to go through an intermediary such as a local chamber of commerce or crime commission.

CHAPTER 8

EVALUATION OF SPECIALIZED PATROL OPERATIONS

Evaluation is a critically important, yet often neglected, aspect of specialized patrol. Evaluation is sometimes regarded by police practitioners as a scholarly exercise of little practical significance to the problems they face in daily operations. In fact, however, it is an essential administrative tool. Evaluation provides the only systematic means of determining whether or not specialized patrol operations are accomplishing what they were designed to accomplish. It provides information about the efficacy of different tactical approaches to dealing with particular crime problems. It enables a department to monitor the continuing need for specialized operations. And, it generates information about the transferability of specialized operations from one department to another, thereby making a potentially important contribution to the overall effectiveness of law enforcement. In brief, evaluation provides the only means of determining whether or not specialized patrol operations are working effectively. It should be an integral part of every specialized operation.

Evaluation can be an immensely complicated and expensive undertaking. Large-scale experimental evaluations sometimes cost more than the programs being evaluated. This chapter does not consider the techniques involved in experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations which are designed to identify cause and effect relationships. Instead, it focuses on relatively simple, inexpensive evaluation techniques which rely primarily on data which are routinely collected by most departments or which could be collected rather easily. All the evaluation techniques presented in this chapter can be used by departmental personnel who have had no previous experience in evaluation research. Departments which are interested in conducting more rigorous, in-depth evaluations of their specialized patrol operations should refer to the publications listed in Appendix C for guidance. If funds are available, consideration might also be given to hiring outside evaluation specialists. While the approaches to evaluation presented here will not provide absolute, incontrovertible proof of the success of specialized operations, they will result in much more definite indications of effectiveness than are currently available in most departments. They will provide patrol administrators with reasonably valid indications of whether or not the program is working, and direct attention to program aspects which might be in need of improvement.

Probably the most important aspect in the evaluation of specialized patrol operations is the development and maintenance of an adequate data collection and record keeping system. An evaluation can be only as good as the information on which it is

based. Data should be routinely collected on all quantitatively measurable aspects of specialized patrol. It is particularly important that separate records be kept for different tactics so that their relative effectiveness and efficiency can be compared.

Evaluation should be an on-going process rather than a one-time activity. Conditions change too rapidly for the effectiveness of a particular tactic to be established once and for all. It is wise to set a fixed schedule for the preparation of evaluation reports, i.e., monthly, quarterly, or semi-annually. Once data collection and analysis procedures have been established and the first evaluation has been completed, the preparation of subsequent evaluation reports should be a fairly simple task which can be handled on a routine basis.

It may be appropriate to assign responsibility for conducting evaluations to the same individuals who handle crime analysis. They would generally have the greatest familiarity with and access to the types of data needed for evaluation. In fact, crime analysis represents a form of on-going evaluation, as it involves the constant monitoring of crime trends and patterns and makes a continuous attempt to determine the impact of specialized operations on these trends. Specialized operations which are supported by careful crime analysis may find that to a large degree evaluation is simply a matter of reanalyzing information initially collected in order to conduct crime analysis.

In assessing the results of specialized patrol operations, departments should have realistic expectations. Dramatic reductions in the overall level of crime in a jurisdiction are not likely to be found, especially in the short term. The level of crime in a jurisdiction is a function of many factors of which police operations are only one. In the past a number of departments have initially had unrealistic expectations concerning the impact of their specialized patrol operations. The result was inevitable disappointment and undeserved criticism of the operations. As stated in Chapter 3, specialized patrol should be focused upon and used to disrupt crime patterns identified by crime analysis. These patterns might consist of a rash of residential burglaries in a particular neighborhood, a series of commercial robberies of convenience stores, or a number of street robberies and purse snatches in an evening entertainment area. Evaluation should concentrate on the success of particular tactics in disrupting crime patterns such as these to the point where the particular, identified problems no longer warrant specialized patrol attention. Specialized patrol may contribute to an overall reduction of suppressible crime in a jurisdiction, but its success should not be gauged by this criterion alone.

There are two basic types of measures which are commonly used in program evaluations: outcome measures and process measures.

Outcome measures are used to assess the success of a specialized operation in combatting crime. Process measures are used to examine the way in which the results of specialized operations were achieved. They help to assess how a program worked, but they are not indicators of overall effectiveness.

Presented below are: (1) some simple outcome measures for evaluating an operation's success in achieving the two fundamental goals of specialized patrol - deterrence and apprehension; and (2) examples of some basic process measures which can be used to examine a specialized unit's internal operations. It should be emphasized that in conducting an evaluation, different tactical approaches to coping with particular crime problems should be analyzed separately. Only in this way can patrol administrators gain information which will help them to improve the productivity of specialized operations.

A. Outcome Measures

1. Deterrence

Deterrence is extremely difficult to measure exactly, since there is no way of counting the number of crimes which did not occur due to police operations. Crimes that did not happen are not tangible events which can be directly measured. Consequently, examination of deterrence effects focuses on the number of crime which *have not* been deterred. Deterrence can be measured by comparing the incidence of target crimes in a particular area for a particular period of time with the number of crimes in the area during previous time periods. Use of the time period immediately prior to the deployment of a specialized unit in a given area as a comparison point can provide an indication of the extent to which a particular crime pattern was disrupted. Use of crime trend data covering longer periods of time for comparison can indicate whether specialized operations have reduced the incidence of target crimes below their "normal" level and disrupted a growing crime trend. Ideally, both types of comparisons should be used in evaluation. Comparisons can also be made between crime rates in a target geographical area and those in other similar areas in a jurisdiction or with crime rates in the jurisdiction as a whole minus those in the target area.

In addition to examining a specialized patrol operation's impact on crime while it is working on a particular problem, evaluation should also continue to monitor the problem after the specialized unit has been redeployed. This will help to determine whether specialized operations have a "halo" effect, i.e., whether they have a lingering effect on a particular crime problem after the unit has turned to other tasks.

It is often argued that deterrence-oriented tactics such as uniformed tactical patrol do not really reduce crime but merely result in crime displacement. Displacement can take any of three forms: crime can move from one geographical area to another; from one time of day to another; or the perpetrators can turn from the crime targeted by a unit to another type of criminal activity. To examine crime displacement, evaluators should monitor crime rates in areas adjacent to the areas in which a specialized patrol unit is working and in other areas which seem to be likely locations for target crimes. Crime rates should also be monitored for the hours during which the specialized unit is not working and changes in the incidence of non-target crimes should be noted.

Specific measures which can be used to evaluate the deterrence effects of specialized patrol operations include the following:

- Comparison of the incidence of reported target crimes immediately before, during, and after deployment in a particular area.
- Comparison of reported crime rates during and after deployment in a particular area with the target crime rate in that area for the same dates during the previous year. This comparison helps to adjust for seasonal variations in crime occurrences.
- Comparison of reported crime rates with the long term (two or three years) crime trends in a target area.
- Comparison of reported crime rates in a target area with those in similar areas in which a specialized unit is not working.
- Comparison of reported crime rates in a particular area with those in the rest of a jurisdiction minus that area.
- Examination of crime rates in areas adjacent to a target area and in other likely crime locations to check for geographical crime displacement.
- Examination of the times of crime occurrences to check for temporal displacement of crime to times when a specialized unit is not working in a particular area.
- Examination of changes in the incidence of non-target crimes to check for displacement from one type of crime to another.

- Comparison of officer-hours devoted to deterrence activities with changes in reported crime rates to estimate the number of officer hours per potentially deterred crime.

2. Apprehension

Apprehensions are real, tangible events which can be measured directly. The evaluation of apprehension-oriented tactics simply involves examining the number and quality of arrests for target crimes and the impact which the arrests appear to have had on the level of reported target crimes. The overall effect of apprehension-oriented tactics on the incidence of target crimes can be assessed by using the measures discussed in the previous section. The effectiveness of these tactics in making worthwhile arrests can be evaluated by using the following measures:

- The number of arrests for target crimes.
- The quality of arrests for target crimes. The most widely accepted measure of arrest quality is the percentage of arrests which pass first screening by the prosecutor. Arrest quality can be assessed by looking at the percentage of arrests which lead to convictions; however, there are a great many factors over which the police have no control which can intervene between an arrest and its final disposition by the courts. In examining arrest quality, records should be kept on the proportion of cases in which the offender(s) were released without charge, the proportion in which the charge was reduced, and the proportion in which the initial police charge was accepted. The reasons for the prosecutor's decision should also be noted, since this can be of considerable help in improving future operations. Many departments do not have an established system for routinely receiving case disposition data from the prosecutor's office. Where this is the case, supervisory evaluations of arrest quality can be substituted for those of the prosecutor. However, consideration should be given to establishing a feedback system from the prosecutor's office. The information is generally well worth the effort required to obtain it.
- The importance of particular arrests. Arrests for serious crimes and of multiple offenders are generally more significant than arrests for relatively minor crimes and of first-time offenders. This should be reflected in the measures used in an evaluation.

- The number of officer hours, days or months expended per arrest for target crimes. For example, if six officers assigned to decoy duty for two months made 23 arrests, their arrest productivity would be $(23)(2 \times 6) = 1.92$ arrests per officer month. These figures can be used to evaluate the comparative productivity of different tactical approaches to making apprehensions for particular types of crime problems.
- The number of officer hours per arrest for target crimes which pass first screening by the prosecutor.
- The number of arrests made for target crimes compared to the total number of target crimes reported in a particular area.
- The number of crimes cleared. Clearance rates are the percentage of crimes reported to the police which they claim to have solved. Crimes can be cleared by arrest, by suspect confessions, or by M.O. comparisons and witness identifications. One arrest may clear a number of crimes. Use of clearance rates as a measure of effectiveness has justly been criticized because of the somewhat lax and occasionally inconsistent standards which are applied in making clearances. However, the number of crimes cleared by an arrest does provide an indicator of the value of that arrest, since the apprehension of multiple offenders is generally felt to be of more importance than the apprehension of novice criminals.
- Finally, the assistance provided by specialized patrol officers to other officers in making arrests should be considered in an evaluation. For example, it is not uncommon for specialized patrol officers to develop information which leads to arrests by investigators or general patrol officers. While it is difficult to measure precisely, this type of cooperation should be included in an evaluation.

B. Process Measures

The number of specific measures which can be used to evaluate the internal operation of a specialized unit is almost endless. Process measures can be used to evaluate all facets of a specialized patrol operation, including: training, safety, equipment, officer morale, crime analysis, etc. The measures presented below are intended as examples of the types of measures which can be used in process evaluation.

1. Equipment:

- percentage of false alarms;
- number of cameras that functioned properly when triggered;
- maintenance costs per flight hour of aircraft.

2. Safety:

- days lost due to injury for officers using different tactics;
- injuries to citizens by type of tactic;
- suspect resistance to arrest by type of tactic.

3. Morale:

- results of anonymous officer questionnaire;
- level of absenteeism;
- number of minor rule infractions.

4. Crime Analysis:

- accuracy of crime predictions;
- timeliness of reports;
- ability to handle specific requests;
- number of arrests resulting from information supplied by crime analysis.

Again, these categories and measures are only intended to be indicative of the types of issues which should be addressed in a process evaluation. Specialized operations which do not have the resources or the desire to conduct complete process evaluations on a periodic basis should consider doing evaluations of specific aspects of their operations when particular problems emerge or when significant operational changes are made.

CHAPTER 9

SPECIAL CONCERNS IN THE CONDUCT OF SPECIALIZED PATROL

It is appropriate to conclude this volume by highlighting some issues which warrant particular attention in the conduct of specialized patrol. These are issues which should be of special concern to departments which are contemplating undertaking specialized patrol for the first time and to departments which are reassessing their current specialized operations. Most of these issues have been touched on in previous chapters; however, it is most important to give them special emphasis since they represent some of the most common and telling arguments against using specialized patrol. They are considered here not to dismiss their validity and importance, but rather to stress that they represent legitimate concerns which should be carefully considered in the conduct of specialized patrol. The issues are:

- cooperation and coordination between specialized patrol operations and the general patrol force;
- the impact of specialized patrol on police/community relations;
- the practicality of specialized patrol for small and medium-sized departments;
- the relative merits of specialized vs. general patrol.

A. Cooperation and Coordination

It is commonly said that one of the major drawbacks of specialized patrol is that it leads to divisiveness within the patrol force. There is often intense competition for positions on specialized patrol units, and officers selected for specialized duty frequently consider themselves to be the "elite" of the patrol force who concentrate on "real police work," leaving the more mundane, unexciting service calls to beat officers. These feelings are often reciprocated by beat officers, who feel jealous toward their colleagues in specialized units and are frequently reluctant to cooperate with them.

The extent to which cooperation and coordination between these two facets of patrol poses a problem varies from department to department. However, most of the officers and patrol administrators interviewed in the preparation of this manual felt that elitism, jealousy, and non-cooperation were significant problems.

A number of them expressed the belief that these difficulties were inherent in the process of specialization and could be tempered but not completely avoided by administrative policies.

Their experiences and perceptions suggest that any department which is considering establishing a specialized patrol unit should be prepared to accept certain personnel problems. These problems appear to be one of the unavoidable costs of conducting specialized patrol. There are, however, several steps which can be taken to help minimize their impact.

- Officers in specialized units should not receive special perquisites such as extra pay. Special inducements are not generally needed to attract qualified applicants to specialized duty, and they can contribute greatly to general patrol officers' feelings of jealousy toward their specialized colleagues.
- Officers in specialized units should not be allowed to shift onerous tasks to general patrol officers. In particular, they should be required to do all their own paperwork.
- An attempt should be made to integrate specialized and general patrol operations as closely as possible. When feasible, specialized officers should attend roll-calls with beat officers from the areas in which they are working. They should also seek to involve beat officers in their activities, giving them a full share of the credit for successful operations.
- A policy of systematically rotating officers between general and specialized patrol is worthy of consideration as a means of keeping tensions to a minimum. Such a policy should be very carefully considered as it could have a negative impact on the quality and performance of officers assigned to specialized duty: it would reduce a unit's ability to be selective in choosing officers; it could interfere with the development of officer expertise through specialized training and constant practice; and it could detract from the development of cohesive teams composed of individuals experienced in working with one another. It is noted, however, that the Wilmington, Delaware, Bureau of Police has adopted this policy in the context of its split

patrol project and does not believe that it has seriously hampered specialized patrol operations. Wilmington's experience suggests that departments might consider establishing this policy to a limited degree by rotating selected groups of officers between general and specialized patrol assignments. This could help to strike a balance between the need for quality and expertise on the one hand and cooperation and coordination on the other. It might be an appropriate policy for departments in which the relationship between specialized and general patrol is especially strained and tense.

- All specialized patrol responsibilities do not need to be concentrated in a single unit. For example, S.W.A.T. squads, which are often considered to be the elite of the elite, can be staffed by general patrol officers rather than members of a specialized unit.
- Finally, supervisors of specialized units should insist that officers under their command do not act like an elite force. Pride and *esprit de corps* are to be encouraged, but arrogance should not be tolerated.

B. The Impact of Specialized Patrol on Police/Community Relations

Specialized patrol operations can have and have had serious negative consequences for police/community relations. In several instances, otherwise successful specialized operations have been discontinued because of severe negative reactions from certain segments of the community. Most of the criticism has centered on what was felt to be the unnecessary use of physical force. While the use of force, and sometimes deadly force, is a necessary part of police work, it should be tempered by consideration of how it might affect a specialized unit's long-term future. In some cases, it may be the better part of wisdom to forgo the use of force, even when it is legally justified, if the result might reflect negatively on the public perceptions of a specialized unit. The benefits from the arrest may be outweighed by negative public reactions. Departments should develop detailed, rigidly enforced guidelines governing the use of force in different types of specialized operations.

C. Specialized Patrol in Small and Medium-Sized Departments

It is frequently argued that while specialized patrol units

may be appropriate for large departments, they are an impossible luxury for small and medium-sized police agencies. It is, of course, much easier to divert patrol personnel to specialized duty in a large department with ample manpower. However, several small and medium-sized departments have found that by conducting a careful analysis of patrol allocation, similar to that described in Volume I of this publication, personnel availability was less of a problem than initially anticipated. Small departments might also consider forming small *ad hoc* units when problems emerge which appear to require concentrated specialized attention. Or, several small departments could join together to form a consolidated specialized patrol unit which works on an interjurisdictional basis. While it has seldom been tried, this would seem to be a potentially promising approach for small departments which have a frequent need for specialized operations but lack the resources to create individual units. It should be remembered that it is not the size of a jurisdiction which determines the need for specialized patrol, but rather the nature of its crime problems and the necessity of matching the most appropriate tactics to the defined problems.

D. The Relative Merits of Specialized vs. General Patrol

Specialized and general patrol are often cast as alternative means of handling similar types of problems with arguments ensuing over the merits of each approach. In fact, debates over the general benefits of specialized vs. general patrol are usually rather fruitless. From a functional point of view, specialized patrol consists of a set of crime control tactics the effectiveness of which requires that officers using them be relieved of the responsibility for handling routine calls for service. These tactics can be used by general patrol officers on a temporary basis, by investigators, or by members of a specialized unit. Regardless of the official status of the officers, when they are using these tactics, they are engaged in specialized patrol.

In considering the merits of specialized patrol, attention should be focused on the effectiveness of different, specific tactical alternatives to handling particular types of crimes. The decision to undertake specialized operations should be based on an analysis of the nature of the crime problems facing a department and on an assessment of the most promising approaches to dealing with them. General opinions concerning the benefits and drawbacks of specialization *per se* should be of secondary importance.

Certain tactics simply require the uninterrupted attention of officers for extended periods of time. If a department faces a frequent need for such tactics and if *ad hoc* tactical assignments are being made on a frequent basis, then serious consideration should be given to establishing a specialized patrol unit. In some instances, specialized units may actually increase a department's flexibility for they are able to engage in not only long-term tactical operations, but also in short-term crime prevention and deterrent activities which can backstop the general patrol force. These activities are described in detail in Volume I of this report. The overall effectiveness and efficiency of patrol operations depends critically upon the close coordination and integration of specialized and general patrol activities.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SELECTED SPECIALIZED PATROL OPERATIONS

I-V
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Department	Unit	Principal Target Crimes	Principal Tactics
Atlanta, Georgia, Bureau of Police Services	Anti-Robbery Unit	Pedestrian Robbery Commercial Robbery	Stake-Outs Decoys
	Anti-Burglary Unit	Residential Burglary Commercial Burglary	Area Surveillance Electronic Stake-Outs Uniformed Tactical Patrol
	High Crime Foot Patrol Project	Street Crimes	Uniformed Tactical Patrol
Denver, Colorado, Police Department	Special Crime Attack Team	Burglary Robbery	Uniformed Tactical Patrol Covert Area Surveil- lance Stake-Outs Suspect Surveillance
	Escort (Eliminate Street Crime on Residential Thoroughfares)	Street Crimes	Uniformed Tactical Patrol on Motor Bikes
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Depart- ment	Special Enforcement Bureau	Target Crimes Vary, Selected by Sub- Station Commanders	Uniformed Tactical Patrol

Department	Unit	Principal Target Crimes	Principal Tactics
Los Angeles Police Department	Metropolitan Division	Robbery Burglary Auto Theft Auto Larceny	Uniformed Tactical Patrol Area Surveillance Stake-Outs Decoys Suspect Surveillance
Miami, Florida, Police Department	STOP Robbery/Burglary Unit	Robbery Burglary	Decoys Suspect Surveillance Area Surveillance Stake-Outs
New York City Police Department	Street Crime Unit	Robbery Grand Larceny From Person	Decoys Area Surveillance
	Precinct Anti-Crime Units	Varies with Precinct	Varies with Precinct
	Tactical Patrol Unit	Street Crimes	Uniformed Tactical Patrol
Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department	Selective Enforcement Unit	Any Serious Supres- sible Crime Problem	Suspect Surveillance
	District Crime Prevention Units	Varies with District	Varies With District
Pueblo, Colorado, Police Department	Special Operations Section	Burglary Robbery	Area Surveillance Mobile Alarm Stake-Outs Uniformed Tactical Patrol Suspect Surveillance

A-2

Department	Unit	Principal Target Crimes	Principal Tactics
Tucson, Arizona, Police Department	Tactical Operations	All Suppressible Felonies	Stake-Outs Area Surveillance Suspect Surveillance Uniformed Tactical Patrol
	Special Problems Detail	Multiple Offenders For Any Serious Crime	Suspect Surveillance
	Crime Prevention Unit	Commercial Robbery	Use of Covert Cameras
Wilmington, Delaware, Bureau of Police	Structured Patrol Force	Robbery Burglary	Area Surveillance Stake-Outs Suspect Surveillance Decoys Mobile Alarms and Cameras

A-3

APPENDIX B

MODEL GUIDELINES
FOR CONTROL OF EXPENDITURES
FROM AN INFORMANTS' FUND

Miami Police Department
Strategic Target Oriented Project
S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary
Standard Operating Procedures

SUBJECT: Confidential Expenditures

SCOPE: This SOP covers the use of federal funds for investigative expenses and information; the method for drawing funds; the method for accounting for funds expended in accordance with federal guidelines, M7100, 1A-Appendix 10.

I. Federal Guidelines for Confidential Expenditures

Confidential expenditures have been approved for the S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary grant by L.E.A.A. Confidential expenditures would be payments to informants, purchase of materials as evidence (stolen property), or other uses as may be required by S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary personnel. This approval was based on a finding that they are necessary and reasonable for proper and efficient administration of the program under which they are to be used. L.E.A.A. also requires that the controls over the disbursement are adequate to safeguard against misuse of such funds. The following guidelines are outlined in L.E.A.A. Guideline Manual M7100. 1A-Appendix 10.

A. The commanding officer in charge of the unit must authorize all advances of funds up to \$500 to investigators for the purchase of information.

1. Authorization must specify the information to be received, the amount of the expenditures, and the assumed name of the informer.

B. The Chief of Police must approve advance of funds in excess of \$500.

1. The same guidelines apply as in A (1).

C. The unit must maintain confidential files of the true names, assumed names, and signatures of all informers to whom payment of confidential expenditures have been made.

1. Where practicable, picture and/or fingerprints should be maintained.

D. The finance department shall receive from the officer a receipt for the cash advanced to him.

E. The investigator shall receive a receipt from the informer for all monies that he receives (Form R.F. #135).

F. A signed receipt from the informer, along with a memo from the investigator will be forwarded to the commanding officer of the unit.

1. The commanding officer will compare the informant's signature with the confidential informant's file of assumed name signatures.

2. The commanding officer will evaluate the information received in relation to the monies spent, and add his evaluation remarks to the memo or report.

3. A certification of payment will be made to the Finance Department as support of expenditures made.

G. The commanding officer of the unit shall prepare a quarterly report showing status and reconciliation of the informant fund and itemizing each payment, name used by informer payee, information received and use to which the information was put. This report is to be directed to the Chief of Police.

II. Payment of Informants

A. All payment of informants must be recommended by a supervisor and approved by the S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary commander.

B. The unit commander may authorize the payment of monies to persons classified as informants under the following circumstances:

1. The information, service or document is not available through normal investigative procedures and the investigator is unable to induce the informant to cooperate with the authorities by other means.
2. The securement of the information, service, or document is necessary to bring the investigation under consideration to a successful conclusion.
3. Other investigative procedures would be too lengthy or costly in relation to the objective of the matter under consideration.
4. Requests for payment will be accompanied by a receipt and a file on the informant will be submitted by the investigator.
5. Continued payment of an informant must have the approval of the unit commander and will depend on the value of information that has been supplied in the past.

C. L.E.A.A. funds will be used only for information secured to accomplish S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary grant objectives, i.e., to combat the specific crimes of robbery and burglary and related offenses.

1. Special Investigation Section funds will be sought for vice information (narcotics-gambling).
2. Criminal Investigation Section funds will be sought for information relating to other investigations (homicide-kidnapping-auto theft).

III. Selection of Informants

A. If a potential informant is encountered or developed, an investigation will be made of the informant's past. Pertinent information such as photograph, fingerprint card (if available), rap sheet and copies of all reports concerning the informant will be secured.

B. The investigator will submit this information with his request to utilize the informant through his supervisor to the unit commander.

C. When approval is granted for use of an informant, all information on the informant will be placed in the informant file.

VI. Informant File

A. An informant file has been set up for the following purposes:

1. To enable unit supervisors and commanders to review and evaluate the expenditures made for use of informants.
2. To minimize incidents which could be used to question integrity of investigators.
3. As an accounting and justification for use of L.E.A.A. funds for informants in accordance with grant objectives.

B. The following procedures will be followed whenever informants have been paid any monies from S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary funds.

1. All information previously secured on the informant will be placed in an informant file jacket along with an information sheet on the informant.
2. All information obtained on the informant after the file is initiated will be included in the file jacket including but not limited to the following:
 - a. Copies of forms #101, #85, #135 whenever payments are made.
 - b. Arrest, cases and supplementary reports arising out of information obtained from informant.
 - c. Utilization of informant that was unproductive or did not result in payment of funds.
 - d. Arrests of informant after he becomes an informant.
 - e. Changes of address of informant if he continues to be used.

f. New photograph (dated) if informant's appearance changes.

g. A note will be placed in the file when informant becomes inactive with date and circumstances or length of time since last utilization.

3. A code name will be assigned to the informant.

4. An informant code number will be assigned to the informant from the list of numbers in the front of the informant card index file. The next number in sequence will be used and crossed off the list. This number will be placed on the informant file jacket and his index card for cross reference.

5. An index card will be made on the informant with the following information:

a. Real name.

b. Code name.

c. Sample of informant's handwriting in the form of signature of his code name. This signature will be used on receipts for funds given to the informants and compared with the sample by the unit commander.

d. Address.

e. Phone number.

f. Height and weight.

g. Color of hair and eyes.

h. Date of birth.

i. Date of card and investigator's name.

j. Informant's code number.

6. Index card will be filed in the informant card index file in alphabetical order under the informant's real name.

7. File jacket will be filed in informant file by informant code number and forms R.F. #112-125.

8. The informant file jackets and the informant card index file will be kept under maximum security. The true identify of the informant will be known only to S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary commander, supervisors, and investigators.

V. Procedures for Requesting L.E.A.A. Funds

A. During regular office hours:

1. A request for funds form (R.F. #98) will be prepared addressed to the Property Unit by a supervisor and approved by the S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary unit commander or in his absence the section commander.

Note: "S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary #5-139.98, 4235" will be placed on the bottom of form R.F. #98.

Note: One copy of R.F. #98 will be placed in the informant file jacket.

B. Other than regular office hours:

1. A request for funds form (R.F. #98) will be prepared addressed to the Property Unit by a supervisor and he will contact the unit commander for approval.

Note: "S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary #5-129.98.4235" will be placed on the bottom of form R.F. #98.

Note: One copy of R.F. #98 will be placed in informant file jacket.

C. Return of funds

1. Monies that have been withdrawn from Property Unit will be returned by the same person who withdrew them.

VI. Accounting for L.E.A.A. Funds

A. As soon as possible but in no case later than the next day after expenditure of L.E.A.A. funds, investigator will complete a handwritten form R.F. #101, Memo, random, Accounting for Investigation Funds.

Note: "S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary #5-139.98.4235" will be placed on the bottom of form R.F. #101.

B. Investigator will complete and attach to R.F. #101 a handwritten form R.F. #85, Assignment and Investigation Report, giving details of investigation and expenditures and attach receipts.

C. These forms will be reviewed by unit supervisor and given to S.T.O.P. Robbery/Burglary secretary along with R.F. #135, Fund Receipt, for duplication (typing) and distribution as follows:

1. Form R.F. #101:
 - a. One copy to informant jacket.
 - b. One copy to unit file.
 - c. One copy to section file.
 - d. Original typed and one copy to Chief's Office through channels.
 - e. Handwritten copy to investigator.
2. Form R.F. #85:
 - a. One copy to informant file (Xerox)
 - b. Original handwritten to unit file.
3. Form R.F. #135:
 - a. One copy to informant file (Xerox).
 - b. Original to unit file.
4. Unit file copies of all three forms will be presented to unit commander for review and signature comparison before being placed in unit file.

Attached are forms #98, #112, #125, #101, #135, #85, ICL.

Department of Police
City of Miami, Florida

Criminal Investigation Section
Special Investigation Section

REQUEST FOR FUNDS

TO: _____ DATE: _____

FROM: _____

Please allocate to _____

(Title, Name, IBM # of person to receive
the sum of \$ _____ from the Special
funds)

Investigation Fund. This amount is to used by him/her to cover
expenses incurred during an official Miami Police Department Investi-
gation.

APPROVED

APPROVED

APPROVED

R.F. No. 98

Department of Police
City of Miami, Florida

Criminal Investigation Section
Special Investigation Section

FUND RECEIPT

Received from Police Investigator _____

The sum of \$ _____ for _____

Police Investigator Recipient

Witness Date and Time

R.F. No. 135

Department of Police
City of Miami, Florida

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: City Manager
(Through Channels)

Date:

File:

From:

Subject: Accounting for Investigation
Funds

References:

Enclosures:

I certify that the following monies were expended by me in connection with the performance of official duties, as shown:

<u>Date</u>	<u>File Number</u>	<u>Type of Investigation</u>	<u>Items Purchased</u>	<u>Cost</u>
-------------	------------------------	----------------------------------	----------------------------	-------------

Receipt #:

Approved:

Total: _____

Supervisor

Commanding Officer

Section Commander

Chief of Police

R.F. No. 101 (Rev. 8/73)

ASSIGNMENT AND INVESTIGATION REPORT

159

INFORMANT
EXPENDITURE CONTROL

[illegible][illegible]

R.F. No. 112

160

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C.I. # _____

INFORMANT FILE CHECK LIST (ICL)

Confidential Informant File Card

- ☐ Card #2 (Filed Alphabetically)
 - ☐ C.I. Name (Real)
 - ☐ Assumed Name
 - ☐ Aliases
 - ☐ D.O.B.
 - ☐ Address (Home/Business)
 - ☐ Phone Number (Home/Business)
 - ☐ C.I. Signature (Real/Assumed)
 - ☐ Investigator Making File

Confidential Informant File

- ☐ Information Sheet
 - ☐ Signature (Real/Assumed)
 - ☐ Fingerprints
 - ☐ Verification of Information on Sheet
 - ☐ Other Agencies Worked With
- ☐ Photograph (Current)
- ☐ C.I. Debriefing Sheet
- ☐ Unit Case Reports (When Applicable)
- ☐ F.B.I. Rap Sheet
- ☐ M.P.D. Case Report
- ☐ Other Agencies Case Reports
- ☐ Information Reports (Information the C.I. Tells You)
- ☐ Control Expenditure Report
- ☐ Fund Receipts (When Applicable)
- ☐ A&I Reports (When Applicable)
- ☐ Records Check
 - ☐ M.P.D.
 - ☐ D.P.S.
 - ☐ N.C.I.C.
 - ☐ F.C.I.C.
 - ☐ U.S. Government

INTERROGATION INFORMATION AND INFORMANT DEBRIEFING FACT SHEET

NARCOTICS:

Who Does The Subject Know?

	NAME	ALIAS	ADDRESS	TYPE OF NARCOTIC
1.	_____	_____	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____	_____	_____

Who Can Subject Make Purchases From?

	NAME	ALIAS	TYPE OF DRUG	AMOUNT	PRICE
1.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

GAMBLING:

What Bookmakers Does Subject Know?

	NAME	ADDRESS	TYPE OF BOOK
1.	_____	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____	_____

What Lottery/Bolita Operations is the Subject Aware Of?

1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____

Who can the Subject Make Gambling Bets With? Can Subject Introduce Undercover Police Officer?

BURGLARY:

What "Fences" Does the Subject Know? What Type Merchandise do These Fences Handle?

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____

What Does Subject Know About Stolen Checks and/or Credit Cards?

What People Does Subject Know That Have Been Doing Daytime B & E's?

Nighttime B & E's:

House B & E's:

Commercial B & E's:

AUTO THEFTS:

What Does Subject Know About Where Stolen Vehicles are "Dropped Off" At?

What People are Involved with Stealing Cars? Campers? Trucks? Boats?

Where are the Stolen Cars Being "Garaged" At?

Painted? Body Parts? Car Parts?

What Does Subject Know About Truck Hijackings?

ROBBERY:

What Does Subject Know About Current Robberies in the City/County?

Where do Robbery Suspects Get Their Guns to Pull Robberies With?

APPENDIX C

SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following are some recent publications which should be helpful to patrol administrators who are interested in implementing specialized patrol operations, improving existing operations, or simply exploring various facets of specialized patrol in greater depth.

Albright, Ellen, et al. Evaluation in Criminal Justice Programs: Guidelines and Examples.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1973. (Available from GPO - 2700-00-210)

Initially intended as a manual for local evaluations of projects funded under L.E.A.A.'s High Impact Program, this volume provides an excellent introduction to the evaluation of crime control programs. It focuses on the measurement of program effectiveness and the organization of evaluation activities. Pages 1 to 65 present material which is particularly relevant to the evaluation of patrol operations.

Boydston, John E. San Diego Field Interrogation Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1975.

This volume reports the results of a year-long experiment on effects of field interrogations. The experiment examined their impact on arrest rates, levels of suppressible crime, and police-community relations. It found that use of field interrogations contributed to the deterrence of suppressible crimes, provided some assistance in making arrests, and did not have a negative impact on police-community relations. While the authors properly stress that generalizations from their findings should be made with extreme care, this is, nevertheless, the best available study of field interrogations and it should be of interest to departments throughout the country.

Buck, George, et al. Police Crime Analysis Unit Handbook. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1973. (Available from GPO - 2700-00-232)

The operation of most specialized patrol units is guided by crime analysis. This "Prescriptive Package" provides an excellent introduction to the practice of crime analysis and the organization of crime analysis units.

Dahmann, Judith S. A Review of Six Research Studies on the Relationship Between Police Patrol Activity and Crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1974.

The author presents a critical review of six selected empirical studies of the relationship between police patrol activities and crime. The reviews cover some of the most recent and sophisticated research in the field. Of particular relevance to specialized patrol are the sections on the Rand Institute's study of the impact of increased police manpower in one New York City precinct (pp. 6-12), and an examination of intensive patrol in Washington, D.C. (pp. 13-17).

Dahmann, J. S. High Impact Anti-Crime Program: Examination of Police Patrol Effectiveness. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1975.

This report contains an analysis of the impact of three police patrol projects on the level of reported crime. The projects, which were part of LEAA's High Impact Anti-Crime Program, are: the Special Crime Attack Team in Denver; Concentrated Crime Patrol in Cleveland; and Pilot Foot Patrol in St. Louis. Each project used overt (e.g., visible) patrol in an effort to combat street crime and burglary. The Denver project is a clear-cut case of specialized patrol, while the other two occupy a borderline between specialized and routine patrol. The analysis concludes that although there may not be a consistent relationship between overt patrol activities and levels of reported crime, the evidence does indicate that these projects have contributed to levels of crime which are lower than might have been expected on the basis of pre-

vious crime rates in the impacted areas. They thus represent potentially useful crime control strategies.

This report is a very useful contribution to current knowledge about the effectiveness of various patrol strategies. It should be helpful to patrol administrators in selecting appropriate strategies and tactics and its methodology constitutes an easily transferable technique for gauging patrol effectiveness.

Eliot, Warner A., et al. National Evaluation Program Phase I Report, Early-warning Robbery Reduction Projects: An Assessment of Performance. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1976. (Available from GPO)

This N.E.P. report presents an excellent summary of current knowledge about the operation and effectiveness of EWRR (Early-warning Robbery Reduction) projects. It provides some practical advice regarding the use of E.W.R.R. devices and reports that in most communities surveyed in the study the use of E.W.R.R. equipment was associated with robbery reductions in the stores in which they were installed.

Gourley, G. Douglas. Effective Police Organization and Management, Volume 4: Patrol Specialization vs. Generalization. Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service, 1966.

This volume contains an excellent discussion of the general advantages and disadvantages of specialization in police work and emphasizes the importance of flexibility in conducting specialized operations. It also presents some dated, but nevertheless interesting, descriptions of specialized patrol projects. The material on pages 330-337 and 405-427 is particularly relevant to specialized patrol.

Gourley, G. Douglas. Patrol Administration (2nd ed.). Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1974.

This recent textbook on police patrol is one of the few in the field that includes a fairly lengthy treatment of specialized patrol (Chapter III, "Special Systems of Patrol," pp. 57-80). It presents an examination of specialized units in several large departments and de-

scribes a cooperative arrangement through which small departments can join together to establish a specialized unit. It also contains a useful discussion of plain clothes patrol.

Greenwood, Peter W. An Analysis of the Apprehension Activities of the New York City Police Department, New York: The New York City Rand Institute, 1970.

This study develops criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of police activities aimed at criminal apprehension and applies the criteria to programs in New York City. It presents a comparison of the apprehension output of different types of units, including specialized patrol.

Halper, Andrew and Richard Ku. New York City Police Department Street Crime Unit: An Exemplary Project. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1975. (Available from GPO - 027-000-00338-9)

New York's Street Crime Unit has been highly successful in using stake-outs, "old clothes" patrol, and decoys to combat street crime in high crime areas of the city. This volume presents a detailed description and careful assessment of the unit's operation. It covers organization, management, personnel, deployment, equipment and facilities, cost, tactics, and performance evaluation. Despite the fact that the size and complexity of both New York's police operations and the crime problems facing the department may be justly considered somewhat unique, this report should be immensely helpful to all departments interested in specialized patrol. It is one of the most practical and thorough reports of specialized patrol presently available.

Hirsch, Gary B. and Lucius J. Riccio. "Measuring and Improving the Productivity of Police Patrol," Journal of Police Science and Administration, Volume 2, Number 2, pp. 169-184.

This article stresses the importance of using multiple measures to tap the complexities of police productivity. The recommendations for measuring apprehension productivity are particularly relevant to specialized patrol.

Maltz, Michael D. Evaluation of Crime Control Programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1973. (Available from GPO - 2700-00163)

This publication represents an excellent starting point for law enforcement personnel interested in exploring the process of program evaluation. It recommends procedures for planning programs, selecting areas for program implementation, choosing measures of effectiveness, and conducting an evaluation. The material is presented in a straightforward, readable fashion and the report includes a useful set of references for those interested in pursuing the subject at greater length.

Reiner, G. Hobart, *et al.* National Evaluation Program Phase I Summary Report: Crime Analysis in Support of Patrol. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, forthcoming.

This N.E.P. report presents the findings of a national evaluation of current knowledge about crime analysis. It contains a useful review and assessment of the "state-of-the-art" in crime analysis and some observations which should assist specialized units in using crime analysis to greater advantage.

Smock, John S. Virginia Division of Justice and Crime Prevention, HIT Program Evaluation Handbook: Volume I, Executive Summary, and Volume II, Evaluative Findings. Washington, D.C.: Arthur Young and Company, 1975.

These two volumes present a useful evaluation of the High Incident Target (HIT) program which operated in eleven jurisdictions in the State of Virginia. Each local program concentrated on the reduction of robbery and/or burglary. Various strategies and tactics were used including: increased crime-specific overt patrol in selected areas; surveillance, both directly by officers and with equipment such as cameras, night vision scopes and video tape; aggressive patrol; stake-outs; civilian dress patrol; and portable alarm systems. Each program is described and evaluated in terms of the degree to which it achieved its stated goals. Most of the programs were rated as qualified successes, i.e., some improvement was made, but predetermined goals were not met.

This evaluation report is one of the few which focuses on specialized patrol in small and medium-sized departments, and it should be particularly useful to administrators in departments of similar size.

The National Commission on Productivity.
Opportunities for Improving Productivity in
Police Services. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1973.

This publication presents an excellent introductory discussion of the measurement of police patrol performance. It includes a consideration of the use of specialized patrol units as a means of maximizing the impact of patrol (p. 35). They are reported to be particularly useful ways of maximizing the marginal value of any additional patrol officers, especially in making felony arrests.

Ward, Richard H., Thomas J. Ward, and Jayne Feeley. Police Robbery Control Manual. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1975. (Available from GPO - 027-000-00316-8)

This volume is an informative addition to NILECJ's "Prescriptive Package" series. It presents detailed, practical descriptions of robbery control projects in five departments and summarizes similar projects in another 30 jurisdictions. Most of these projects involved the use of specialized patrol. The manual also includes a discussion of the types and patterns of robbery, and guidelines for developing and operating robbery control projects.

Webb, Kenneth W., *et al.* National Evaluation Program, Phase I Summary Report: Specialized Patrol Projects. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1975.

This report summarizes the findings of an evaluation of current knowledge about the conduct of specialized patrol. The authors conclude that existing information on specialized patrol is incomplete and of doubtful accuracy; however, in their judgement,

the combined use of civilian dress and uniformed tactical officers appears to be the most promising approach. The summary contains a synopsis of material drawn from a number of other volumes which were produced as part of this evaluation. Probably the most useful of these is Phase I National Evaluation of Selected Patrol Strategies, Specialized Patrol Operations Under the National Evaluation Program, Product 2, The Universe and Selected Project Descriptions, which contains detailed descriptions and assessments of 21 specialized patrol projects in departments throughout the country.

White, Thomas W., *et al.* Police Burglary Prevention Programs. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, 1975. (Available from National Criminal Justice Reference Service)

This Prescriptive Package presents detailed, practical guidelines on the operation of burglary prevention programs which are based on the experiences of numerous departments. It includes helpful discussions of: the analysis of burglary problems; the evaluation of burglary reduction efforts; and patrol activities which can be used to combat burglaries.

Wilson, James Q. Thinking About Crime. New York: Basic Books, 1975.

This recent and influential collection of essays includes a chapter entitled, "The Police and Crime" (pp. 81-97), which presents an insightful review and evaluation of recent research on the impact of various types of police patrol on the level of suppressible crime. The chapter examines saturation patrol and crime-attack techniques such as stake-outs, decoys and "old clothes" patrol. It concludes that specialized patrol operations aimed at specific offenses may hold a great deal of promise, but are in need of much more careful evaluation before they can be unconditionally recommended. This chapter provides an excellent introduction to current research on innovative crime control strategies and tactics.

Wolfe, Joan L. and John F. Heaphy (eds.).
Readings on Productivity in Policing.
Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1975.

This collection of articles provides a general introduction to the process and problems of measuring and improving police productivity. Of particular relevance to specialized patrol are: John A. Grimes, "The Police, The Union, and the Productivity Imperative," (pp. 47-85) which contains some useful comments on and examples of the use of task forces in developing strategies and tactics for general and specialized patrol; Harry D. Hatry, "Wrestling with Police Crime Control Productivity Measurement" (pp. 86-128), which presents an excellent overview of productivity measurement; and James P. Morgan, "Planning and Implementing A Productivity Program" (pp. 129-149), which offers some very practical advice for improving patrol productivity.

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